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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation investigates negative or-positive patterns and the behavioral stability of 
cross-strait relations with a time-series analysis. It aims to clarify the impacts of these four 
factors in cross-strait relations: the Cold War legacy, the Chinese Civil War legacy, economic 
interdependence, and Taiwanese domestic politics. The key findings are as follows. 
First, most factors suggested by the existing literature only influence the stability, rather 
than negative-or-positive patterns, of cross-strait relation. For the Cold War legacy, although the 
United States played an important role in the formation of the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle, the 
U.S. influence mainly works on the stability of cross-strait relations in an indirect way. 
Regarding the Chinese Civil War legacy, the legacy is the only factor that can influence both 
negative-or-positive patterns and the stability of cross-strait relations. China’s tit-for-tat response 
to Taiwan is the only significant pattern related to the negative-or-positive change of cross-strait 
relations, which suggests Taiwan’s special status in China’ policy-making process since 1949. 
For economic interdependence and Taiwan’s domestic politics, the decline of economic 
interdependence and the approach of Taiwan’ presidential election both create instability rather 
than conflict for cross-strait relations. In short, the validity of existing international relations 
theories, like the commercial peace theory and “election to fight” mechanisms, is not supported 
by the statistical analysis in this dissertation. 
Second, the importance of Taiwan is evident, and the conventional wisdom about the 
conflictive and instable effects of the pro-independence leadership in Taiwan may be more like a 
myth in cross-strait relations. The results in this dissertation show no evidence to support the 
presence of a conflictive tendency when Taiwan’s pro-independence leaders are in power. More 
importantly, with the evidence of China’s tit-fir-tat response to Taiwan since 1979, building an 
environment to induce Taiwan’s persistent cooperation to China is the key to reduce the future 
tension in the Taiwan Strait.  
Finally, although the impact of leadership change in Taiwan is limited, it still works as a 
good proxy to identify the priorities of Taiwan and China’s behaviors in different periods and 
synthesize the factors coming from both international and domestic levels. 
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION  
The goal of this dissertation is to clarify what influences cross-strait relations. Based on 
the existing literature in international relations (IR) and the history after World War Two, there 
are four factors that can influence cross-strait relations, which are the Cold War legacy, the 
Chinese Civil War legacy, economic interdependence, and Taiwan’s domestic politics. The two 
main interests of this dissertation are: First, what is the relationship between cross-strait relations 
and the triangular relations among the United States (U.S.), China, and Taiwan? Second, how do 
the four factors influence cross-strait relations? To answer the questions, I mainly apply the time 
series analysis to identify the causal mechanisms in a context of time. 
Regarding the first research interest, the goal is to ensure the necessity to include the U.S. 
influence when analyzing cross-strait relations. From a perspective of history, the formation of 
the current cross-strait relations are a jointly product of the Chinese Civil War and the Cold War 
and the Taiwan issue is entangled with the “one Chine” sovereign dispute and the U.S.-Taiwan 
security cooperation. The U.S. influence is obvious but how great it is in the real world is seldom 
tested empirically and usually taken for granted with no clear clue about its influential patterns. 
This dissertation conducts a series of statistical analysis to test the presence of the U.S. influence 
in cross-strait relations, and aims to figure out: Is it necessary to consider the U.S. related 
behaviors in cross-strait relations? If the answer is yes, the results may help us to specify the U.S. 
influential patterns in cross-strait relations. If the answer is no, the result then becomes the 
evidence to support the claim that cross-strait relations are pure bilateral affairs between Taiwan 
and China, and more importantly, it also means that taking a two-player approach between 
Taiwan and China is sufficient to explain cross-strait relations.  
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As to the second research interest, the war-and-peace aspect is not the only dimension in 
cross-strait relations, and behavioral stability is a new dimension that this dissertation attempts to 
model. The interest to model instability is to reflect the reality that states’ behavioral patterns are 
not always constant. More importantly, the existing literature may provide theories and 
hypotheses to explain what leads to conflict and what triggers cooperation, for example the 
liberal peace theory and the connection between electoral cycle and war (Doyle 1983; Gaubatz 
1991). However, the existing literature does not provide sufficient theories about what leads to 
instability. This dissertation hypothesizes that uncertainty leads to instability, and any behavior 
disrupting the status quo creates uncertainty for decision-makers and then leads to behavioral 
instability for a state. In other words, this dissertation may not only contribute to how the Cold 
War legacy, the Chinese Civil War legacy, economic interdependence, and Taiwan’s domestic 
politics influences the level of cooperation and conflict of cross-strait relations, but also how and 
in what way these factors create uncertainty for decision-makers in Taiwan and China, and then 
leads to instability for Taiwan and China’s behaviors toward each other.  
1.1 What Influences Cross-Strait Relations? 
Cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan have been the topic of a wide and 
extensive literature that has focused on several recurring factors. In this dissertation, I investigate 
the influence of the Cold War legacy, the Chinese Civil War legacy, economic interdependence, 
and Taiwan’s domestic politics on cross-strait relations.  
At the international level, the power politics among the United States, China, and Taiwan 
and the economic interdependence between Taiwan and China are the most salient international 
factors in many works about cross-strait relations. First, the formation of the U.S.-China-Taiwan 
triangle is based on two historical legacies, which are the Cold War legacy, the Chinese Civil 
3 
War legacy. The most important legacy of the Chinese Civil War is the “one China” principle in 
the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle. Although Taiwan (the Republic of China, ROC) and China (the 
People Republic of China, PRC) have been a pair of political rival for decades, their preferences 
to hold the “one China” position were identical for a long time.1 In other words, although the 
civil war stopped in 1949, the legacy of one China principle remains and enables both Taiwan 
and China to directly or indirectly influence each other’s behavior. In the beginning of the 1980s, 
the hostility and rivalry started to ease with China’s proposal of peaceful unification and “One 
Country, Two Systems.” Taiwan responded in the late 1980s with the liberalization of citizens’ 
visits to China and more importantly, the official end of the mobilization for suppressing the 
communist rebellion in 1991, which had lasted for 44 years. However, the “one China” legacy 
continues to this day and shows no signs of vanishing although the political rivalry and hostility 
have been mitigated in the 1980s. Thus, in this dissertation, the Chinese Civil War legacy is 
operationalized by China’s influence on Taiwan’s behavior toward China and Taiwan’s 
influence on China’s behavior to Taiwan. If the Chinese Civil War legacy works, we may expect 
to see Taiwan’s behavior toward China is function of China’s behavior to Taiwan, and China’s 
behavior to Taiwan is a function of Taiwan’s behavior toward China. 
The legacy of the Cold War is, in essence, the import role of the United States in setting 
the status quo of the Taiwan Strait. From China’s perspective, the Chinese Civil War stopped 
because of U.S. efforts to neutralize the Taiwan Strait with the 7th Fleet after the outbreak of the 
Korean War. On the other hand, for U.S. foreign policy and strategy in the first half of the Cold 
                                                 
1 Although Taiwan stopped to emphasize the rigid “one China” principle in the 1990s, the framework of “one China” 
still constrains the behavior of Taiwan domestically and internationally. At the international level, “one China” 
policy has been an important part in both the U.S. and China’s foreign policies. At the domestic level, the political 
cleavage in Taiwan is based on the unification-or-independence line, which makes to stay on the “one China” 
position or not become a sensitive issue in Taiwan’s domestic politics.  
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War, having different regimes on the two sides of the Strait was helpful for building an anti-
communist security system in East Asia. In fact, due to different strategic considerations in 
Europe and East Asia, the U.S. strategy to ally in East Asia was to build a set of bilateral security 
pacts with several Asian countries, resulting in the so-called “hub and spoke” system in East 
Asia.2 In other words, the U.S. strategy in East Asia created a set of triangular relations instead 
of the multilateral pattern found in Europe. As a result, Taiwan, China, and the United States 
became one of the triangular behavioral networks and Taiwan Strait became a key hot spot in 
East Asia. Thus, in this dissertation, the Cold War legacy is operationalized by the U.S. influence 
on cross-strait relations. If the Cold War legacy works, we may expect to see that cross-strait 
relations are a function of the U.S. related behaviors. 
Second, the rapid growth of cross-strait economic independence has become the most 
noticeable phenomenon since the late 1980s. Taiwan’s liberalization of investment and trade 
toward China started to be legal in the early 1990s. In fact, the liberalization was only to 
recognize an already existing situation in which the Kuomintan (KMT) regime in Taiwan had 
already lost its capability to totally control and censor all out-going trade flow and investment to 
China. At that time, the trade flow and investment to China was like a public secret in Taiwan. 
With such a strong level of economic interaction, liberal international relations theory scholars 
began suggesting that the economic interdependence between two countries increases the 
possibility of cooperation. However, some empirical studies about cross-strait relations also 
found that the causal relationship between economic interdependence and political cooperation is 
unclear and sometimes spurious.3 In short, the relationship between economic interdependence 
                                                 
2 The strategy to ally in West Europe was multilateralism and the result was the establishment of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO). For a detailed discussion about the different strategies in these two areas, see Cha 
(2010). 
3 For example, Chu (1997) explains that the trade-promote-peace hypothesis does not consider Taiwan’s domestic 
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and cooperation in cross-strait relation still needs a further investigation. In this dissertation, the 
economic interdependence is operationalized by trade interdependence. If economic 
interdependence plays a role in cross-strait relations, we may expect to see the more 
interdependent, the less likely to have conflict between Taiwan and China. 
With regard to Taiwan’s domestic politics, the democratization of Taiwan provides an 
opportunity for Taiwan’s domestic politics to influence cross-strait relations because the “one 
China” position is on longer the only preference that Taiwan may hold. Taiwan’s 
democratization is unique because democracy is not the only issue between the ruling and 
opposition camps. Since the foundation of KMT’s authoritarian rule in Taiwan is based on the 
need to prepare for striking back to mainland China for unification, to democratize equals to 
challenge the latent assumption of national unification under the KMT regime. As a result, the 
debate about independence and unification becomes the central issue for Taiwan’s domestic 
politics. However, Taiwan’s deviation from the “one China” position can impact cross-strait 
relations and the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle profoundly because it challenges the consensus 
between the United States and China since 1979 and may lead to military conflict. In short, after 
democratization, Taiwan’s domestic politics becomes a crucial factor because Taiwan’s 
willingness to stay on the “one China” position is no longer a constant. Thus, due to the 
unification-or-independence nature of Taiwanese politics, it is reasonable to take Taiwan’s 
electoral cycle and leadership change as indicators to reveal Taiwan’s willingness to stay on the 
“one China” position. In general, this dissertation hypothesizes the approach of Taiwanese 
elections and Taiwan’s pro-independence leadership leads to a conflictive tendency in cross-
strait relations. 
                                                 
politics, and Tung (2003) emphasizes that economic interdependence only promotes China’s leverage on Taiwan. 
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In sum, this dissertation wants to explore how the Cold War legacy, the Chinese Civil 
War legacy, economic interdependence, and Taiwan’s domestic politics influence cross-strait 
relations. The research framework of this dissertation is presented as Figure 1.1. 
 
Figure 1.1 Research Framework 
1.2 Theoretical Debates and Questions  
The approach of this dissertation is a liberal approach in general because the factors from 
the domestic level are included and assumed to influence the decision-making of foreign policy. 
More importantly, the liberal approach also helps assess the relative importance of the factors 
from both international and domestic levels in cross-strait relations. Therefore, although I take a 
liberal approach, the international factors are not excluded and will be treated equally as the 
domestic factors in the analysis. 
For a long time, what the relative importance of international versus domestic factors is in 
determining the external behavior of states has been an important debate in IR. From the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
neorealist perspective, for pursuing parsimony, assuming states as unitary and rational actors is a 
rational choice to see the variance within the international system (Waltz 1979: Ch 6). In this 
light, only the power structure at the international level illustrates the basic framework of world 
politics. Although factors from the domestic and individual levels may provide some 
understanding about the formation of preference in foreign policies, when facing the anarchy 
nature at the international level, only security and survival are the first priority to concern for a 
state. In other words, the neo-realists assume that states are all alike with a similar preference for 
survival, and the position in the international structure is the only factor influencing varying 
strategies to survive. Following this logic, polarity and alliances become the most significant 
factors to explain foreign behaviors like conflict or trade in many IR studies (Levy 1984; 
Mansfield 1994; Siverson & Sullivan 1983; Waltz 1979). If this is correct, cross-strait relations 
should be a function of the international power structure, more specifically, the balance of power 
among the U.S., China, and Taiwan. 
On the other hand, in Moravcsik’s (1997) concept, state behavior is a function of state-
society relations, not a function of the international structure, so state preference may vary with 
social ideas, interests and institutions. In other words, all global politics is local, and this liberal 
concept challenges the neo-realist assumption that states are unitary actors with similar 
preferences. The salience of domestic explanations comes from two interactive parts. First, 
domestic politics helps explain the origins of national preference. Thus, factors like the balance 
of power among domestic groups, politicians' preferences, and historical memories are 
determinants of state preferences that lead to different foreign policies (Fearon 1994; Katzenstein 
1996; Rogowski 1987). Second, the political institutions at the domestic level helps explain how 
preferences are aggregated in certain ways. In this light, factors, like regime type, the executive-
8 
legislative relations, and electoral system, are also important determinants of foreign policy 
(Christensen & Snyder 1990; Doyle 1997; Gaubatz 1991). In sum, by relaxing the assumption of 
unitary actor, domestic factors help explain the variation of foreign behavior and reveal different 
preferences and capacities among states. If this liberal concept is correct, cross-strait relations 
should be a function of the domestic politics on each side, and factors like election cycle, 
partisanship, and leadership may have a direct impact on cross-strait relations. 
However, although domestic politics is important when analyzing foreign policy, the 
traditional problem of social science remains, i.e., the problem of “too many variables” (Lijphart 
1971). To simply include all factors from the two levels only produces a list of variable without 
priority, and may not help with identifying the significant factors. Synthesizing factors and 
setting priority are necessary for both decision-makers and IR researchers. In the relevant 
literature, there are two ways to synthesize factors from the two levels. The first is the rational 
model, which is the two-level-game approach that takes the strategic interactions between the 
two levels into account as found in Milner (1997) and Putnam’s (1988) works. The second is the 
normative model, which takes values and beliefs at the individual or collective levels as policy 
guidelines. At the individual level, leaders’ ideas can work as a road map to determine 
preferences or understand the causal relationships in policymaking (J. Goldstein & Keohane 
1993), and at the collective level, the consolidation or collapse of a belief system is the key to 
predict when a state changes its behavioral patterns (Legro 2005). In sum, both rational and 
normative models help clarify the scope of impact for a certain factor and under what condition 
this factor works. 
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In the case of cross-strait relations, it is very likely that both international and domestic 
factors contribute to the fluctuation of cross-strait relations. In this case, I will investigate these 
topics in the following chapters to clarify how a certain factor influences cross-strait relations. 
The first part of this dissertation is to test the significance of the U.S. influence from 1979 
to 2012. The question in this part is whether cross-strait relations are a function of the U.S.-
China-Taiwan triangular relations or only a function of the bilateral interactions between Taiwan 
and China. In fact, many studies taking the dyadic conflict approach, the bargain game approach, 
and the “divided nation” approach all tend to treat cross-strait relations as a pure two-player 
interaction (Henderson, Lebow, & Stoessinger 1974; Lo & Lin 1995; Wu 1995). On the other 
hand, the strategic triangle approach emphasizes the special role of the United States in the 
Taiwan Strait (Dittmer 2011; Wu 2005a). I plan to use statistical analysis to test the necessity to 
include the U.S. behaviors when analyzing cross-strait relations.  
The second part is to assess the influence of cross-strait economic interdependence from 
1990 to 2012. Based on the results of many empirical studies, liberal theories suggest the trade-
promote-peace hypothesis to build a causal relationship between economic interdependence and 
the potential for conflict (Keohane & Nye 1977; Oneal & Russett 1999). However, the realist 
critiques are also crucial because the trade-promote-peace hypothesis fails to consider the 
relative gains problem, the security externality problem, hegemonic stability and alliance 
relationships (Gilpin 1981; Gowa 1995; Grieco 1988). In this case, it is necessary to control for 
the effect from the real politics before making the causal inference about the economic 
interdependence between Taiwan and China. I plan to use the strategic interactions among the 
United States, China, and Taiwan to control for the political effects from the international level 
and then assess the influence of economic interdependence crossing Taiwan Strait. More 
10 
importantly, asymmetric dependence can also be a leverage to induce cooperation, as found in 
Keohane and Nye’s (1977) concept of vulnerability, so the effect of dependence should also be 
considered. In this case, I plan to run another model in the same chapter to compare the different 
effects between interdependence and asymmetric dependence.  
The third part is to investigate the influence of Taiwan’s elections on cross-strait relations 
from 1990 to 2012. Since Taiwan did not have direct and meaningful elections at the central 
government level before 1992 and the first direct presidential election was held in 1996, to assess 
the effect of direct election starting from 1990 should be appropriate. The main question of this 
part is: Whether cross-strait relations are influenced by the timing of election or not. Empirical 
studies suggest that the war-prone tendency of democratizing states comes first from the 
institutional incapacity to deal with the uprising civil demand and then second from the 
candidates’ utilization of nationalist emotion and prestige strategy in elections (Mansfield & 
Snyder 1995; 2002; 2005). More specifically, the sequence between Taiwan’s election cycle and 
the aggressive policies is a common hypothesis in many Taiwanese scholars’ studies. For 
example, Wu (2011) claims that the aggressiveness, mainly on the topic of Taiwan’s sovereignty, 
is more likely to take place at the end of election cycle. In other words, it tends to occur with the 
approach of the next election. On the other hand, when analyzing military conflicts, Gaubatz’s 
(1991) study shows that the aggressiveness tends to occur in the early stage of election cycle, 
which means the more distant to the next election, the more likely to have a conflict. Both 
empirical works show that election cycles are an important factor when deciding when to initiate 
a conflictive behavior. I plan to assess the effect of Taiwanese election cycle and control for the 
effect of international factors, like cross-strait economic interdependence and the strategic 
11 
interactions among the United States, China, and Taiwan at the same time to compare the effect 
of domestic politics with the international influence in cross-strait relations. 
The fourth part is to investigate the influence of some important events in the U.S.-China-
Taiwan triangle and cross-strait relations. These events are the end of Cold War at the 
international level and the changes of Taiwan’s leadership at the domestic level. The main 
research question is: How the change of power structure and leadership change in Taiwan 
influence state behaviors in the triad. As to power structure, realists have a long tradition in 
making inference based on the change of polarity and power disparity (Mearsheimer 1990; 
Organski & Kugler 1980; Waltz 1979). As to the alternation of leadership, on the other hand, 
some liberal theorists tend to take leaders’ ideas as a proxy to assess the priorities in 
policymaking or the guidelines of foreign behavior (J. Goldstein & Keohane 1993). Both realist 
and liberal predictions are worth being tested in the case of cross-strait relations. In this 
dissertation, I only take the change of Taiwan’s leadership into analysis because only the change 
of Taiwan’s leadership leads to the possibility for Taiwan to deviate from the “one China” 
position and the positions of China and the United States on the “one China” policy is consistent 
so far. Therefore, I plan to create a set of dummy variables based on the date that the change 
occurred to assess the impact of these political events on the dynamics in the U.S.-China-Taiwan 
triad and cross-strait relations. 
1.3 Organization of This Dissertation 
Having laid out the research questions and context of the dissertation in this chapter, the 
rest chapters are as follows. Chapter 2 presents research method and a summary of main 
variables. Chapter 3 examines the presence of the U.S. triangular effects on cross-strait relations 
and explains the significant role of the United States from 1979 to 2012. Chapter 4 explores the 
12 
effect of the end of the Cold War and the impact of Taiwan’s democratization on the U.S.-China-
Taiwan triangle. The impact of Taiwan’s democratization is operationalized by the change of 
leadership in Taiwan. Chapter 5 accesses the average effects of the U.S.-China-Taiwan strategic 
interactions, economic interdependence across the Taiwan Strait, and the impact of Taiwanese 
elections on cross-strait relations from 1990 to 2012. The two concepts of interdependence, 
sensitivity and vulnerability, are both tested in this chapter. Chapter 6 investigates the impact of 
leadership change in Taiwan on cross-strait relations from 1990 to 2012 and the variance of 
policy priorities when different Taiwanese leaders are in power. Chapter 7 is a summary of 
findings and conclusion. 
CHAPTER 2. DATA AND METHOD 
In this dissertation, statistical analysis is the main research method to find out the effects 
of the strategic interactions in the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle, economic interdependence, and 
Taiwanese domestic on cross-strait relations. I mainly apply the time series analysis to identify 
the causal mechanisms in the context of time. Based on the availability of data, the scope of time 
for most variables in this dissertation is from 1990 to 2012, but the state behavior variables have 
a greater scope of time starting from 1979 to 2012.  
This chapter has two sections. In the first section, I will introduce the measurements of all 
variables, the source of data, and a summary of all variables. In the second section, I will explain 
my choice to apply the generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) 
model in the following chapters. 
2.1 Data and Measurement 
The dataset of this dissertation includes: (1) international variables including state 
behaviors in the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle and trade interdependence between China and 
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Taiwan; (2) domestic variables likes election cycles in Taiwan. Beside the two groups of 
variable, a series of dummy variables are also created to test for the effect of some important 
political events like the end of the Cold War and the leadership change in Taiwan. 
2.1.1 State Behavior 
The interactions among the United States, China, and Taiwan are crucial independent 
variables for this dissertation, because this dissertation uses the U.S. related behaviors to denote 
the Cold War legacy and Taiwan and China’s behaviors toward each other to denote the Chinese 
Civil War legacy. In general, states make cost-benefit analysis based on the memory of its own 
and other states’ behavioral patterns, and the same holds true for the three actors in the U.S.-
China-Taiwan triangle. The interactions in the triad are defined as dyadic actions in a source-
target form, so there are six dyadic behaviors in the source-target form in the U.S.-China-Taiwan 
triad. This dyadic form for recording events has been widely applied to capture the dynamics in 
crises or conflicts, and many event databases in this form have been created and have worked 
well in the field of foreign policy.4 The basic assumption to apply event data in foreign policy 
studies is that an event is not only a result of actions; it is also an international signal with 
conflictive or cooperative connotations. Following this assumption, it is reasonable to treat the 
current cross-strait relations as a function of the previous interactions among the United States, 
China, and Taiwan because all states in the triad make decisions in the environment formed by 
the signals with conflictive or cooperative connotations in the earlier time. 
The state behavior variables used in this dissertation come from the Global Database of 
Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT), which codes state behaviors in a global scale in a 
                                                 
4 By definition, a recorded event has following components: (1) an actor, (2) a target, (3) a time period, (4) an 
activity and (5) an issue about which the activity resolves (Azar 1975: 1). 
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“source-target” from 1979 to 2012 (Leetaru & Schrodt 2013). The GDELT event database is 
built by an automatic coding software recording events in global news media reporting.5 There 
are two important elements in the work of coding state behaviors. The first is about how to 
categorize state behaviors. All state behaviors in the GDELT event database are coded by the 
Conflict and Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO) framework, which codes all aspects of 
foreign behavior into twenty main categories with subcategories for distinguishing the subtle 
difference within a main category (Gerner, Abu-Jabr, Schrodt, & Yilmaz 2002).6 All event codes 
of CAMEO are listed in Appendix A. The second is about how to evaluate a certain foreign 
behavior. State behaviors have conflictive or cooperative connotations, so Goldstein (1992: 376-
77) weights each event code in the WEIS scheme and transformed them into cooperative (above 
zero) or conflictive (below zero) scores, which is the Goldstein net-cooperation scale. Therefore, 
each behavior has a positive score of cooperation or a negative score of conflict, and Goldstein 
further calculated a state’s “net cooperation” score by summing up the total score of cooperative 
actions (positive) and the total score of hostile actions (negative) in a certain time period to 
capture the intention of a state at a certain time. In this dissertation, I also use the Goldstein scale 
to evaluate the level of cooperation for a state toward another state. The relationship between the 
Goldstein scale and the CAMEO event scheme is also listed in Appendix A. 
The unit of analysis is source-target/month in this dissertation. The unit of time is month, 
so the net cooperation score is calculated on a monthly basis. All state behaviors involve two 
                                                 
5 The validity and performance of computer-coding systems have been well examined and confirmed by King and 
Lowe (2003). The coverage of news source for the GDELT database includes AfricaNews, Agence France Presse, 
Associated Press Online, Associated Press Worldstream, BBC Monitoring, Christian Science Monitor, Facts on File, 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, United Press International, the Washington Post, the New York Times, the 
Associated Press, Google News, and local domestic sources in English in almost every country. The distribution of 
news and events from various sources can be found in Leetaru & Schrodt’s (2013: 2-15) paper. 
6 There are other categorized frameworks to code state behaviors like World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) 
(McClelland 1999)、Conflict and Peace Database (COPDAB) (Azar 2009)、Integrated Data for Events Analysis 
(IDEA) (Bond, Bond, Oh, Jenkins, & Taylor 2003). 
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actors, the initiator (source) and the recipient (target), so there are six state behavior variables in 
the context of the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle, Taiwan’s “net cooperation” toward China (TC), 
China’s “net cooperation” toward Taiwan (CT), the U.S. “net cooperation” toward China (UC), 
China’s “net cooperation” toward the United States (CU), the U.S. “net cooperation” toward 
Taiwan (UT), and Taiwan’s “net cooperation” toward the United States (TU). The descriptive 
statistics of all state behavior variables is shown as Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics of State Behavior Variables 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N 
TC 200.585 266.571 -285.6 (Mar. 2005) 1380.1 (May, 2008) 402 
CT 163.209 250.193 -787.6 (Mar. 1996) 1293.6 (Apr. 2009) 402 
CU 435.391 534.390 -281.2 (May, 1999) 2900. (Jan. 2011) 402 
TU 98.661 128.376 -127.3 (Jan. 1985) 960.5 (Jan. 2010) 402 
UC 443.953 544.513 -437.7 (May, 1999) 3378.6 (Jan. 2011) 402 
UT 109.067 140.232 -135.4 (Feb. 1985)  899.7 (Jan. 2010) 402 
Source: Leetaru and Schrodt (2013). 
For Taiwan’s behavior toward China (TC), the most hostile time is March 2005 when the 
Anti-Secession Law was passed by the National People's Congress of the P.R.C., and the 
friendliest time is May 2008 when Ma Ying-jeuo was inaugurated as the President of Taiwan. 
For China’s behavior toward Taiwan (CT), the most conflictive time is March 1996, the time of 
the third Taiwan Strait Crisis, and the most cooperative time is April 2009 when the World 
Health Organization (WHO) invited Taiwan to participate in the World Health Assembly as an 
observer with the name of "Chinese Taipei." In fact, this invitation was under the consent of 
China. In Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2, an uprising trend of cooperation is obvious for both sides of 
the Taiwan Strait during the Ma period, starting from May 2008. 
As to China’s behavior toward the United States (CU) and the U.S. behavior toward 
China (UC), the time points of the maximum and minimum are identical. The most hostile time 
is May 1999 when the United States accidentally bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and 
the friendliest time was January 2011 when Hu Jintao visited the United States. Regarding 
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Taiwan’s behavior toward the United States (TU) and the U.S. behavior toward Taiwan (UT), 
the time points of the maximum and minimum are almost identical. The most hostile time is 
January and February 1985 when Taiwan admitted to get involved in assassinating Henry Liu, 
who was the author of the biography of Chiang Ching-kuo and also a US citizen. The friendliest 
time is January 2010 when the Obama administration approved an arms sale package worth more 
than 6 billion dollars to Taiwan.  
In the following pages, I will present the visualization of all six state behavior variables 
(TC, CT, CU, UC, TU, UT) and the monthly growth of the net cooperation score of the six state 
behaviors (DTC, DCT, DCU, DUC, DTU, and DUT) over time.7 
                                                 
7 The reason to include the monthly growth of the net cooperation score of state behaviors into analysis is not to 
violate the assumption of stationarity in the time series analysis. A detailed explanation will be presented in the next 
section. 
17 
 
Figure 2.1 Taiwan's Behavior toward China (1979-2012) 
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Figure 2.2 China's Behavior toward Taiwan (1979-2012) 
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Figure 2.3 China's Behavior toward the United States (1979-2012) 
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Figure 2.4 The U.S. Behavior toward China (1979-2012) 
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Figure 2.5 Taiwan's Behavior toward the United States (1979-2012) 
  
-200
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
TU
-800
-400
0
400
800
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
DTU
22 
 
Figure 2.6 The U.S. Behavior toward Taiwan (1979-2012) 
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of Taiwan (Ttrade). In other words, the two variables measures Taiwan and China’s dependence 
on cross-strait trade flow respectively. However, this measurement only captures the concept of 
sensitivity, which is the mutual effect coming from the interdependent relationship but not the 
concept of vulnerability, the ability to endure the disruption of the relationship (Keohane & Nye 
1977). Therefore, I also construct an indicator of asymmetric dependence as a proxy to capture 
the concept of vulnerability to test the logic of “the more dependent, the more vulnerable.” The 
asymmetric dependence variable (Dependency) is calculated by subtracting the share of cross-
strait trade flow in China’s foreign trade (Ctrade) from the share of cross-strait trade flow in 
Taiwan’s foreign trade (Ttrade), so the positive vale of the dependence variable means that 
Taiwan is more dependent on China. In other words, this variable measures the level of Taiwan’s 
dependence on China. The sources related to the cross-strait trade are from the monthly trade 
statistics of Taiwan and China, and the earliest records start from 1989 and 1990.8 The 
descriptive statistics of trade interdependence variables are listed as Table 2.2. The trends of 
trade interdependence variables (Ttrade, Ctrade, and Dependency) are shown as Figure 2.7, and 
the monthly growth of trade interdependence (DTtrade, DCtrade, and DDependency) is shown as 
Figure 2.8. 
Table 2.2 Descriptive Statistics of Trade Interdependence Variables 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N 
Ttrade 0.0868 0.0842 0.000528 0.227 282 
Ctrade 0.0247 0.0149 0.00192 0.0548 270 
Dependency 0.0662 0.0710 -0.00533 0.193 270 
Source: Directorate General of Customs Administration (1989-2013) and China Statistical Information and Consultancy 
Service Centre (1992). 
                                                 
8 See Directorate General of Customs Administration (1989-2013) and China Statistical Information and 
Consultancy Service Centre (1992). 
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Figure 2.7 The Trade Interdependence between Taiwan and China (1989-2012) 
As shown in Figure 2.7, the level of economic interdependence crossing the Strait grows 
asymmetrically and Taiwan is in fact more dependent on the cross-strait trade flow. The cross-
strait trade flow keeps lower than 4% in China’s foreign trade amount. More importantly, 
Taiwan’s dependence on the cross-strait trade flow grows rapidly, from 4% to 20%, when the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was in power, from 2000 to 2008. 
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Figure 2.8 Monthly Growth of Trade Interdependence (1989-2012) 
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2.1.3 Election Cycle 
In this dissertation, I take two Taiwanese election cycles to represent the effect of 
Taiwan’s direct election, presidential elections and parliamentary elections (both the Legislative 
Yuan elections and the National Assembly elections) after 1990. Thus, there are two election 
variables (Election (Pres.) and Election (Parl.)), and each is measured by how close a certain 
time point is to the next election. For example, about the presidential election variable, since the 
first direct presidential election was held in March 1996, the observation of March 1996 will be 
coded as 0. For the same reason, February 1996 will be coded as 1 because after one month, the 
election will be held. April 1996 will be coded as 47 because the next presidential election will 
come after 4 years. In general, the value of these variables decreases with the approach of the 
next election. After 1990, there are five presidential elections in Taiwan, in 1996, 2000, 2004, 
2008, 2012.9 Regarding parliamentary elections, this dissertation includes the 1991 and 1996 
National Assembly elections and the Legislative Yuan elections in 1992, 1995, 1998, 2001, 
2004, 2008, and 2012.10 
2.1.4 Dummy Variables for Important Political Events 
There are two types of dummy variable in this dissertation. The first is to distinguish the 
time before or after the Cold War, and the second is to distinguish the periods of Taiwan’s 
presidents. For the first one, the selection about the date to distinguish the Cold War period and 
the post-Cold War era needs a further consideration. The idea to treat the end of the Cold War as 
a breakpoint is to see whether the loss of common enemy for the United States and China 
                                                 
9 Taiwan’s presidential elections are usually held in March, but, in 2012, the presidential election was held in 
January in order to combine with the 2012 Legislative Yuan election. 
10 The 1991 National Assembly election was held in December and the 1996 National Assembly election was in 
March. On the other hand, the Legislative Yuan elections were usually held in December, but the 2008 and 2012 
election were in January. 
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changes their bilateral relationship and then furthers to impact cross-strait relations or not. Since 
the end of the Cold War is a process rather than a sudden change, several potential dates can be 
considered and I take June 1989 as the date to distinguish the Cold War era and the post-Cold 
War era. A further discussion goes as follows. 
The first date to be considered is the official end of the Soviet Union, December 1991. 
However, many important events that also need to be considered had occurred before December 
1991. In 1989, some member states of the Warsaw Pact had started to negotiate with the 
opposition and then held general elections, like Poland and Hungary, because the military 
support from the Soviet Union had been withdrawn. The Berlin Wall fell in November 1989, and 
the unification of Germany occurred in October 1990. In short, starting from 1989, the strategic 
role of the Soviet Union in the Cold War was declining. Thus, it is obvious that the date in 1989 
or 1990 are more appropriate to capture the end of the Soviet polarity, and the date of the Soviet 
dissolution in 1991 is too late.  
The second is the date of the Malta Summit, December 1989, because after the summit 
the United States and the Soviet Union jointly declared the end of the Cold War. This date was a 
symbol for the end of the enduring rivalry between the two countries, but the real test of the 
U.S.-China relationship and the improvement of the Soviet-China relationship had occurred 
earlier. Therefore, it is necessary to review the time points of earlier symbolic events to capture 
the changing point of the U.S.-Chinas strategic nature. In May 1989, Gorbachev visited Beijing 
and declared the normalization of the Soviet-China relations with Deng Xiaoping. This event 
represents that the constant hostility between China and the Soviet Union is no longer a reality. 
On the other hand, the Tiananmen Square protest started in April 1989 and was suppressed by 
the Chinese government in June 1989. Since then, a series of sanction from the Western 
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countries including the United States caused a significant loss for the Chinese economy. This is 
the first time that the United States had to face the contradictory interests from both the moral 
and realistic aspects in the U.S.-China relations after the anti-Soviet cooperation between the 
United States and China was established (Clark 2011: 2-3). More importantly, the changing role 
of the Soviet Union from a source of threat to a normal country also led both China and the 
United States to reflect the potential contradiction in their bilateral relationship. Since my interest 
is to test the effect of the end of the Cold War on the U.S.-China relationship and cross-strait 
relations, it is reasonable to select a time which indicates both the change of the U.S-Soviet 
relationship and the challenge to the U.S.-China relationship. In this case, June 1989 is a 
reasonable choice because it is the beginning of the normalization of the Soviet-China relations 
and a tough test for the existing cooperation between the United States and China. More 
importantly, at the same time point, the Soviet Union also started to step on its process toward 
the dissolution in 1991. In short, June 1989 is the date to distinguish the Cold War era and the 
post-Cold War era in this dissertation. 
The second part of dummy variable is about Taiwan’s leadership change. There are four 
presidents before 2012, Chiang Ching-kuo (from January 1991 to December 1987), Lee Teng-
hui (from January 1988 to May 2000), Chen Shui-bian (from June 2000 to May 2008), Ma Ying-
jeou (from June 2008 till now). Thus, four dummy variable (Chiang, Lee, Chen, Ma) are created 
to represent their presidencies. 
2.2 Methodology 
In this dissertation, the main variables are time series variables, state behavior variables 
and economic interdependence variables. All state behavior variables are from the GDELT event 
database and represent the monthly net cooperation score of the six state behaviors in the U.S.-
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China-Taiwan triangle from 1979 to 2012 (the sum of the score of cooperation and the score of 
conflict in a month). The six time series state behavior variables are: Taiwan's behavior toward 
China (TC), China's behavior toward Taiwan (CT), China's behavior toward the United States 
(CU), The U.S. behavior toward China (UC), Taiwan's behavior toward the United States (TU), 
and the U.S. behavior toward Taiwan (UT). On the other hand, economic interdependence 
variables include the share of the cross-strait trade flow in Taiwan’s total trade amount (Ttrade) 
and in China’s total trade amount (Ctrade) on a monthly basis, and the Taiwan’s dependence on 
China (Dependency) on a monthly basis. Since the main variables in this dissertation are time 
series variables, several methodological issues have to be discussed before making a decision 
about which model to be applied. 
In general, time series variables usually have these following characteristics that violate 
the basic assumptions of ordinary least squares (OLS) method, which are nonstationarity, serial 
correlation, and autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH). In the following pages, I 
will examine the three characteristics for all state behavior variables from 1979 to 2012, and then 
explain the reason to apply an ARIMA(1,1,1)-GARCH(1,1) model in Chapter 3. In the following 
chapters, whenever the time period is changed, like the situation in Chapter 5, all tests in this 
chapter has to be redone to ensure that the model is not biased by the three problems.11  
The first is about whether a variable, or a series, is stationary or not. Stationarity is the 
fundamental characteristics in the time series analysis because it implies that a finite variance can 
be expected in a series when responding to a shock. If a random shock to a variable only has an 
impact for a short time and the impact reverses to the mean level eventually, we can define that 
this variable is stationary. In this light, a nonstationary variable implies that the memory of a 
                                                 
11 The time period in Chapter 5 is from 1990 to 2012, because Chapter 5 includes trade interdependence into 
analysis and the availability of the trade data starts from 1990. 
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shock never dies out, and this characteristic can lead to biased inference easily. Since Nelson and 
Plosser’s (1982) study indicates that most economic time series variables are nonstationary, it is 
necessary to check the stationarity of all state behavior variables in this dissertation. 
To ensure the stationarity for further causal inference, I perform the augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) unit root test for all state behavior variables. The presence of a unit root implies 
that the variable is not stationary. When a variable is not stationary, the common strategy is to 
transform the variable into a differenced variable. In most situations, time series variables are 
difference-stationary. In this dissertation, I take a first-difference strategy, which is to transform 
a nonstationary series into a series describing the changes from the last month to this month.12  
The results of the ADF test for all state behavior variables and all variables after first 
differencing from 1979 to 2012 are shown as Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3 Results of the ADF Test for State Behavior Variables (1979-2012) 
Variable ADF ADF with trend ADF 
(first difference) 
ADF with trend 
(first difference) 
TC -1.715924 (5) -2.813270 (5) -15.58117 (4)** -15.56226 (4)** 
CT -2.107773 (5) -3.126734 (5) -13.83423 (4)** -13.81887 (4)** 
CU 0.942375 (16) -0.943515 (16) -8.399412 (15)** -8.650045 (15)** 
UC 0.520570 (15) -1.200265 (15) -8.433531 (14)** -8.607260 (14)** 
TU -0.862674 (14) -4.195875 (4)** -7.513963 (13)** -7.541378 (13)** 
UT -1.132347 (10) -2.841503 (10) -10.05621 (9)** -10.06633 (9)** 
Note: 1. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 2. The optimal lag length is in the parentheses and is selected based 
on the Akaike information criteria (AIC). 3. The null hypothesis is that the variable is not stationary. 4. The test is 
performed by EViews (ver. 7.2). 
As Table 2.3 shows, all state behavior variables are not stationary when not including a 
trend because all variables fail to reject the null hypothesis of having a unit root. Even when 
considering the possibility of trend, most variables still fail reject the null hypothesis. In other 
words, both results in the first two columns suggest almost all state behavior variables are not 
                                                 
12 The first difference strategy is to transform the variable from describing the value on time t to describing the 
change of value from t to t+1. A good example is like that when GDP is not stationary, the growth of GDP, which is 
to subtract the GDP at time t from the GDP at time t+1, may be stationary in most situations. 
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stationary, which means that with the increase of time, the disturbance does not converge to the 
long-term mean and works like a random walk. The policy implication of the nonstationarity in 
all state behavior variables in the US-China-Taiwan triad is that all policy innovations or shocks 
have a long-term effect and the memory of earlier actions is difficult to die out for the decision-
makers. 
For ensuring the stationarity in the statistical analysis, all state behavior variables are 
transformed to first-differenced variables that measure the monthly change of the net cooperation 
score of the six state behavior variables. The results in the last two columns of Table 2.3 show 
that all variables after first differencing are stationary. This means that a shock only has a short 
term effect on the monthly change of state behaviors, and the impact declines toward the mean 
level with the increase of time. However, Table 2.3 only shows the results of the ADF test for the 
state behavior variables from 1979 to 2012, which is the time frame of the model in Chapter 3. In 
the following chapters, the ADF test on time series variables has to be performed again when the 
time period is changed, like the models in chapter 5, to ensure that the variables are stationary 
within a certain period. 
The second problem is about serial correlation, which means that the error term in a 
regression model depends on its past. The presence of serial correlation in a time series variable 
can be detected by the Ljung–Box Q test, and the results of all state behavior variables from 
1979 to 2012 are listed as Table 2.4. Since the results of the ADF test have shown that all state 
behavior variables are not stationary and need to be differenced, I also include the first-
differenced state behavior variables (DTC, DCT, DCU, DUC, DTU, and DUT) to test for the 
presence of serial correlation. 
  
32 
Table 2.4 Results of the Ljung–Box Test for State Behavior Variables (1979-2012) 
Variable Lags(3) Lags(6) Lags(12) Lags(18) 
TC 777.07** 1491.1** 2731.8** 3625.5** 
CT 703.78** 1320.6** 2336.0** 2983.2** 
CU 830.31** 1510.1** 2736.6** 3904.2** 
UC 793.77** 1468.2** 2672.3** 3788.8** 
TU 699.89** 1277.2** 2236.9** 2998.1** 
UT 588.33** 1081.3** 1880.5** 2528.7** 
DTC 57.240** 75.594** 86.956** 97.766** 
DCT 64.716** 66.951** 80.518** 88.578** 
DCU 53.667** 55.528** 67.726** 70.164** 
DUC 79.073** 81.983** 97.704** 113.25** 
DTU 44.159** 53.238** 66.448** 84.609** 
DUT 61.198** 62.878** 82.322** 93.780** 
Note: 1. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 2. The null hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation at a certain 
lag. 3. This table reports the Ljung–Box Q statistics at a certain lag. 4. The test is performed by STATA (ver. 12). 
The results in Table 2.4 indicate that all state behavior variables suffer for the problem of 
serial correlation, because all variables reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in 
different time periods at 1% level. All variables after differencing also show the presence of 
serial correlation at 1% level. In short, both the original and differenced variables have a 
characteristic that their current value is a function of history, which implies that one actor’s 
behavior is constrained by its own history of behavior. Therefore, the policymaking in the U.S.-
China-Taiwan triangle is often made in the context of time and the legacy of pervious actions. In 
general, the serial correlation problem can be solved by including lagged dependent variables, 
the AR terms, or lagged error terms, the MA terms, as the right-hand-side variables. More 
importantly, since the results of the ADF test show that all state behavior variables have the non-
stationary problem, it is necessary to deal with the two problems at the same time. Thus, I apply 
the autoregressive integrated moving-average (ARIMA) model to control the problems of 
autocorrelation and non-stationarity, more specifically an ARIMA(1,1,1) model. The model 
includes three components, which are the first-order autocorrelation, AR (1), the first-order 
moving-average, MA (1), and first-differenced variables I(1). 
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The third issue is heteroskedasticity. In the time series analysis, heteroscedasticity means 
that the variance of the error term is not the same across time periods. Thus, the Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) test should be applied first to detect the presence of heteroskedasticity. The 
results of the LM test for the state behavior variables are shown as Table 2.5. 
Table 2.5 Results of the LM test for State Behavior Variables (1979-2012) 
Variable Lags(3) Lags(6) Lags(12) Lags(18) 
TC 47.963** 54.353** 62.630** 62.630** 
CT 30.848** 44.182** 53.287** 54.035** 
CU 30.136** 50.928** 73.285** 88.425** 
UC 58.922** 88.567** 144.927** 155.129** 
TU 54.677** 65.819** 69.834** 74.649** 
UT 66.201** 70.326** 78.868** 99.293** 
DTC 93.240** 110.864** 115.474** 117.488** 
DCT 48.634** 50.156** 54.495** 55.117** 
DCU 27.658** 59.484** 76.738** 95.606** 
DUC 38.110** 64.572** 92.336** 100.829** 
DTU 78.319** 106.035** 111.364** 118.129** 
DUT 45.086** 48.863** 52.612** 63.429** 
Note: 1. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 2. This table reports Engle’s LM test statistic. 3. The null hypothesis 
is that the variable has no ARCH effect. 4. The test is performed by STATA (ver. 12). 
It is obvious that the original state behavior variables and the transformed variables after 
differencing both have the problem of heteroskedasticity. All variables reject the null hypothesis 
of no ARCH effect at the 3rd, 6th, 12th, and 18th lags, which implies that the variance or the 
volatility of state behaviors in the US-China-Taiwan triad changes over time. This is not hard to 
image because many structural changes have occurred in the time period from 1979 to 2012, for 
example the end of the Cold War and the change of regime type and leadership in Taiwan. 
Therefore, states may respond differently because of the change of international structure, regime 
type, and leadership.  
When the presence of heteroskedasticity is evident, the autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (ARCH) model or the Generalized autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (GARCH) should be applied to control the inconstant variance of errors over 
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time (Bollerslev 1986; Engle 1982). The basic concept of the GARCH model is to assume that 
the current variance is a function of the variance of the previous error term, the ARCH term, and 
the previous variance, the GARCH term.13 In other words, besides the conditional mean 
equation, the ARCH or GARCH models also include the conditional variance equation to model 
the relationship between the current variance and its past. In the following chapters, I plan to 
apply the  GARCH(1,1) model to control the problem of heteroskedasticity, which means to 
include the variance of the last error term, ARCH(1), and the last variance, GARCH(1) in the 
conditional variance equation. 
In sum, I plan to apply an ARIMA(1,1,1)-GARCH(1,1) model to deal with the three 
problems violating the OLS assumptions and investigate the causalities among the six state 
behavior variables in Chapter 3. In the following chapters, these procedures to test serial 
correlation, stationarity, and heteroskedasticity will be the necessary process to determine which 
model should be applied whenever the time period is modified. 
CHAPTER 3. THE SPECIAL ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES 
Is it necessary to take the U.S. influence into account when analyzing cross-strait 
relations? What is the relationship between cross-strait relations and the U.S.-China-Taiwan 
triangle? The goal of this chapter is to answer the two questions with both historical and 
statistical analyses. In fact, the two questions are both related to how important the U.S. 
influence is in the Taiwan Strait. The logic for this chapter is simple. If the U.S. influence is 
significant in cross-strait relations, then cross-strait relations are a function of the U.S. influence. 
If the U.S. influence is not significant, then cross-strait relations are pure bilateral affairs 
between Taiwan and China. The result in this chapter will also have a great impact on the 
                                                 
13 If the order of the ARCH term is too high in a model, a GARCH model is suggested to mitigate the difficulty of 
estimation and reduce the necessary number of the ARCH terms in the conditional variance equation. 
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research design in the following chapter. The significance of the U.S. influence indicates that it is 
necessary to include the U.S.-China-Taiwan strategic interactions when analyzing cross-strait 
relations. On the other hand, the insignificance of the U.S. influence indicates that it is possible 
to have a more parsimonious model of cross-strait relations because the U.S. related behaviors 
can be ignored. In sum, to figure out the U.S. influence is an important step for further studies.  
From a perspective of history, the formation of the current cross-strait relations is a 
jointly product of the Chinese Civil War and the Cold War and the Taiwan issue is entangled 
with the “one Chine” sovereign dispute and the U.S.-Taiwan security cooperation. For example, 
both the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the fundamentalists in the KMT still claim that the 
“one China” position is the basic common ground for the future development of cross-strait 
relations. On the other hand, the United States has play a role of the conflict-preventer in the 
Taiwan Strait for decades, starting from an official ally of Taiwan in the Cold War era and then a 
powerful conflict-preventer with strategic ambiguity after 1979. However, how great the U.S. 
influence is and how the United States influences Taiwan and China’s behaviors to each other 
are seldom examined empirically. Thus, this chapter also conducts a statistical analysis to test the 
presence of the U.S. influence in cross-strait relations and figure out the pattern of the U.S 
influence on Taiwan and China’s behaviors toward each other. 
As to the research design in the following chapters, the result related to the significance 
of the U.S. influence in cross-strait relations concerns to a choice to make causal inference based 
on a two-player game approach or a three-player game approach including the U.S. behaviors. 
For pursuing parsimony, it is necessary to ensure not to include too many variables. The three-
player approach means that all state behaviors in the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle have to be 
included. The two-player approach means that when analyzing Taiwan’s behavior toward China, 
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it is only necessary to consider China’s behavior to Taiwan, and when analyzing China’s 
behavior toward Taiwan, it is only necessary to consider Taiwan’s behavior to China. Comparing 
both approaches, it is clear the three-player approach is more comprehensive, but we still need 
statistical analysis to support the choice.  
This chapter has three sections. In the first section, a summary of the relevant literature 
about the two-player-game approach and the three-player-game approach will be presented. In 
the second section, I will explain the formation of the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle from a 
historical aspect. In the third section, I will present the result of the statistical analysis based on 
the GDELT event database from 1979 to 2012 to illustrate the influence of the United States on 
cross-strait relations after 1979. 
3.1 Literature Review 
Since the main question of this chapter is to examine the necessity to include the U.S. 
influence in the analysis of cross-strait relations, this section will review the relevant literature 
focusing on the difference between the two-player game approach and the three-player game 
approach.  
3.1.1 Three-Player Game Approach 
The three-player game approach emphasizes the presence of the significant third party. 
For analyzing the role of the third party, two questions must be asked. First, how to define a 
three-actor network or a strategic triangle? Second, how do states, especially the significant third 
party, influence each other’s behavior in a triangle? 
Regarding the first question, what is the definition of a strategic triangle or a three-actor 
network in which actors’ behaviors can influence each other? In the literature, there are three 
principles coming from two origins, game theory and the traditional rules of balance of power 
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(Dittmer 1981: 489-90; J. S. Goldstein & Freeman 1990: 33). The first principle is the rational 
assumption: network actors are rational and egoistic players. The second principle is 
triangularity: the level of amity or hostility of a bilateral relationship is a function of the two 
actors' relationships with the third. Basically, scholars taking this approach treat a strategic 
triangle, or a three-player game, as a set of two-player games and the result of one two-player 
game could influence the payoff in another bilateral games. For example, in the U.S.-China-
Taiwan triangle, the United States may ally with Taiwan when both Taiwan and the United 
States are in a conflictive relationship with China. In this situation, the U.S. action to Taiwan is a 
function of Taiwan’ relationship with China and the U.S. relationship with China. As an Arabic 
proverb goes, the enemy of my enemy is my friend. The principle of triangularity is the key 
concept that will be examined by the statistical analysis in this chapter. The third basic principle 
is the balance of power assumption. Based on Kaplan’s (1957: 686) rules of balance of power, all 
states oppose any single state in a position of predominance within the system. Thus, both China 
and the United States tend to prevent each other’s total domination over Taiwan in the U.S.-
China-Taiwan triangle. The principle of balance of power is main concept that will be examined 
by the history after World War Two in this chapter. 
This chapter mainly relies on the second principle, the presence of triangular causality, to 
examine whether the United States plays a role in cross-strait relations and whether the United 
States, China, and Taiwan qualify to be a strategic triangle. More importantly, the presence of 
the U.S. triangularity also indicates the validity of the three-player game approach in analyzing 
cross-strait relations. Otherwise, if the U.S. triangularity does not present, cross-strait relations 
are only pure bilateral affairs between China and Taiwan and the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle 
may be only a set of unconnected bilateral relationships. 
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Regarding the second question, how do states influence each other’s behaviors in a 
triangle? The cooperative game literature provides the basic framework and hypotheses to 
answer the question (Axelrod 1984). The fundamental question in a three-player cooperative 
game is: How does cooperation initiate and evolve in an iterated interaction with three actors? 
Scholars taking the three-player game approach argue that tit-for-tat (reciprocity) or coercive 
cooperation (bullying) are the most common patterns and both patterns can work in the bilateral 
or triangular ways. More importantly, triangularity can also work in both direct and indirect 
forms. The main difference between indirect and direct triangularity is that indirect triangularity 
is not a response to a direct request or proposal from the third party, but a self-adjustment to 
situational changes in the triangle. Based on the cooperative theory and the forms of 
triangularity, the four behavioral patterns can be specified as follows. 
First, based on Axelrod’s (1984: 27-54) cooperation theory, the reciprocity or tit-for-tat 
strategy is the basic logic of state behavior when facing the anarchic nature at the international 
level. A good example of the tit-for-tat strategy is Jervis’s (1976: 58-116) spiral model or 
security dilemma. That is, hostility leads to a hostile response and compromise leads to a 
compromising response. 
Second, cooperation can be a result of coercion or compliance as Krasner’s (1976; 1991) 
emphasis on the role of power gap in international cooperation. Again, Jervis’ (1976) deterrence 
model works as a good example for coercive cooperation (bullying). That is, hostility leads to a 
compromising response and compromise leads to a hostile response. In other words, the core 
mechanism of coercive cooperation is a fear of bullying or a sense of insecurity in this pattern. 
Third, the concept of direct triangularity can also be operationalized in two forms, 
triangular tit-for-tat (reciprocity) and triangularly coercive cooperation (bullying), and both are 
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initiated directly by the behaviors of the third party. For example, the United States may request 
Taiwan to cooperate with China through a threat of stopping arms sale (coercive cooperation) or 
through a promise of arms sales (tit-for-tat). Empirical studies have shown that the direct 
triangularity initiated by the significant third party exists in many cases of enduring rivalry and 
regional conflict.14 
Fourth, as to indirect triangularity, it works in two forms, triangular calculation of utility 
and triangular self-adjustment. Both are triggered indirectly by the behaviors related to the third 
party. The main difference between indirect and direct triangularity is that indirect triangularity 
is not a response to a direct request or proposal from the third party, but a self-adjustment to 
situational changes in the triangle. In an interconnected triangular relationship, the result of each 
bilateral game influences the pay-off in another bilateral games. Therefore, in theory, any 
behavior in an interconnected triad may have indirect triangular effects, and empirical studies 
also support the presence of indirect triangularity.15 
Regarding triangular calculation of utility, the example is that when the United States and 
China engage with each other, Taiwan has an option either to stand tough toward China to win 
the U.S. support or to stay neutral to avoid China’s criticism or attack. In sum, for Taiwan, the 
triangular calculation of utility is a response to the U.S-China relationship, and for China, it is a 
response to the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. 
As to triangular self-adjustment, the example is that if Taiwan decides to totally cooperate 
with China, then Taiwan may have to table the U.S. proposal of further cooperation in order to 
                                                 
14 For example, the U.S. behavior toward the Soviet Union can influence the Soviet behavior toward China in the 
Cold War, see J. S. Goldstein and Freeman (1990: 79-84) . For the NATO’s coercively cooperative pattern on the 
Serb force in the Bosnia conflict, see J. S. Goldstein and Pevehouse (1997); Pevehouse and Goldstein (1999). For 
the case of the Middle East conflicts, see J. S. Goldstein, Pevehouse, Gerner, and Telhami (2001). As to public 
opinion in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with the U.S. intervention, see Brandt, Colaresi, and Freeman (2008). 
15 In Goldstein and Freeman’ s (1990) empirical study about the U.S.-U.S.S.R-China triangle, the triangular 
calculation of utility caused by the U.S. behaviors is evident in the interactions between the Soviet Union and China.  
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align with the decision to cooperate with China. In short, for Taiwan, the triangular self-
adjustment is an alignment between its policies toward China and the United States, and, for 
China, it is an alignment between its policies toward the United States and Taiwan. 
For efficiently investigating the patterns of triangularity and reciprocity, event data with 
Goldstein’s (1992) net cooperation scale is widely applied in the cooperative game approach. 
Surprisingly, the efforts and attempts to analyze the U.S.-China-Taiwan triad in the cooperative 
game approach with an analysis based on an event database is still rare and limited. Thus, one of 
the empirical contribution for this dissertation is to analyze the U.S. triangularity in cross-strait 
relations by taking the cooperative game approach. 
Unlike the cooperative game approach, the triangular structure approach provides a 
structural perspective about state behaviors in the triad. In general, the research question of this 
approach is: Which position in a certain triangular structure is the most favorable that all actors 
tend to sit in order to maintain or enhance their interests? Based on Dittmer’s classification 
(1981), there are four types of triangular structure: (1) ménage à trois (three friendly 
relationships); (2) stable marriage (two hostile relationships and one friendly relationship); (3) 
romantic triangle (two friendly relationships and one hostile relationship); (4) unit veto (three 
hostile relationships). The four types of triangular structure are shown as Figure 3.1. It is obvious 
that the positive-or-negative dynamics of bilateral relationships in the triad is the precondition to 
determine the type or structure of a triangle in this approach. 
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Figure 3.1 Dittmer's Strategic Triangle Typology 
As to the most favorable position, based on the egoist calculation of utility, both Dittmer 
(2011) and Wu (2011) suggest that the pivot position in a "romantic triangle" is the most 
favorable position that all actors tend to be.16 The pivot can enjoy the positive relationships from 
the rest of other two actors, while does not need to worry too much about losing this superiority, 
because the other two actors are hostile to each other. In this case, the ultimate behavioral logic 
is that all actors tend to do their best to form a romantic triangle in which they sit in the position 
of pivot.17 
Comparing the triangular structure and the cooperative game approach, the cooperative 
game approach with the analysis of event data has a great advantage in revealing the triangular 
                                                 
16 The position is where actor A sits in the romantic triangle in Figure 3.1. 
17 Empirical studies taking this approach based on the historical analysis assert that America has been in the pivot 
position and played a role of balancer since the 1970s. In this case, the strategy of “dual deterrence” between Taiwan 
and China is a rational choice to serve for the best interest for America (Bush 2005; Dittmer 2005; Wu 2000).  
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causality and influential patterns (tit-for-tat or coercive cooperation; direct or indirect 
triangularity). First, the estimation of a bilateral relationship in the cooperative game approach 
with event data is more accurate and objective. Although the triangular structure approach also 
depends heavily on the positive-or-negative dynamics of bilateral relationships, the standard to 
evaluate a relationship is absent and subjective. Moreover, the positive-or-negative dynamics for 
the triangular structure approach only has two dimensions, positive or negative, which is hard to 
capture and compare the subtle changes in a shifting dynamics. With the development of the 
scaling system for event data, the cooperative game approach has a more objective and detailed 
standard to assess the impact caused by the change of relationships in a triad.  
Second, the unit-of-analysis in the cooperative game approach makes the causal chain 
more clear than the strategic triangle approach. In reality, a bilateral relationship consists of two 
behaviors with opposite directions, so the cooperative game approach records state behaviors in a 
form of source-target as the unit-of-analysis. For example, the China-Taiwan bilateral relations 
are in fact the sum of Taiwan’s behavior toward China and China’s behavior toward Taiwan. In 
most situations, the triangular structure approach does not consider the difference within a 
bilateral relationship and threats a bilateral relationship as a whole. 
Third, to identify the structure or the type of a triangle, which researchers taking the 
triangular structure approach usually do first, is not a necessary step to analyze the presence of 
triangularity. In fact, the typology of triangular structure is only a description of current structure 
that helps people easily grasp the whole picture of a triangular network, but it does not explain 
much about how and in what way the triangular structure constrains actors’ behaviors in the 
triad. On the other hand, the cooperative game approach goes beyond depicting what the current 
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structure is and helps specify the causal mechanisms of how earlier interactions influence current 
state behaviors by employing the time series statistical analysis with event databases. 
Based on these three reasons, I take the cooperative game approach as the main approach 
to formulate hypotheses and test the presence of triangularity in the statistical analyses of this 
chapter. 
3.1.2 Two-Player Game Approach 
The two-player game approach basically treats cross-strait relations as an iterated 
bilateral game between Taiwan and China only. In the studies taking this approach, three 
common factors are often emphasized, which are the assessment of the adversary’s preference, 
the gap of capability, and institutional designs. 
First of all, in a traditional two-player game, the assessment to the other actor’s 
preferences is a crucial factor that influence actors’ strategies or behaviors. Due to the legacy of 
the Chinese Civil War, Lo and Lin (1995) believe that cross-strait relations are a bargaining 
game between China and Taiwan on a spectrum of sovereignty and security, because the two 
issues always play a crucial role in cross-strait relations. Their work finds that in fact China’s 
behavior toward Taiwan derives from its assessment on Taiwan's preferences and Taiwan’s 
behavior toward China also derives from it assessment on China’s preferences, not solely from 
an objective evaluation of the payoff structures. In short, the preferences of Taiwan and China 
are endogenous with each other, and how they assess each other’s preference influences their 
next moves. Thus, cross-strait relations are a function of both the assessment on the adversary’s 
preference and the objective calculation of interests. 
Second, the gap of capability can be the main factor to influence the weaker actor’s 
choice between balance and bandwagon in a dyadic conflict. By taking a dyadic conflict 
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approach, Wu (1995) makes a generalization from the cases of Russia and its surrounding 
countries and suggests that the choice to balance (conflict) or to bandwagon (compromise) 
toward a strong neighbor is a function of the asymmetry in the economic size and military might 
between the strong country and each weak neighbor. In this light, the dynamics of cross-strait 
relations is a function of the asymmetry between Taiwan and China. 
Third, the general pattern toward unification in all cases of “divided nations” makes the 
institutional arrangement related to unification become the main factor to influence the two 
actors’ behaviors. From the cases of Germany and the Korean peninsula, Henderson, Lebow, and 
Stoessiger (1974) summarize and predict a pattern toward unification for all divided nations with 
three stages: conflict, coexistence, and political integration. The key to go toward peaceful 
unification for divided nations is the institutional arrangement between the two governments. In 
the case of cross-strait relations, the institutional arrangement about the future political status of 
Taiwan is the most important factor to the peaceful development of cross-strait relations. Chiu 
(1991) emphasizes that the recognition for Taiwan to participate in international organizations 
and a credible guarantee of China’s commitment for Taiwan’s autonomy are the most important 
two features in any institutional arrangement for facilitating peaceful unification. Zhao (1991a), 
on the other hand, suggests that arranging the future Taiwan-China relations in a federal system 
helps promote and further the cross-strait political integration. In short, the institutional design 
can influence the possibility of cooperation or conflict between Taiwan and China. 
In sum, the fluctuation of cross-strait relations is a result of the interactions between 
Taiwan and China in the two-player game approach, and can be influenced by the assessment of 
the other’s preference, the disparity of capability between Taiwan and China, and the 
institutional arrangement for the future relations. As to the contribution of the two-player game 
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approach, the studies taking this approach clearly identify some important characteristics of the 
Chinese Civil War legacy in the current relations between Taiwan and China, such as power 
disparity, the twofold issue intertwined with security and sovereignty, and the arrangements for 
political integration. However, the potential problem of the two-player game approach is to omit 
the U.S. influence without considering the possibility that in fact cross-strait relations are 
influenced by the interactions in the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle. 
For investigating the role of the United States and the influential patterns of the United 
States in cross-strait relations, it is necessary to compare the two-player game approach and the 
three-player game approach. Since the goal of this chapter is to test the presence of the U.S. 
influence in cross-strait relations, I will use historical and statistical analyses to examine the 
validity of the two approaches in the following sections.  
3.2 The Formation of the Triangle from a Historical Perspective 
The goal of this section is mainly to examine the third principle of strategic triangle, the 
balance of power assumption. Current cross-strait relations can be characterized as the struggle 
for sovereignty between Taiwan (ROC) and China (PRC) and the U.S. preference to maintain the 
status quo of the Taiwan Strait without furthering to the final solution of the Taiwan issue. In 
fact, the two characteristics of current cross-strait relations comes from e two important historical 
legacies, the Chinese Civil War legacy and the Cold War legacy. First, the Chinese Civil War 
legacy helps understand the incentives and preferences of Taiwan and China’s foreign behaviors. 
Simply speaking, the Chinese Civil War legacy constrains both Taiwan and China’s policy 
preferences around the “one China” position, and more importantly, provides a strong incentive 
for both sides of the Taiwan Strait to eliminate each other before Taiwan’s democratization. 
Second, as to the Cold War legacy, the presence of the United States in the Taiwan Strait further 
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constrains the capabilities of both sides of the Taiwan Strait to change the status quo unilaterally, 
and more importantly, it also made the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle become a part of the U.S. 
global strategy in the Cold War. In this light, the Cold War legacy not only makes the U.S. 
preference become important in cross-strait relations, but also keeps the three actors in the 
Taiwan Strait to function like a balance of power system in which China and Taiwan are not able 
eliminate each other.  
3.2.1 The Legacy of the Chinese Civil War 
First of all, the most important legacy of the Chinese Civil War is so-called the “one 
China” principle in general, which made both China (PRC) and Taiwan (ROC) have an identical 
preference to unify in spite of the incapability for both sides to realize the unification of China in 
the Cold War era. The result of the Chinese Civil War had brought an ironic fact to the 
international community because there were, in fact, two “Chinas,” the P.R.C. and the R.O.C., 
both claiming that there is only “one China” in the world since October 1, 1949. For both sides 
of the Taiwan Strait, the Chinese Civil War was still going and the status quo in the Taiwan 
Strait was just like a cease-fire situation due to the incapability of each side to conduct a large 
scale amphibious attack to fulfill the holy mission of unification. In other words, what the R.O.C. 
and the P.R.C. competed for was the legitimacy to rule the territory of China and this created a 
situation in which the foreign policies of China and Taiwan inevitably came into with one 
another. For example, the one China principle of the KMT was symbolized by the motto “there is 
no room for patriots and traitors to live together” (hanzeibuliangli, 漢賊不兩立), which denotes 
that the solely legitimate government of China is an either/or choice between the P.R.C. and the 
R.O.C. Ironically, however, at the same time, the “one China” principle was in fact a consensus 
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for both Taiwan and China, and the preferences for unification was basically identical for both 
sides in the Cold War. 
This identical preference for “one China” including Taiwan and China provides a strong 
incentive for Taiwan and China to compete for the international representation of China and keep 
preparing for the unfinished war of unification. First, as to the competition over “who represents 
China,” the membership in the international organizations, like the United Nations (UN), became 
an important battlefield for both sides of the Taiwan Strait. From the 1950s to the 1960s, the 
U.S.-headed coalition opposing the seating of the Communist China had a majority in the 
General Assembly of the UN (see Table 3.1). During this period, facing the question of the 
R.O.C legitimacy in the General Assembly from the Communist Bloc, Taiwan (ROC) chose to 
cooperate with the United States unconditionally. The reason for Taiwan’s unconditional 
cooperation was apparently for the ideological “one China” legitimacy and not necessarily for 
furthering any strategic interest based  a pure utility calculation (Keohane 1967: 224). However, 
the coalition to maintain the membership of Taiwan (ROC) in the UN lost its majority in 1970 
and Resolution 2758 was passed in 1971, which recognized the P.R.C. as “the only legitimate 
representative of China” to the UN and expelled "the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek” 
(General Assembly 1971). Since that day, it is clear that the P.R.C. had won the game of the 
international representation of China. Resolution 2758 becomes a supporting document for the 
“one China” policy of the P.R.C. in the international community, which emphasizes the 
legitimacy of the P.R.C., and, more importantly, China steps further to emphasize it sovereign 
claim over Taiwan from “who represents China” to “Taiwan is a part of China.”  
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Table 3.1 The Voting Record of the Representation of China in the United Nations 
Year Total Voting 
Membership 
In Favor of the 
P.R.C. 
In Favor of the 
R.O.C. 
Abstention Not Voting 
1950 59 8 42 6 3 
1951 60 5 36 2 17 
1952 60 7 42 11 0 
1953 60 10 44 2 4 
1954 60 11 43 6 0 
1955 60 12 42 6 0 
1956 79 24 47 8 0 
1957 82 27 47 7 1 
1958 81 28 44 9 0 
1959 82 29 44 9 0 
1960 99 34 42 22 1 
1961 104 34 61 7 2 
1965 117 49 56 11 1 
1966 122 48 66 7 1 
1967 122 48 69 4 1 
1968 126 47 73 5 1 
1969 126 48 71 4 3 
1970 127 52 66 7 2 
1971 131 76 35 17 3 
Source: United Nations Bibliographic Information System. 
Second, as to the persistent preparation of the unfinished civil war, the KMT 
authoritarian rule in Taiwan is a good example. The foundation of the KMT authoritarian rule 
was based on the need to suppress the communist rebels and regain the mainland. Since the 
R.O.C. under the KMT rule was the only legitimate government representing China, the 
authoritarian rule in Taiwan was justified as a wartime measure to deal with the communist 
rebels. The Temporary Provisions of the Constitution of the R.O.C. provided this justification 
and institutional design for the KMT rule in Taiwan under the banner of striking back to 
mainland China. Thus, it is safe to say that the KMT’s authoritarian regime in Taiwan was a 
product of the Chinese Civil War. The same logic also explains the reason for the KMT regime 
to refuse accepting the proposal of the coexistence in the UN with the Communist China in the 
1970s. The coexistence with the PRC might be interpreted as the end of the Chinese Civil War, 
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which may lead to the loss of legal foundation to continue the wartime authoritarian regime in 
Taiwan. 
The KMT’s insistence on the R.O.C. version of the “one China” principle also implies 
that Taiwan’s democratization is not a purely domestic issue. For the opposition camp in Taiwan, 
to democratize meant to remove the KMT’s “one China” principle which legitimated the priority 
for the unification warfare and suspended some provisions about civil liberty in the R.O.C. 
Constitution. In other words, without getting rid of the hegemony of the Chinese Civil War 
legacy in Taiwan’s domestic politics, it was impossible to democratize. The chance for Taiwan 
to democratize came in the 1970s. The KMT’s legitimacy of authoritarian rule in Taiwan based 
the “one China” principle started to be shaken by the loss of the seat in the UN and the 
normalization of the U.S.-China relationship. Taiwan’s rigidity of the “one China” preference 
was further softened with the pace of the KMT’s Taiwanization. For example, Chiang Ching-kuo 
publicly claimed that he is a Taiwanese before his death. Then, Lee Teng-hui’s “special state-to-
state relationship” between Taiwan and China in the late 1990s and the rule of the pro-
independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) after 2000 were also the efforts attempting to 
get rid of the Chinese Civil War legacy at both the international and domestic levels. In sum, 
democratization in Taiwan goes hand in hand with the decline of the KMT’s “one China” 
legitimacy, and the consequence of Taiwan’s democratization is a shift of Taiwan’s preference 
from the rigid “one China” to the current KMT’s “two Chinas” versus the DPP’s “one China, 
one Taiwan.” 
More importantly, after democratization, a trend of maintaining Taiwan’s de facto 
independence grows among Taiwanese people even as closer economic and social interactions 
with China take root after 2000. As shown in Figure 3.2, the share of Taiwanese supporting 
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independence and the share of Taiwanese supporting to maintaining the status quo forever rose 
since 1994 and the share of the two categories is more than 50% in 2013. On the contrary, the 
supporting rate for unification and future unification decline steadily from 1994. In other words, 
the trend shows that what was acknowledged by the United States in the Shanghai Communiqué 
in 1972 is no longer the reality. That is, “all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain 
there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.”18 The trend in Figure 3.2 also explains 
the shift of Taiwan’s preference about the “one China” principle after Taiwan’s democratization 
and the KMT’s indigenization in the 1990s because politicians or parties seldom directly 
confront the majority in a democratic regime. In short, Taiwan’s democratization and the shift of 
identity after the 1990s provide the basic momentum for Taiwan to deviate from the “one China” 
principle in the civil war legacy. 
                                                 
18 The whole statements for both the United States and China sides, see Wikisource (1972). 
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Figure 3.2 The Independence vs. Unification Trend Distribution in Taiwan 
With the end of the game for the seat in the UN and the normalization of the U.S.-China 
relationship, the hostility and rivalry started to ease due to China’s proposal to stop military 
hostility and then the “One Country, Two Systems” proposal in the beginning of the 1980s.19 
Taiwan responded in 1987 with the liberalization of Taiwanese citizens’ visits to China and the 
end of “the period of mobilization for the suppression of communist rebellion” in Taiwan’s 
constitutional system in 1991, which meant that Taiwan (ROC) stopped treating the P.R.C. as a 
rebellious regime and ended its hostile status toward China caused by the Chinese Civil War. 
However, although the political rivalry and hostility have been mitigated, there is no sign that 
                                                 
19 The proposal of ending military confrontation was made in the “Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan” 
announced by the Standing committee of the National People's Congress and the concept of “One Country, Two 
Systems” was firstly brought by Ye Jianying's “Nine-Point Proposal” in 1981. 
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these two countries, especially for Taiwan, can totally get rid of the “one China” legacy for two 
reasons. First, the “one China” policy has been a part of the United States and China’s policy 
position in the triangle, and it is also widely recognized in the international community. More 
importantly, China still stands quite firm on the “one China” position, and any deviation from the 
position leads to China’s strong response. For example, from China’s responses to a series of 
events from Lee Teng-hui’s visit in 1995 to the 1996 crisis, it was clear that China was willing to 
confront and even to be defeated rather than to accept the erosion of the one China principal by 
Lee’s incremental “private visit” diplomacy. Therefore, Taiwan’s international space to deviate 
from the “one China” position is in fact quite limited. Second, for the political actors in Taiwan 
and China, the “one China” legacy still maintains a considerable power for mobilization. For 
China, promoting nationalist resentment toward Taiwan is still a useful tool to distract citizens’ 
dissatisfaction toward the CCP rule. In Taiwan, since the political cleavage of the two main 
parties goes with the unification-or-independence line, to cooperate with the CCP by 
compromising on the “one China” position is always an easy option to balance the pro-
independence force in Taiwan’s domestic politics. The KMT’s strategy after the electoral defeat 
in the 2004 presidential election is a good example. In short, the legacy of “one China” principle 
never fades out for both Taiwan and China since the end of World War Two, and the foreign 
policies of the two countries still entangle with each other even after Taiwan’s democratization. 
To sum up, the most important legacy of the Chinese Civil War is the “one China” 
principle or policy, which makes Taiwan and China’s preferences always prioritize the sovereign 
issue and also provides incentive for Taiwan and China to compete and even eliminate with each 
other. In the period of the KMT authoritarian rule, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait competed 
for the title of the solely legitimate government of China and treated the other side as the 
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rebellious force that should be eliminated. After Taiwan’s democratic transition, although 
Taiwan no longer competes the representation of China with the P.R.C., the main issue between 
Taiwan and China is still sovereignty. During the period of the KMT authoritarian rule, the issue 
between China and Taiwan was “who represents China,” but the issue between Taiwan and 
China then becomes “who is eligible to decides the future of Taiwan” after Taiwan’s 
democratization. In both periods, the two sides contend with each other and make calculation 
based on the other’s movements for winning international supports, like the recognition or 
support from the United States In short, although the Chinese Civil War stopped in 1949, the 
legacy remains, which makes Taiwan and China be able to directly or indirectly influence each 
other’s preferences and behaviors and have incentives to engage military conflict. 
3.2.2 The Legacy of the Cold War 
The legacy of the Cold War is mainly about the special role of the United States in the 
Taiwan Strait and how the capabilities of Taiwan and China are constrained by the United States 
since the Korean War. The presence of the United States in the Taiwan Strait preserves the status 
quo of 1949 that both sides of the Strait are incapable of defeating or even eliminating each 
other. Moreover, it makes cross-strait relations not only work in the legacy of the Chinese Civil 
War, but also be influenced by the U.S. global strategy in the Cold War structure. Before the 
Korean War, facing the result of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the United States held a hands-
off policy toward the situation in the Taiwan Strait. In other words, the Truman administration 
had no intention to interfere the result of the civil war between the KMT and the CCP, and the 
CCP’s takeover of Taiwan seemed to be a natural end of the Chinese Civil War.20 More 
importantly, at that time, the United States did not include Taiwan and the Korean peninsula in 
                                                 
20 For the U.S. position toward the Chinese Civil War from 1944 to 1949, see the United States (1949). 
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the U.S. defensive perimeter toward the Communist Bloc in the western Pacific Ocean 
(Trefousse 1966: 152-57). However, the U.S. position shifted sharply because of the Korean War 
in 1950. The Truman administration gave an order to the U.S. 7th Fleet to neutralize the Taiwan 
Strait immediately after the outbreak of the Korean War. Since then, the security of Taiwan 
became a part of the U.S. global strategy in the Cold War. However, from the Chinese 
perspective, on the other hand, the Chinese Civil War was forced to stop because of the U.S. 
interference in the Taiwan Strait. From the start of the Cold War and the U.S. commitment to 
protect Taiwan, the third principle of strategic triangle starts to work because no single actors in 
the triad is able to totally dominate the rest of two actors. In this case, balance of power becomes 
the behavioral rule in the triangle.   
In the first half of the Cold War era, building security systems in Europe and Asia was a 
crucial step to contain the Soviet threat for the United States, and it was obvious that, in these 
two regions, the United States took different strategies towards regional alliance formation, and 
this difference made the United States, China, and Taiwan become a strategic triangle. Unlike 
the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Europe, the U.S. alliance 
strategy in East Asia was to build a set of bilateral security pacts with some Asian countries 
toward common enemies, and the result was a U.S.-centered “hub and spoke” system. The 
rationale behind the different strategy in East Asia was that America’s Asian allies (Japan, South 
Korea, and Taiwan) all had incentives or historical reasons to conduct aggressive behaviors and 
thereby bring the United States into direct conflict with the Communist Bloc (Cha 2010). For 
example, John F. Dulles, the Secretary of State in the Eisenhower administration, suspected that 
the Chiang Kai-shek administration in Taiwan was attempting to drag the United States into a 
war with China during and after the crises of the coastal islands near China in the 1950s (Tucker 
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2005: 113).21 More importantly, due to the complexity of East Asia, the United States does not 
want to be constrained by other states or regional organizations when facing a certain issue like 
Taiwan. 22 The “hub and spoke” system can reduce the number of actors in a certain issue area, 
like the security of Taiwan, and ensure that the United States will not fight a war and be drawn 
into another war at the same time in Asia. In sum, the United States created a set of triangular 
relations in East Asia with its superiority to constrain its anti-communist allies’ aggressive 
behaviors, and the U.S.-China-Taiwan was one of them. Based on the design of the “hub and 
spoke” system, a triangle of stable marriage in the Dittmer’s typology is formed with a positive 
relationship between the United States and Taiwan and two negative relationships between 
Taiwan and China and between the United States and China. 
The impact of the U.S. interference is profound for both China and Taiwan, and it 
preserves the status quo of the Taiwan Strait, which means both sides are incapable to change the 
status quo unilaterally. In other words, the presence of the United States further constrains the 
capabilities of Taiwan and China to eliminate each other and the two’s relationships with the 
United States become a crucial factor in the balance of power game in the Taiwan Strait. Thus, it 
is obvious that, from the beginning, the capabilities among the three actors in this triad are never 
equal and the great power disparity between the United States and the two sides of the Taiwan 
Strait makes the United States become the significant third party in the Strait and ensures that the 
three actors interact as the third principle of strategic triangle. 
Since the United States plays a crucial role in maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan 
Strait, how does the U.S. preference influence Taiwan and China’s behaviors? Some have argued 
                                                 
21 The crises includes the Dongshan Island Campaign in 1953, the first Taiwan Strait crisis for the offshore islands in 
1955, and the second Taiwan Strait crisis for the Kinmen islands in 1958. 
22 For a more detailed discussion about the non-existence of a multilateral alliance in East Asia, see Hemmer and 
Katzenstein (2002), and Duffield (2001). 
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that the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle was a function of the larger “great” triangle among the 
United States, China, and the Soviet Union, and looked at in that light the US-China-Taiwan 
triangle was merely a smaller part of the larger competition between the United States and the 
Soviet Union (Dittmer 2011: 11).  When the Soviet-China relationship started to deteriorate, the 
positive U.S.-Taiwan relationship also started to become unstable because of the change of the 
U.S. preference toward China. With the increasing hostility of the Sino-Soviet split from the 
ideological divergence to the border conflict in the 1960s, both China and the United States 
started to reconsider each other’s position in their global strategies. For the United States, Nixon 
(1967) had suggested the necessity to end the isolation toward China in 1967, earlier than the 
beginning of his presidency. For China, starting from the end of Mao period, the normalization 
of the U.S.-China relations became the priority of China's foreign policy.23 Figure 3.3 shows the 
development after the Sino-Soviet split between the great and small triangle. The change of the 
Soviet-China relationship from positive (cooperative) to negative (conflictive) led to the U.S.-
China rapprochement consequentially. However, the improvement of the U.S.-China relationship 
did not make the United States to totally give up Taiwan for exchanging China’ strategic support 
to balance the Soviet Union. Thus, although it was true that the U.S. favor had shifted from 
Taiwan to China, to eliminate Taiwan or China’s total domination of the Taiwan Strait was not a 
part of the U.S. preference. 
                                                 
23 See Pantsov and Levine (2012: 555-72). 
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Figure 3.3 The Great and Small Strategic Triangles in the 1970s 
The U.S. opening to China had started in early 1970s, and the United States normalized 
its relationship with China while maintained a close but informal relationship with Taiwan at the 
end of the 1970s. Looking back to the second principle about triangularity, in the U.S.-China-
Soviet triangle, first of all, the U.S. initiated rapprochement toward China was based on a 
triangular calculation of utility because the U.S. opening to China was caused by the Sino-Soviet 
split. Second, China’s rapprochement with the United States was a triangular self-adjustment 
because it was caused by the change of China’s policy toward the Soviet Union. Thus, based on 
the historical development before 1979, it was obvious that the “great” triangle dominated the 
fate of the small triangle in this period. 
Studies focusing on the released U.S. governmental documents also show two important 
characteristics in the process of the U.S.-China rapprochement. First, what made the great and 
small triangles connected was China’s insistence on the Taiwan issue. Based on Tucker’s (2009: 
29-52) study, from the U.S.-China meeting in Warsaw in 1970 to Nixon’s visit in 1972, the 
representative of China always prioritized the Taiwan issue to everything else.24 Facing the same 
pressure of the Brezhnev doctrine in 1968, China seemed not so eager to normalize the U.S.-
                                                 
24 The core arguments of China were that Taiwan is a part of China and the United States has to totally withdraw its 
military forces and installations from Taiwan. 
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China relationship as the United States did, because China showed no intention to make any 
concession on the Taiwan issue in the negotiation process. In other words, although it was 
important for China to adjust its relationship with the United States because of the Soviet threat, 
to soften the “one China” position was still a red line that was impossible to cross. Second, in the 
process of the U.S.-China negotiation, Taiwan’s sovereign and security interests were never on 
the top of the U.S. agenda set by Nixon and Kissinger. In other words, the Cold War game of 
balance of power was more important than the survival interests of Taiwan for the Nixon 
administration (Tucker 1994: 68-69). At the end, the result of the Sino-Soviet split was the U.S.-
China rapprochement, and the rapprochement then caused the formation of a romantic U.S.-
China-Taiwan triangle in which the United States sat at the pivot position when the U.S. 
Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act. In fact, the Taiwan Relations Act was a product of 
triangular self-adjustment for the United States, because the cause of the act was an alignment 
for the change of the U.S. policy toward China. Thus, clearly, the documentary evidence shows 
the importance of indirect triangularity for both the U.S and China to benefit from the 
interactions between the great and small triangles. 
Although China benefited from the U.S. preference to balance the Soviet Union, China 
still failed to persuade the United States to give up its promise for maintaining Taiwan’s 
capability of self-defense. In other words, the development after the U.S.-China normalization 
did not quite follow the path that China originally predicted and China remained lacking the 
capability to take over Taiwan. In 1979, the Taiwan Relations Act was passed by the U.S. 
Congress soon after the establishment of the formal relations between the United States and 
China. The act requires the United States to provide “defensive” weapons to Taiwan and states 
that the United States concerns about any threat to the peaceful determination of the future of 
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Taiwan. Therefore, after the first and second communiqués between the United States and China 
mainly focusing on the status of Taiwan (ROC), the third communiqué started to address on the 
issue about the arms sale to Taiwan, and the United States promises to decrease its quality and 
quantity of arms sold to Taiwan in the third communiqué, the August 17 communiqué signed in 
1982.25 Again, the development after the U.S.-China rapprochement showed that the U.S. 
preference was only to maintain the status quo of the Taiwan Strait and the status quo had to 
serve for the U.S. global strategy. This is the main logic behind the formation of the “romantic 
triangle” in the second half of the Cold War, in which the United States recognizes the P.R.C.-
defined “one China” policy while maintaining the arms sale to Taiwan to deal with the 
contradiction between Taiwan’s sovereignty and security caused by the Chinese Civil War 
legacy. This U.S. efforts to balance was a self-adjustment of the United States between its 
policies toward China and Taiwan. Based on the Three Communiqués between the United States 
and China and the Taiwan Relations Act, a new framework for the U.S.-China-Taiwan relations 
is finally established, the framework of the Three Communiqués and One Act. By analyzing the 
contents of the communiqués and the act, the framework can be summarized as follows. First, 
China does not use force toward Taiwan for unification. Second, Taiwan does not go toward the 
de jure independence. Third, the United States expects the peace and stability of the Taiwan 
Strait while maintains strategic ambiguity. 
It is obvious that the contents of this framework are a compromise between the main 
actors’ preferences and capabilities. More importantly, the framework clearly defines the status 
quo of the Taiwan Strait in favor to the United States. For China and Taiwan, the framework 
                                                 
25 The first communiqués is the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972 signed by the U.S. President Richard Nixon and the 
P.R.C. Premier Zhou Enlai. The second one is the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations 
in 1979. In both communiqués, the United States claimed to respect and recognize that the P.R.C. is the solely 
legitimate government of China and Taiwan is a part of China. 
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prevents them from pursuing their first priorities, which are to take over the sovereignty of 
Taiwan and to be independent from the P.R.C. respectively. In this framework, their inabilities to 
pursue their goals are further worsened by the uncertainty about the U.S. intervention. For the 
United States, although the recognition of the P.R.C.-favored “one China” position is a price to 
pay for exchanging China’s strategic support, the instability of the Taiwan Strait is not a cost that 
can be tolerated by the United States Therefore, a position of strategic ambiguity supported by 
the superiority of capability in this triad is necessary for the United States to rule out any 
possibility for the rest of two actors to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait unilaterally. 
Although the framework is challenged and shaken by the rise of China and the democratic 
transition in Taiwan, it seems that the framework still holds and works as the basic code of 
conduct in the U.S.-China-Taiwan triad till now. 
In sum, the framework of the Three Communiqués and One Act is the most important 
product of the Cold War legacy and it is mainly a product of the U.S self-adjustment between its 
policies toward China and Taiwan. The process about the formation of the framework illustrates 
how great the influence of the U.S. policy preference is in the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle and 
how Taiwan and China’s capabilities are constrained in the process. In short, what the United 
States pursues is the stability in the Taiwan Strait only, and it seems that the U.S.-defined status 
quo of still plays an important role in maintaining the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle as a balance of 
power system in which no actor will be totally excluded or eliminated.  
To sum up for this section, it is obvious that the legacy of the Chinese Civil War and the 
legacy of the Cold War are both important for the formation of the U.S-China-Taiwan triangle in 
a historical aspect. First of all, the legacy of the Chinese Civil War mainly influences Taiwan and 
China’s incentives to take the sovereignty issue as their first priorities, and binds their 
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preferences together in the context of “one China” principle. In the post-Cold War era, although 
Taiwan’s preference has shifted gradually from unification, the constraint of the “one China” 
principle remains because the concept that Taiwan is a part of China still plays an important role 
at the international level and in China and Taiwan’s domestic politics. Second, as to the legacy of 
the Cold War, the shift of the U.S. preference and the U.S.-defined status quo make the U.S.-
China-Taiwan triangle function like a balance of power system. More importantly, the U.S.-
China rapprochement and the formation of the framework of the Three Communiqués and One 
Act are both a result of indirectly triangular consideration for both the United States and China. 
Moreover, the framework of the Three Communiqués and One Act is a compromise between the 
U.S. preference and the incapability of China and Taiwan, and the framework also provides a 
clear definition about what the status quo of the Taiwan Strait should be. 
3.3 The Formation of the Triangle from a Statistical Perspective 
In this section, the most important goal is to examine the second principle of strategic 
triangle, the triangular causality. That is, the level of cooperation or conflict of a bilateral 
relationship is a function of the two actors' relationships with the third. The research question is 
twofold. First, do the U.S.-related behaviors have an impact on cross-strait relations? Second, 
how and in what way does the U.S. influence cross-strait relations? The former is a test of the 
presence of the U.S. triangularity, and the latter is to know whether the U.S. pattern is in a form 
of direct triangularity or indirect triangularity. In this section, I plan to use statistical analysis to 
answer the questions and investigate the effect of the United States in cross-strait relations from 
1979 to 2012. 
62 
3.3.1 Research Design and Methodological Notes 
In this section, I use the three-player game approach and treat a triangle as a set of two-
player game, so any bilateral interaction in the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle will not be exclude. 
Based on what the relevant literature has suggested, six hypotheses about cross-strait relations 
for testing the causal relations among state behaviors in the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle are listed 
as follows. The first and second hypotheses are about bilateral response. The third and fourth 
hypotheses are about directly triangular response. The fifth and sixth hypotheses are about 
indirect triangularity. 
H1 Bilateral Tit-for-Tat between Taiwan and China 
The positive development of China’s behavior toward Taiwan leads to the positive 
development of Taiwan's behavior toward China and vice versa.  
The negative development of Taiwan’s behavior toward China leads to the negative 
development of China’s behavior toward Taiwan and vice versa. 
H2 Bilaterally Coercive Cooperation between Taiwan and China  
The negative development China’s behavior toward Taiwan leads to the positive 
development of Taiwan's behavior toward China and vice versa.  
The negative development of Taiwan’s behavior toward China leads to the positive 
development of China’s behavior toward Taiwan and vice versa. 
H3 Triangular Tit-for-Tat caused by the United States in the Taiwan Strait  
The positive development of the U.S. behavior toward China leads to the positive 
development of China's behavior toward Taiwan, and the negative development of the U.S. 
behavior toward China leads to the negative development of China's behavior toward Taiwan. 
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The positive development of the U.S. behavior toward Taiwan leads to the positive 
development of Taiwan's behavior toward China, and the negative development of the U.S. 
behavior toward Taiwan leads to the negative development of Taiwan's behavior toward China. 
H4 Triangularly Coercive Cooperation caused by the United States in the Taiwan Strait  
The positive development of the U.S. behavior toward China leads to the negative 
development of China's behavior toward Taiwan, and the negative development of the U.S. 
behavior toward China leads to the positive development of China's behavior toward Taiwan.  
The positive development of the U.S. behavior toward Taiwan leads to the negative 
development of Taiwan's behavior toward China, and the negative development of U.S. behavior 
toward Taiwan leads to the positive development of Taiwan's behavior toward China. 
H5 Triangular Calculation of Utility in the Taiwan Strait  
The development of Taiwan's behavior toward China is a function of the development of 
the China-U.S. interactions. 
The development of China's behavior toward Taiwan is a function of the development of 
the U.S.-Taiwan interactions. 
H6 Triangular Self-Adjustment in the Taiwan Strait  
The development of Taiwan's behavior toward China is a function of the development of 
Taiwan's behavior toward the United States and the development of Taiwan’s behavior toward 
the United States is a function of the development of Taiwan’s behavior toward China. 
The development of China's behavior toward Taiwan is a function of the development of 
China's behavior toward the United States and the development of China’s behavior toward the 
United States is a function of the development of China’s behavior toward Taiwan. 
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As to the methodology, the state behavior variables from 1979 to 2012 have these 
following characteristics: nonstationarity, serial correlation, and autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (ARCH). This section applies an ARIMA(1,1,1)-GARCH(1,1) model to deal 
with the three problems. The ARIMA(1,1,1) model includes three components, which are the 
first-order autocorrelation, AR (1), the first-order moving-average, MA (1), and the first- 
differenced variables, I(1), to deal with the serial correlation and non-stationary problems. The 
GARCH(1,1) model is to assume that the current variance is a function of the variance of the last 
error term, ARCH(1), and the previous variance, GARCH(1). In sum, this section applies an 
ARIMA(1,1,1)-GARCH(1,1) model for the six state behavior variables (DTC, DCT, DCU. DUC, 
DTU, DUT), and the time scope is from January 1979 to June 2012.26 
The GARCH model is designed to model both the mean and variance of time series 
data, so there are two equations in the GARCH model, which are the conditional mean equation 
and the conditional variance equation. For the conditional mean equation, each first-differenced 
state behavior variable is regressed on the previous value of the other five differenced state 
behavior variables in one month, the AR (1) term, the MA (1) term, and a constant. The 
conditional mean equation helps explain how the negative-or-positive pattern of a state behavior 
is influenced by other state behaviors in the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle. In other words, all 
hypotheses from the three-player cooperative game approach will be examined by the results of 
the conditional mean equations. Taking Taiwan’s behavior toward China as example, the 
conditional mean equation of Taiwan’s behavior toward China (DTC) is: 
𝐷𝑇𝐶𝑡  = 𝐷𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝐶𝑈𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝑈𝐶𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝑈𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝐴𝑅(1) + 𝑀𝐴(1) + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 
                                                 
26 All state behavior variables are first-differenced variables, so the “D” in front of all state variables is to distinguish 
the original variables with the first-differenced variables. 
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As to the conditional variance equation, the variance of each first-differenced state 
behavior variable is a function of the previous value of the other five differenced state behavior 
variables in the last month, the ARCH (1) term, the GARCH (1) term, and a constant. The 
conditional variance equation in the GARCH model helps examine how a certain variable 
changes the variance of a state behavior. In the case of the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle, the 
conditional variance equation is used to examine how the stability of a state behavior is 
influenced by other state behaviors. The sensitivity or instability here is defined as a greater 
variance cause by a certain state behavior variable. Taking Taiwan’s behavior toward China as 
example, the conditional variance equation of Taiwan’s behavior toward China (DTC) is: 
𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑇𝐶𝑡  
= 𝐷𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝐶𝑈𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝑈𝐶𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝑈𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻(1)
+ 𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻(1) + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 
The results of the conditional mean equations are shown as Table 3.2, which helps 
explain the causal relations about negative-or-positive patterns in the U.S.-China-Taiwan triad 
since 1979. Regarding the diagnostics of standardized residuals in Table 3.2, there is no evidence 
of serial correlation, because all equations fail to reject the null hypotheses of having no serial 
correlation at 5% level. In short, the results are ready to make causal inference and the residuals 
function in a normal way. 
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Table 3.2 Results about Negative-or-Positive Patterns in the Triad (1979-2012) 
 DTC DCT DCU DUC DTU DUT 
Conditional mean 
DTC  0.363** -0.0116 -0.0720 -0.0139 0.0160 
t-1  (0.067) (0.149) (0.151) (0.0349) (0.028) 
DCT -0.0316  0.0593 0.198 0.0299 -0.0368 
t-1 (0.0687)  (0.127) (0.135) (0.0347) (0.027) 
DCU 0.0133 -0.0512  0.229* -0.00482 -0.0431* 
t-1 (0.0662) (0.050)  (0.101) (0.0352) (0.022) 
DUC -0.00483 0.0135 -0.0135  0.00329 -0.0179 
t-1 (0.0640) (0.053) (0.103)  (0.0331) (0.023) 
DTU -0.105 0.198+ -0.0154 0.0740  0.275** 
t-1 (0.162) (0.11) (0.301) (0.312)  (0.066) 
DUT 0.0811 -0.229* 0.272 0.456+ 0.285**  
t-1 (0.129) (0.10) (0.267) (0.267) (0.0734)  
AR(1) 0.0967 -0.225** 0.192 -0.0853 -0.0619 -0.0721 
 (0.0982) (0.082) (0.121) (0.0892) (0.0941) (0.063) 
MA(1) -0.793** -0.811** -0.829** -0.810** -0.799** -0.777** 
 (0.0474) (0.036) (0.0488) (0.0538) (0.0534) (0.039) 
Constant  0.617 0.707 0.877 0.650 0.291 0.766* 
 (0.867) (0.75) (1.579) (1.146) (0.363) (0.38) 
N 400 400 400 400 400 400 
B Statistic 
se 
0.5172 1.2384 0.7881 0.5023 0.7844 1.3227+ 
Note:  
1. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.  
2. Standard errors in parentheses.  
3. The B statistic reports the results of the Bartlett's test on standardized residuals, which helps detect serial 
correlation in the standardized residuals (se) of each equation.  
4. All tests and regressions are performed by STATA (ver. 12). 
3.3.2 Policy Inertia 
In Table 3.2, one AR term and all MA terms are significant at 5% level. The AR term is 
interpreted as the presence of policy inertia directly, which implies that the behavioral change in 
the last month can influence the change of the same behavior in this month in this triad. As 
shown in Table 3.2, only China’s behavior toward Taiwan (DCT) shows an evidence of policy 
inertia, and the negative and significant coefficient of the AR(1) term implies that the negative 
development of China’s behavior toward Taiwan in the last month leads to a positive 
development of China’s behavior toward Taiwan in this month, but the positive development in 
the last month leads to a negative development of China’s behavior toward Taiwan. 
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On the other hand, the significant MA terms in all equations reveal the effect of 
unexplained shock in the last month on this month. The negative sign of all MA terms indicates 
that a greater shock or surprise in the last month leads to a more negative development for all 
state behaviors in this month. Therefore, any surprise leads to a more negative development for 
all state behaviors in the triad subsequently. In short, the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle is a 
behavioral network in which actors’ behaviors are easy to go toward a conflictive development 
when facing surprising behaviors.  
3.3.3 The Negative-or-Positive Patterns in the Triad 
The results in Table 3.2 help identify the causal relations influencing negative-or-positive 
patterns of state behaviors in the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle. Based on the results in Table 3.2, 
Figure 3.4 shows all causal arrows significant at 5% level in the triad, which indicates all 
significant variables influencing the negative-or-positive development of state behaviors in the 
US-China-Taiwan triangle. Where the causal arrow goes means the dependent variable and 
where the arrow is from is the independent variable that is significant for the dependent variable 
in Table 3.4.27 
                                                 
27 As shown in Table 3.2, there are two significant state behavior variables in the equation of China’s behavior 
toward Taiwan (DCT), which are Taiwan’s behavior toward China (DTC) and the U.S. behavior toward Taiwan 
(DUT). Thus, in Figure 3.4, there are two arrows going from Taiwan’s behavior toward China (TWN toward CHN) 
and the U.S. behavior toward Taiwan (US toward TWN) to China’s behavior toward Taiwan (CHN toward TWN). 
The rest of causal arrows can also be interpreted in the same way. 
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Figure 3.4 Causal Relations of Negative-or-Positive Patterns in the Triad 
In general, negative-or-positive patterns in this triangle work in both bilateral and 
triangular ways. The presence of triangularity is evident in cross-strait relations and the U.S.-
Taiwan relations, and some states’ negative-or-positive patterns are quite independent from the 
interactions of the triangle. A detailed implication of the statistical results goes as follows. 
First of all, as shown in Table 3.2 and Figure 3.4, the development of Taiwan’s behavior 
toward China (DTC) is quite independent from any behavior in the triad because no state 
behavior variable is significant in the conditional mean equation of Taiwan’s behavior toward 
China (DTC) besides the MA term. This result rejects all hypotheses (from H1 to H6) about 
Taiwan’s behavior toward China. 
Second, the presence of bilateral tit-for-tat (H1) is evident in China’s policy toward 
Taiwan. The positive sign of Taiwan’s behavior toward China (DTC) in the equation of China’s 
behavior toward Taiwan (DCT) indicates that Taiwan’s behavior toward China (DTC) leads to 
China’s reciprocal response. Interestingly, China’s behavior toward Taiwan does not have the 
same tit-for-tat effect on Taiwan’s behavior toward China because China’s behavior toward 
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Taiwan (DCT) is not significant in the equation of Taiwan’s behavior toward China (DTC). This 
result suggests the special status of Taiwan in China’s decision-making process. More 
importantly, this result also reveals the insufficiency of the two-player game approach. Although 
the causality of bilateral interactions between Taiwan and China is significant, the causal arrow 
is not a two-way causal arrow. Only Taiwan’s behavior trigger China’s reciprocal response but 
China’s behavior does not trigger Taiwan’s response in cross-strait relations. Thus, researchers 
taking the two-player game approach on cross-strait relations should reconsider the question 
about “who makes the first move” and “who cares more,” because the statistical results show that 
China cares Taiwan’s behavior but Taiwan does not care so much about China’s behavior in 
cross-strait relations from 1979. 
Third, the indirectly triangular calculation of utility (H5) is partially evident in the 
conditional mean equation of China’s behavior toward Taiwan. The statistical evidence shows 
that the U.S. behavior toward Taiwan (DUT) leads to China’s inverse response toward Taiwan 
(DCT) because the sign of the coefficient is negative. This implies that the positive development 
of the U.S. behavior toward Taiwan triggers a negative development of China’s behavior toward 
Taiwan, or the negative development of the U.S. behavior toward Taiwan triggers a positive 
development of China’s behavior toward Taiwan. Again, the statistical result reminds the danger 
to treat a bilateral relationship as a whole. Although the U.S. behavior toward Taiwan (DUT) can 
influence China’s behavior toward Taiwan, Taiwan’s behavior toward the United States (DTU) 
does not have the same causal influence on China’s behavior because Taiwan’s behavior toward 
the United States (DTU) is not significant in the equation of China’s behavior toward Taiwan 
(DCT). Therefore, only the U.S. behavior toward Taiwan changes China’s calculation of utility 
in its behavior toward Taiwan, but Taiwan's policy toward U.S. is not. In China's rationale, the 
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sensitivity to the U.S. behavior to Taiwan is reasonable, because any U.S. positive development 
toward Taiwan shows a great potential to wreck China’s superiority and sovereign claim over 
Taiwan, but Taiwan’s positive development with the United States may not. In this case, a 
balancing or inverse behavior is necessary for China to increase Taiwan’s cost to cooperate with 
the United States or to mitigate Taiwan’s cost to conflict with the United States. A summarized 
result of hypothesis testing in cross-strait relations is presented as Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3 The Result of Hypothesis Testing Related to Cross-Strait Relations 
DV DTC DCT 
Bilateral tit-for-tat (H1)  ** 
Bilaterally coercive cooperation (H2)   
Triangular tit-for-tat by the US (H3)   
Triangularly coercive cooperation by the US (H4)   
Triangular calculation of utility (H5)  ** (DUT only) 
Triangular self-adjustment (H6)   
Note: ** indicates that the hypothesis is supported by the results in the conditional mean equations. 
Fourth, although it is not directly related to the hypothesis testing, the statistical results 
basically confirm Beijing’s efforts to influence Taipei through Washington and the U.S. strategy 
to balance China by cooperating with Taiwan. However, the effectiveness of Beijing’s efforts is 
questionable. In the first place, China’s behavior toward the United States (DCU) can influence 
the U.S. behavior toward Taiwan (DUT) in an inverse way. As shown in Table 3.2, the 
coefficient of China’s behavior toward the United States (DCU) in the equation of the U.S. 
behavior toward Taiwan (DUT) is negative. Therefore, the negative development of China’s 
behavior toward the United States triggers a positive development of the U.S. behavior toward 
Taiwan, which indicates that the United States uses its level of cooperation toward Taiwan as a 
means to respond or balance China’s behavior to the United States On the other hand, the 
positive development of China’s behavior toward the United States can lead to the U.S. reduction 
of cooperation toward Taiwan, and this is how Beijing attempts to influence the U.S. policy 
toward Taiwan. Second, the effectiveness is questionable because there is no evidence indicating 
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that the U.S. behavior toward Taiwan can influence Taiwan’s behavior toward China. In fact, the 
statistical results show that Taiwan’s behavior toward China (DTC) is independent from all 
behaviors in the triangle. Thus, although China can influence the development of U.S. policy 
toward Taiwan, the U.S. policy toward Taiwan does not influence Taiwan’s policy toward 
China. 
Considering the findings with the historical after 1979, first of all, there is no sign of the 
U.S. direct triangularity in the statistical analysis.28 Since the normalization of the U.S.-China 
relationship, the U.S. direct involvement in the Taiwan Strait is no longer an easy option, and the 
statistical evidence also echoes the trend. Second, although the U.S. leverage in cross-strait 
relations is limited, the U.S. behavior toward Taiwan still works as a useful means to influence 
China’s behavior toward Taiwan. As shown in Table 3.2, the U.S. behavior toward Taiwan 
(DUT) can lead to an opposite development of China’s behavior toward Taiwan (DCT), and this 
is also the only triangular causality influencing cross-strait relations which allows the United 
States to influence China’s policy toward Taiwan through changing its level of cooperation with 
Taiwan. This fact may well illustrate the main rationale of the United States to refuse setting a 
deadline to totally cease the arms sale to Taiwan because to terminate the channel of cooperation 
with Taiwan may also means the United States has to lose the only leverage to influence 
negative-or-positive patterns of cross-strait relations. On the other hand, there is no evidence to 
support that cross-strait relations are important to the negative-or-positive patterns of the U.S. 
policy because cross-strait relations (DTC and DCT) does not cause any significant change of the 
U.S. behaviors (DUT and DTU) in the conditional mean equations. However, the U.S. policy 
toward Taiwan really plays a role in cross-strait relations, especially for China’s behavior toward 
                                                 
28 Because the U.S. behavior toward Taiwan (DUT) is not significant for Taiwan’s behavior toward China (DTC), 
and the U.S. behavior toward China (DUC) is not significant for China’s behavior toward Taiwan (DCT). 
72 
Taiwan. Third, Taiwan in fact has some advantages in cross-strait relations. Taiwan’s policy 
toward China is quite independent and more importantly, Taiwan’s policy toward China can 
influence China’s policy toward Taiwan but not vice versa. Therefore, based on this pattern, 
Taiwan has the potential to play a more active role in cross-strait relations. 
To sum up, the results in the conditional mean equations indicate that the United States 
plays an indirect role in China’s policy toward Taiwan and lacks a direct leverage in negative-or-
positive patterns of cross-strait relations. As to the validity of the two-player game and three-
player game approaches, the statistical results suggest that negative-or-positive patterns of cross-
strait relations are not only a function of the interactions between Taiwan and China. At least for 
China, China’s behavior toward Taiwan is influenced by the U.S. indirect triangularity and 
Taiwan-initiated tit-for-tat. In other words, both bilateral and triangular causalities are evident for 
the negative-or-positive pattern of China’s behavior toward Taiwan. Thus, the two-player 
approach is not sufficient enough to explain the whole picture of cross-strait relations. More 
importantly, both two-player game and three-player game approaches fail to explain the 
negative-or-positive pattern of Taiwan’s behavior toward China, because no behavior in the triad 
can influence Taiwan’s behavior toward China. In short, since the U.S. leverage in the Taiwan 
Strait from 1979 to 2012 is evident although it only works indirectly on the China side, it is 
reasonable to claim that the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle functions as the second principle of 
strategic triangle predicts. Therefore, it is necessary to include the U.S. related behaviors when 
analyzing negative-or-positive patterns of cross-strait relations, and treat cross-strait relations as 
a part of the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle. 
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3.3.4 Patterns about Shocks 
The results of the conditional variance equations are used to identify the factors 
influencing the volatility of a state behavior, and are shown as Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4 Results of the Behavioral Stability in the Triad (1979-2012) 
 DTC DCT DCU DUC DTU DUT 
Conditional variance 
DTC  0.00567** -0.000182 0.00845** 0.00541* -0.00787* 
 t-1  (0.0018) (0.00224) (0.00239) (0.00239) (0.0031) 
DCT 0.00578**  -0.0101** -0.00902** -0.00773** 0.0107** 
t-1 (0.00196)  (0.00142) (0.00199) (0.00116) (0.0018) 
DCU -0.00212 -0.0000004  0.00599** 0.00428+ 0.00196 
t-1 (0.00320) (0.0032)  (0.000943) (0.00251) (0.0023) 
DUC 0.00103 0.000158 0.00284**  0.00234 -0.0057** 
t-1 (0.00316) (0.0030) (0.00103)  (0.00218) (0.0016) 
DTU -0.0161** 0.000925 0.0178** -0.0199*  0.0129** 
t-1 (0.00509) (0.0063) (0.00322) (0.00796)  (0.0040) 
DUT 0.00472 0.00580 -0.00869** 0.0130* 0.000859  
t-1 (0.00487) (0.0045) (0.00310) (0.00535) (0.00237)  
Constant 6.056** 7.031** 5.603** 5.646** 3.581** 4.534** 
 (0.230) (0.15) (0.288) (0.494) (0.260) (0.326) 
ARCH 0.265** 0.543** 0.0657** 0.107** 0.0700** 0.548** 
t-1 (0.0494) (0.061) (0.0186) (0.0290) (0.0145) (0.049) 
GARCH 0.678** 0.457** 0.891** 0.858** 0.856** 0.452** 
t-1 (0.0487) (0.061) (0.0201) (0.0203) (0.0232) (0.049) 
N 400 400 400 400 400 400 
B Statistic 
se2 
0.4744 0.4894 0.3702 0.5957 1.1180 0.4230 
Note:  
1. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.  
2. Standard errors in parentheses.  
3. The B statistic reports the results of the Bartlett's test on standardized residuals, which helps detect 
heteroscedasticity in the squared standardized residuals (se2) of each equation.  
4. In the DCT and DUT equations, the sum of the ARCH and GARCH terms is constrained to be 1 as the 
integrated GARCH model.  
5. All tests and regressions are performed by STATA (ver. 12). 
Regarding the diagnostics of standardized residuals, there is no evidence of the 
heteroscedasticity problem. As shown at the bottom of the Table 3.4, all equations fail to reject 
the null hypotheses of having no heteroscedasticity. In short, this is a model ready to make causal 
inference and the squared standardized residuals function in a normal way. 
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The results in Table 3.4 show a strong tendency of surprise-caused volatility and 
volatility clustering, because all ARCH and GARCH terms are positive and significant at 5% 
level. The ARCH term helps explain how uncertainty or unexplained shock in the last month 
influence the variance in this month.29 The positive ARCH terms imply that an unexpected news 
or shock in the last month tends to trigger a greater variance for all state behaviors in this month. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that any surprising movement or unexpected crisis tends to 
produce a greater variance or instability for all state behaviors in the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle. 
On the other hand, the GARCH terms help indicate the phenomenon of volatility clustering.30 
The positive GARCH terms in Table 3.4 suggest that the greater variance in the last month leads 
to a greater variance for all state behaviors in this month. In the reality of the U.S.-China-Taiwan 
triangle, this implies that if the instability in the last month is evident, the presence of instability 
in this month can be expected. In other words, there is a tendency that the instable time points 
tend to cluster. More importantly, the higher the sum of the coefficients of the ARCH and 
GARCH terms is, the stronger the persistence of volatility is. As shown in Table 3.4, the sum of 
the coefficients of the ARCH and GARCH terms for the conditional variance equations of all 
state behavior variables are very close or even equal to one.31 The fact implies that the volatility 
of state behaviors in the triad hardly dies out. In sum, the stability of the U.S.-China-Taiwan 
                                                 
29 ARCH(1) in the conditional variance equation means the squared error term at time t-1 in the conditional mean 
equation. In this dissertation, the error term is interpreted as uncertainty, so the ARCH term can be explained as the 
extreme level of uncertainty in the earlier time unit because the more extreme the error term in the conditional mean 
equation is, the greater the ARCH term in the conditional variance equation is. 
30 GARCH(1) means the value of variance at t-1 in the conditional variance equation. Therefore, the greater the 
variance in the last month is, the greater the variance is in this month. 
31 When the sum of the ARCH and GARCH terms is greater than one, I will then constrain the sum to be 1. In other 
words, the model then becomes an integrated GARCH (IGARCH) model used to depict the presence of high 
persistence in volatility. In the Table 3.4, the models of China’s behavior toward Taiwan (DCT) and the U.S. 
behavior toward Taiwan (DUT) are IGARCH(1,1) models. 
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triangle is very sensitive to any surprising behavior or instability, and the instable effect of 
surprises tends to work as a long-run memory for policy-makers. 
3.3.5 The Behavior Stability in the Triad 
The causal relations between state behaviors and the variance of a certain state behavior 
are based on the results of the conditional variance equations in Table 3.4, and Figure 3.5 shows 
all causal relations based on the results of the conditional variance equations. 
 
Figure 3.5 Causal Relations about the Behavioral Stability in the Triad 
In Figure 3.5, the positive relations mean the positive sign of the relative variables 
significant at 5% level in the conditional variance equations and the negative relations mean the 
negative sign of the relative variables. A positive relationship indicates that the positive change 
of a state behavior causes a greater variance or instability of another state behavior. A negative 
relationship, on the other hand, indicates the negative change of a state behavior causes a greater 
variance or instability for another state behavior. As in Figure3.4, where the causal arrow goes 
means the dependent variable and where the arrow is from is the independent variable that is 
significant for the dependent variable in Table 3.4. 
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One thing has to be noted before entering the discussion about the causal relationships 
between state behaviors and the volatility of state behaviors in the triad. In fact, there is not much 
theoretical guidance helping to formulate hypotheses about cooperation and states’ behavioral 
stability. In general, it is reasonable to assume that uncertainty tends to make it difficult for 
rational actors making decision and predicting the future. Thus, when decision-makers perceive 
any political change or event that brings great uncertainty, a sudden and sharp policy 
modification may be expected because they may not be able to respond rationally due to the 
great pressure caused by the uncertainty. The quick and assertive response to the outbreak of a 
crisis is a good example for the response to uncertainty. Therefore, it is reasonable to interpret 
that the greater instability or volatility of a certain state behavior is caused by the uncertainty 
made by other state behaviors. 
In general, the results in the conditional variance equations show that state behaviors in 
the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle are sensitive to each other’s behavior, as shown in Figure 3.5. In 
other words, the volatility of state behaviors in the triad can be predicted by some actor’s 
pervious behaviors in the triad. Comparing Figure 3.4 with Figure 3.5, it is obvious that many 
state behaviors have the ability to influence the stability of other state behaviors as shown in 
Figure 3.5, but only very few state behaviors can change the negative-or-positive patterns of 
other state behaviors as shown in Figure 3.4. Thus, in general, the interactions in the triad tend to 
influence the stability rather negative-or-positive patterns of state behaviors in the triad. 
As to the volatility of cross-strait relations, there are two note-worthy patterns. First, 
China’s behavior to Taiwan (DCT) is only sensitive to Taiwan’s behavior toward China (DTC). 
As shown in Figure 3.5, only one causal arrow going toward China’s behavior to Taiwan (CHN 
toward TWN) and it coming from Taiwan’s behavior toward China (TWN toward CHN). The 
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conditional variance equation of China’s behavior toward Taiwan (DCT) in Table 3.4 also shows 
that Taiwan’s behavior toward China (DTC) is the only significant factor. Both indicate the 
sensitive status of Taiwan in China’s decision making. More importantly, the positive coefficient 
of Taiwan’s behavior toward China (DTC) indicates that the positive development of Taiwan’s 
behavior leads to a greater volatility of China’s policy toward Taiwan. In short, China is 
sensitive to the positive change of Taiwan’s behavior, and none of other state behaviors can 
cause any significant variance of China’s behavior toward Taiwan. 
Second, as to the Taiwan side, Taiwan’s behavior toward China (DTC) is sensitive to the 
positive development of China’s behavior toward Taiwan (DCT) and the negative development 
of Taiwan’s behavior toward the United States (DTU) as shown in the conditional variance 
equation of Taiwan’s behavior toward China (DTC) in Table 3.4. The result suggests that the 
two state behavior variables can make Taiwan’s behavior toward China less stable or have a 
greater variance. The instable effect caused by the negative development of Taiwan’s behavior 
toward the United States (DTU) also suggests the presence of indirect triangularity in explaining 
the volatility of Taiwan’s behavior toward China. In other words, within Taiwan’s decision-
making process, the positive development of China’s behavior toward Taiwan and the negative 
development of Taiwan’s behavior toward the United States create uncertainty for Taiwan’s 
decision-makers. The former is a bilateral relationship between Taiwan and China, and the latter 
suggests that the stability of Taiwan’s policy toward China is a function of Taiwan’s policy 
toward the United States, which works like the triangular self-adjustment effect. 
As to the role of cross-strait relations in the U.S. policy, it is obviously that cross-strait 
relations play an important role in the stability of the U.S. behaviors. Both China’s behavior 
toward Taiwan (DCT) and Taiwan’s behavior toward China (DTC) are significant in the 
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conditional variance equations of the U.S. behavior toward China (DUC) and the U.S. behavior 
toward Taiwan (DUT) in Table 3.4. Comparing the results in the conditional variance equations 
(Table 3.4) with the results in the conditional mean equations (Table 3.2), there is no evidence to 
claim that cross-strait relations play a role in influencing the negative-or-positive pattern of the 
U.S. policy, because cross-strait relations (DTC and DCT) is not significant in the conditional 
mean equations of the U.S. behavior toward China (DUC) and the U.S. behavior toward Taiwan 
(DUT) in Table 3.2.32 Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that cross-strait relations have an impact 
on the stability of the U.S. behaviors but not on the negative-or-positive patterns of the U.S. 
behaviors. Any fluctuation of cross-strait relations causes instability for the U.S. policy rather 
makes the U.S. behaviors go toward a positive or negative development.  
To sum up, the results in the conditional variance equations show that many state 
behavior variables contribute to the volatility of other state behavior variables. In other words, it 
is reasonable to believe that the interactions in the triangle do not fundamentally alter the 
framework of the Three Communiques and One Act since 1979 to 2012. Surprises created by 
some actors are not rare, but they only create uncertainty for decision-makers, not incentives to 
change the existing negative-or-positive patterns. In cross-strait relations, China is only sensitive 
to the positive development of Taiwan’s behavior and Taiwan is sensitive to the positive 
development of China’s behavior toward Taiwan and the negative development of its own 
behavior toward the United States. Therefore, the statistical evidence indicates that the two sides 
of the Taiwan Strait are sensitive to any positive development initiated by the other side from 
1979 to 2012. More importantly, the statistical evidence also shows the presence of an indirect 
                                                 
32 A comparison between Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5 also shows the same pattern. In Figure 3.4, no causal arrow goes 
from Taiwan’s behavior toward China (TWN toward CHN) and China’s behavior toward Taiwan (CHN toward 
TWN) to the U.S. behaviors toward China and Taiwan (US toward CHN and US toward TWN). But, In Figure 3.5, 
many causal arrows go in this way. 
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triangularity related to the United States influencing Taiwan’s behavioral stability toward China. 
On the other hand, cross-strait relations have an impact on the volatility of the U.S. behaviors, 
but have no influence on the negative-or-positive patterns of the U.S. behaviors in the triad. The 
result suggests the United States is sensitive to the development of cross-strait relations, but the 
development of cross-strait relations may not directly alter the U.S. behavioral pattern since 
1979. 
In general, the statistical analysis based on the GDELT event data from 1979 shows that 
cross-strait relations are not only a function of the Taiwan-China interactions because of the 
presence of the U.S. triangulairty in the stability of Taiwan’s behavior toward China and in the 
negative-or-positive pattern of China’s behavior toward Taiwan. Based on the results, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the three-player game approach is more applicable than the two-
player approach to analyze cross-strait relations because the U.S. related behaviors cannot be 
omitted. From 1979 to 2012, in general the U.S. influence works in a subtle and indirect way in 
cross-strait relations. Unlike many works emphasizing the direct triangularity in regional 
conflict, the significant third party plays an indirect role in the Taiwan Strait. 
3.4 Conclusion 
Following the three principles of strategic triangle in the relevant literature, both the 
historical and statistical analyses confirm that cross-strait relations are not pure bilateral affairs 
between Taiwan and China. Both results suggest that the U.S. influence cannot be omitted and it 
works in a subtle and indirect way in cross-strait relations as shown in the statistical analysis. 
Based on these results, it seems clear that a three-player game approach is more reasonable than 
the two-player game approach. 
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The historical analysis in this chapter has shown that the three actors’ behaviors are 
heavily interconnected because of the Chinese Civil War legacy and the Cold War legacy. The 
two legacies have forced the three actors to make decisions based on the result of the earlier 
interactions, and more importantly, made the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle functions like a 
balance of power system and no state will be eliminated, as the third principle of strategic 
triangle predicts. The Chinese Civil War legacy and the resulting “one China” principle make 
Taiwan and China always prioritize the sovereignty issue and provide conflictive incentives for 
them. As to the Cold War legacy, the U.S. preference of global strategy and the U.S.-defined 
status quo constrain the capabilities of Taiwan and China to fulfill their sovereign claims. This is 
the reason that Taiwan survives from China’s takeover and the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle can 
function like a balance of power system. In sum, the two legacies bind these three actors’ 
behaviors and entangle them in a way that the third principle of strategic triangle predicts 
The statistical analysis derived from the interactions in the triad from 1979 to 2012 
reveals the presence of the U.S. triangularity working in an indirect form in cross-strait relations, 
which indicates that in the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle, cross-strait relations are a function of 
China and Taiwan’s relations with the United States, as the second principle of strategic triangle 
predicts. The results in the conditional mean equations show that the United States does not have 
a direct leverage to influence cross-strait relations, but the United States can influence China’s 
negative-or-positive pattern toward Taiwan by manipulating its relationship with Taiwan. In 
other words, the U.S. influence works in a form of triangular calculation of utility for China’s 
behavior toward Taiwan, and the positive development of the U.S. behavior toward Taiwan can 
lead to a negative development of China’s behavior toward Taiwan. In sum, the significant third 
party in the Taiwan Strait plays an indirect role through triangular calculation of utility and only 
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on the China side. On the other hand, Taiwan’s negative-or-positive pattern toward China is 
quite independent from the United States and China’s behaviors, so to include Taiwan’s 
domestic politics for further analysis may be a good option to explain Taiwan’s negative-or-
positive pattern toward China. As to the results in the conditional variance equations, the U.S. 
influence on the volatility of cross-strait relations works indirectly on the Taiwan side. The 
empirical evidence shows that Taiwan’s behaviors toward China and toward the United States 
are sensitive to each other because any change of one behavior changes the volatility of the other 
behavior. Again, this is an indirect U.S. influence existing in Taiwan’s decision-making process. 
Finally, the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle is a behavioral network that hates surprise and 
instability, and the statistical analysis suggests that the United States is sensitive to the 
fluctuation of cross-strait relations, but the fluctuation of cross-strait relations may not directly 
and fundamentally alter the U.S. behavioral pattern since 1979. 
CHAPTER 4. THE IMPACT OF THE COLD WAR AND TAIWAN’S 
DEMOCRATIZATION 
Since the formation of the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle is deeply intertwined with the 
Cold War structure and the “one China” legacy, it is worthy to further investigate the impact of 
the Cold War and Taiwan’s democratization on the dynamics of the triangle. From 1979 to 2012, 
there are two important events that significantly impact the two legacies. The first is the 
dissolution of the stable bipolar system brought by the end of the Cold War. Since the U.S.-
China rapprochement in the 1970s was a strategic cooperation to balance the Soviet Union in the 
Cold War structure, does the loss of common enemy after the Cold War alter the nature of the 
U.S.-China relations? Some IR theories in the realist context, like structural realism and power 
transition theory, have suggested a pessimistic and conflictive future of the U.S.-China relations. 
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This chapter will examine the validity of their predictions and implications in the U.S.-China-
Taiwan triangle. 
The second is Taiwan’s regime change from the KMT authoritarian rule to a democratic 
regime. The change of regime type may have a profound impact on foreign policy. More 
importantly, empirical IR studies have suggested a more conflictive tendency for those states in 
the democratic transition process because politicians tend to utilize nationalist emotion for 
winning elections. Beside the empirical implication, Taiwan’s democratization also has its 
political implications. Taiwan’s democratization has created an opportunity for Taiwanese 
leaders to challenge or deviate from the original “one China” position, which may impact the 
“one China” consensus recognized by the United States and China after 1979. Therefore, this 
chapter aims to test the validity of the conflictive tendency suggested by the relevant literature in 
the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle.  
In general, the main research question of this chapter is how the shift of power structure 
and the regime change of Taiwan altered negative-or-positive patterns and the volatility of state 
behaviors in the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle. There are three sections in this chapter. The first 
section is a brief discussion about the theoretical implications of the end of Cold War and 
Taiwan’s democratization. The second is a statistical analysis about the impacts of the Cold War 
and its end. The third section is to observe the changing dynamics in the U.S.-China-Taiwan 
triangle caused by Taiwan’s democratization. 
4.1 Theoretical Implication about the Two Structural Breaks 
In the IR theory, the end of the Cold War has two implications, which are the end of a 
stable bipolar system and the shifting nature of the U.S.-China relationship. From the perspective 
of the realist scholars emphasizing the global structure, like Waltz (1979) and Mearsheimer 
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(1990), the dissolution of the Cold War system leads to endless regional conflicts definitely 
because the stable bipolar structure no longer exists. Based on this prediction, a more conflictive 
cross-strait relationship can be expected. On the other hand, the end of the Cold War also implies 
the end of the cooperative relationship between China and the United States to balance the Soviet 
Union. Then, what should be the nature of the U.S.-China relationship after the Cold War? Since 
the rise of China has been the most spectacular trend after the end of the Cold War, power 
transition theory provides a pessimistic prediction that the more close the gap of capability 
between the status quo hegemon and the revisionist challenger is, the more likely a hegemonic 
conflict will occur (Organski & Kugler 1980). Although the power transition prediction has been 
criticized in the IR field, scholars also agree that China will be more of a threat to the U.S. 
interests in East and Southeast Asia rather than a threat in a global scale (Levy 2008).  Based on 
this prediction, a more conflictive U.S.-China relationship can be expected. In this case, the 
chance for China to tolerate the U.S. inference in the Taiwan Strait will become lower with the 
closing gap between the United States and China since the Taiwan issue is China’s core interest. 
Thus, a more conflictive cross-strait relationship can be expected in the power transition process. 
In sum, with the end of Cold War structure, theories in the realist context suggest a more 
conflictive tendency in cross-strait relations because of the end of the bipolar system and the 
shifting nature of the U.S.-China relations after the Cold War. 
The problem of the neorealist prediction is that in general, realist scholars tend to define 
and operationalize instability as the occurrence of conflictive events or even war. This definition 
has two weaknesses. First, war is not the only form of conflict. Second, the definition ignores 
another dimension of instability, which is the greater variance of behavioral pattern. This chapter 
may contribute to deal with the weaknesses in two ways. First, the GDELT event data applied in 
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this dissertation helps expand the scope of conflictive behavior ranging from verbal conflict to 
material conflict. More importantly, it helps test the validity of the neorealist prediction in the 
real world when stability is not only a dichotomous variable between war and peace. Second, the 
GARCH model applied in this chapter helps explore how the Cold War or the end of the Cold 
War influences the volatility of state behaviors in the triangle since all kinds of behavior have 
been quantified by the GDELT event database. As to the growing economic interdependence 
between Taiwan and China following the end of the Cold War, the impact will be discussed in 
the next chapter. 
On the other hand, Taiwan’s democratization has a great impact on not only Taiwan’s 
“one China” position but also the framework of the Three Communiqués and One Act. Many 
foreign policy studies have suggested a correlation between incomplete democratization and the 
potential for military conflict. Mansfield and Snyder (2005) indicate that there is a great risk of 
military conflict for the incomplete transition from autocracy toward democracy. Due to the lack 
of institutional capacity to deal with the rising civil demand and politicians’ calculation to win 
elections, electoral agenda is easily to be dominated by nationalist emotion and prestige strategy, 
which may lead to military conflicts potentially. In sum, if the correlation is true, a more 
conflictive relationship between Taiwan and China can be expected during Taiwan’s 
democratization. 
More importantly, the nature of Taiwan’s domestic politics also makes the correlation 
between democratization and conflict in the Taiwan Strait appear reasonable. First, the 
uniqueness of Taiwan’s democratization is that democracy is not the only game in town or issue 
at stake, and the nationalist emotion of Taiwan independence always plays a role in the 
democratization transition process. For example, far earlier than the establishment of the DPP, 
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the debate between “independence first” and “democracy first” existed for a long time in the 
opposition camp. Second, as the main opposition party in Taiwan’s democratization, the output 
of the DPP’s China policy was usually a product of institutional design and the compromise 
among historical party factions. The process from the amendment of the party platform to 
establish the Republic of Taiwan in 1991 to the Resolution on Taiwan's Future in 1999 provides 
a good example of the compromise between the Formosa faction and the New Tide faction. The 
New Tide faction was the major force to push the DPP to include Taiwan independence in the 
party charter in 1991, and the Formosa faction basically held a priority that winning election is 
more important than advocating the Republic of Taiwan.33 The 1999 resolution clearly stood in 
the middle ground of the two factions because it claimed that Taiwan is an independent country 
in the name of the Republic of China and any change related to Taiwan’s future should be 
decided by all Taiwanese people. Thus, through the factional politics of compromise within the 
DPP, Taiwan independence has continually been a part of the DPP’s position toward China, 
because top leaders of the DPP cannot risk to lose the support from the New Tide faction.34 In 
sum, it is reasonable to assume that Taiwan’s democratization has a great potential to trigger the 
tension in the Taiwan Strait due to the nature of Taiwan’s democratization and the DPP’s 
position on Taiwan independence. 
To sum up for the theoretical section, the end of the Cold War and Taiwan’s 
democratization are not only challenges to the Cold War and the “one China” legacies, but also 
important cases to reflect the implications of the existing IR theories. First, did the two political 
                                                 
33 After 2000, the Formosa faction was disunited into several small factions, like the New Century Office and the 
New Momentum faction, because its important leader, Hsu Hsin-liang, left the DPP. The two smaller factions also 
stopped functioning several years later. 
34 The New Tide faction never shrinks from the position of Taiwan independence, and keeps functioning as the most 
organized and powerful faction in the DPP. 
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events cause any behavioral change in the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle? Both realism and the 
empirical study of foreign policy predict a higher probability to have a more conflictive 
relationship between Taiwan and China. This chapter aims to examine the validity of these 
predictions. Second, how did the two political events influence the volatility of all state 
behaviors in this triad? Current empirical studies in the IR field seldom directly investigate the 
volatility of state behavior caused by political events. Empirical works of political science 
applying a similar methodology focus on the relationship between parliamentary politics and the 
volatility of foreign exchange rate, like Leblang and Bernhard’s (2006) work. Clearly, the 
behavioral stability of a state is not well explored in the IR field, and this dissertation attempts to 
explain the stability of state behaviors in the triad with the uncertainty created by the end of the 
Cold War and Taiwan’s democratization. In short, this chapter aims to investigate the changing 
patterns and the volatility of state behaviors in the triad under the impacts of the end of the Cold 
War and Taiwan’s democratization. 
4.2 Method and Variables 
This chapter applies an ARIMA(1,1,1)-GARCH (1,1) model to control the bias caused by 
the serial correlation, non-stationarity and heteroscedasticity problems.35 This model is designed 
to model both the mean and variance of time series data, so there are two equations in this model, 
the conditional mean equation and the conditional variance equation. The conditional mean 
equation helps explain how the negative-or-positive pattern of a state behavior is influenced by 
other state behaviors and the important political events in the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle. 
Taking Taiwan’s behavior toward China as example, the conditional mean equation of Taiwan’s 
behavior toward China (DTC) is: 
                                                 
35 For a more detailed discussion about this model specification, see Chapter 2. 
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𝐷𝑇𝐶𝑡  = 𝐷𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝐶𝑈𝑡−1 + 𝐷𝑈𝐶𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝑈𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝐴𝑅(1)
+ 𝑀𝐴(1) + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 
The conditional variance equation is used to examine how the volatility of a state 
behavior is influenced by other state behaviors and the important political events. Taking 
Taiwan’s behavior toward China as example, the conditional variance equation of Taiwan’s 
behavior toward China (DTC) is:36 
𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑇𝐶𝑡  
= 𝐷𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝐶𝑈𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝑈𝐶𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝑈𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦
+ 𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻(1) + 𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻(1) + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 
Regarding the operationalization of the end of the Cold War, a dummy variable (Cold 
War) is created to denote the Cold War period (coded as 1) and the post-Cold War period (coded 
as 0). In this chapter, the time of the Cold War ends in June 1989 when the Tiananmen incident 
occurred.37 As to Taiwan’s democratization, a set of dummy variables are created, which are 
authoritarian rule (authoritarian), democratic transition (transition), and democratic 
consolidation (consolidation). The democratic transition is usually defined as a replacement of 
authoritarian institutions with democratic practices, and in most situations the democratic 
practices are defined by fair, comprehensive, and periodic elections of the most powerful 
position in a country.38 On the other hand, democratic consolidation is still a concept under 
                                                 
36 The model specification of the conditional mean and variance equations here only takes the direct influence of a 
certain event (like the Cold War) on a certain behavior (like Taiwan’s behavior toward China, DTC) into account, 
and assume that the interactive effect between the event  and other right-hand-side variables (like Cold War*DCTt-1) 
is irrelevant. The reason to make this assumption is that the GARCH model is notorious for the convergence 
problem. When more variables are included, it is more likely that STATA fails to converge in the iteration process. I 
have tried to include all interactive variables in both the conditional mean and variance equations for all models in 
the following sections and chapters, but all fail to converge and produce regression results. Therefore, I keep the two 
equations in all models as parsimonious as possible and try to add one or two variables each time to avoid the 
problem. 
37 The reason to select this time point as the date of the end of the Cold War has been discussed in Chapter 2. 
38 This dissertation takes the minimalist definition of democracy, see Huntington (1991) and Przeworski (2010). 
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debate. The Huntington’s (1991: 267) “two turnover test” is an easy way to operationalize the 
concept.39 In the case of Taiwan, the Polity IV Project defines that Taiwan’s democratic 
transition occurred on December 1992 when the whole members of the Legislative Yuan of the 
R.O.C. were elected directly from Taiwan for the first time in the history.40 However, to define 
transition at this time point has two problems. First, due to the long tradition of the KMT 
authoritarian rule, the most powerful position in Taiwan is the president rather than the head of 
the Executive Yuan, or the premier. Second, it may omit Lee Teng-hui’s reforms within the 
KMT regime after 1992. In this case, taking the presidencies of Taiwan is a good choice to 
indicate the different stages of democratization. 
Based on the theoretical guidelines and the reality of Taiwanese politics, the Chiang 
Ching-kuo period can be defined as the authoritarian period with no doubt. Since 
democratization is a process and two direct elections, the 1992 Legislative Yuan election and the 
1996 presidential election, were held in the Lee Teng-hui period, it is reasonable to take the Lee 
period as the transition period. Finally, since the “second turnover” occurred in 2008, it is 
reasonable to take the Chen Sheui-bian and Ma Ying-jeo’s periods as the consolidation period. 
To sum up, in the following section, I apply the ARIMA(1,1,1)-GARCH (1,1) model to 
observe how the two political events, the end of Cold War and Taiwan’s democratization, 
influence negative-or-positive patterns and the volatility of state behaviors in the U.S.-China-
Taiwan triangle. 
                                                 
39 For a more detailed discussion of democratic consolidation, please check Diamond (1999) and Linz and Stepan 
(1996). 
40 The information comes from the website of the Polity Project IV, see Marshall (2010). 
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4.3 The Impact of the Cold War and Its End 
The summarized results of the Cold War model are presented as Table 4.1.41 In the 
conditional mean equations, the results reveal how the Cold War influences the negative-or-
positive pattern of each state behavior. In the conditional variance equations, the results indicate 
how the Cold War influences the volatility of each state behavior. Basically, this is the main 
method to make causal inference in the following sections. 
Table 4.1 Summarized Results of the Cold War Model (1979-2012) 
 DTC DCT DCU DUC DTU DUT 
Conditional mean 
Cold War 0.318 -1.099 -4.373 -2.520 -0.637 -0.0487 
 (2.10) (1.49) (3.49) (2.38) (1.25) (0.61) 
Conditional Variance 
Cold War -0.938** -0.405 -1.092* -0.678 -0.161 -1.323** 
 (0.20) (0.26) (0.45) (0.43) (0.22) (0.43) 
Note: 1. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 2. Standard errors in parentheses. 3. The rest part of these models is 
omitted and all tests on standardized residuals show no evidence of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. 
As to the effect of the Cold War, from the results in the conditional mean equations, it is 
clear that negative-or-positive patterns of all state behaviors are not influenced by the Cold War 
at all, because the dummy variable of the Cold War is not significant in all equations. Thus, there 
is no evidence to claim that the end of Cold War causes any shift of negative-or-positive patterns 
in the triad. In short, the empirical evidence does not support the prediction that the U.S.-China 
and cross-strait relations are more conflictive in the post-Cold War era. 
Checking the realist theories with the statistical results, although neo-realism and power 
transition theory both suggest a more conflictive dynamics after the Cold War in the triad, the 
empirical analysis does not support their predictions. If the correlation between the bipolar 
structure and the lower chance of conflict is true, a positive and significant relationship between 
the Cold War dummy and the six state behavior variables can be expected. On the other hand, if 
                                                 
41 The causal relationships between the three actors’ behaviors are basically the same as the model in Chapter 3. 
Table 4.1 only presents the results related to the Cold War variable. 
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the power transition logic is true, the negative development of the U.S.-China relationship and 
cross-strait relations after the Cold War can be expected. However, the causal relationship 
between the Cold War and the relevant state behavior variables fails to be significant at the 
conventional level in Table 4.1. In short, both neorealist hypotheses do not hold based on the 
statistical results. 
Reviewing the historical reality with the statistical results, there are three reasons to 
explain why the realist predictions about a more conflictive dynamics do not work. First, 
although the U.S.-China cooperation was initiated by the common interest to balance the Soviet 
Union, the dissolution of the “great” triangle never actually shifted the U.S. policy preference 
from maintaining the stability of the Taiwan Strait with strategic ambiguity. Second, the 
increasing economic and strategic interests of the opening and rising China make the United 
States prefer to maintain the U.S.-China cooperation rather than compete with China in a balance 
of power game. Thus, the balance of power game never really favors the Taiwan side in the post-
Cold War era.42 More importantly, Taiwan is never the core interest of the United States with a 
great intrinsic value since the 1970s (Tucker 2009). Third, on the China’s side, the dominant 
national goal since Deng Xiaoping is to integrate into the world order rather than to be a 
revisionist state to challenge it like Mao did (Legro 2007). Thus, a hegemonic competition is 
never an option for China. In sum, both China and the United States have no intention to get into 
a hegemonic competition and a deviation of the two countries’ preferences from maintaining the 
status quo never actually takes place. In short, although the Cold War ended in 1989, the legacy 
remains in the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle and the framework of the Three Communiqués and 
One Act still holds. 
                                                 
42 For a  further discussion about these two points, see Dittmer (2005) and Dittmer (2011). 
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On the other hand, regarding the results in the conditional variance equations, it seems 
that the stabilizing effect of the bipolar system really works on the following three state 
behaviors, Taiwan’s behavior toward China (DTC), China’s behavior toward the U.S (DCU), 
and the U.S. behavior toward Taiwan (DUT). Therefore, if defining stability as lower volatility, 
the results somehow echo the neo-realist hypothesis about the stability in a bipolar system in a 
certain degree. The statistical evidence shows that the three state behaviors are more stable from 
1979 to 1989 and less stable after 1989 because the negative sign of the Cold War variable 
indicates a lower volatility caused by the Cold War or a higher volatility caused by the end of the 
Cold War. Figure 4.1 shows the before-after comparison of the three state behavior variables. 
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Figure 4.1 The Before-After Comparison of the Cold War Model 
As show in Figure 4.1, the volatility of the three state behavior variables (DTC, DCU, 
and DUT) increases after the mid-point of 1989, and the three variables are more stable in the 
Cold War era. More importantly, the results again remind the danger to treat a bilateral 
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relationship as a whole, because the statistical results show no sign of the Cold War effect on the 
countering behaviors of the three significant behaviors. In short, only Taiwan’s behavior toward 
China (DTC), China’s behavior toward the United States (DCU), and the U.S. behavior toward 
Taiwan (DUT) are influenced by the Cold War structure, because of the higher volatility in the 
post-Cold War era. 
However, checking the time point in Figure 4.1, it seems that a trend toward a greater 
volatility starts around 1996 for the three behaviors, which is the year of the third Taiwan Strait 
crisis. In this case, it is also reasonable to test the effect of the 1996 crisis on the stability of all 
state behaviors in the triad. Therefore, a new dummy variable of the 1996 Crisis (After Crisis) is 
created to replace the original dummy variable of Cold War in the model, and the summarized 
results are presented as Table 4.2.43 
Table 4.2 The Effect of the 1996 Crisis (1979-2012) 
 DTC DCT DCU DUC DTU DUT 
Conditional mean 
After -2.580 -0.113 9.031 4.661 1.838 -0.631 
Crisis (2.632) (1.819) (5.591) (4.461) (1.793) (1.120) 
Conditional Variance 
After 1.850** 1.577** 2.259** 2.046** 1.627** 2.055** 
Crisis (0.214) (0.244) (0.224) (0.285) (0.204) (0.421) 
Note: 1. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 2. Standard errors in parentheses. 3. The rest part of these models is 
omitted and all tests on standardized residuals show no evidence of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. 
The results in Table 4.2 can be summarized as two points. First, like the effect of the 
Cold War, the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis do not directly influence negative-or-positive patterns in 
the triad, but make all state behaviors more volatile or less stable after the crisis. As shown in 
Table 4.2, the dummy variables is not significant for all state behavior variables in the 
conditional mean equations, but the variable is positive and significant in all conditional variance 
equations. Second, it seems that the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis plays a more significant role in the 
                                                 
43 The data points later than March 1996 are coded as 1, and the data points earlier than March 1996 are coded as 0. 
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volatility of all state behaviors in the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle. Compared with the effect of 
Cold War that only influences the stability of three state behaviors, all state behaviors in the triad 
are more volatile in the period after the 1996 crisis. In short, it is reasonable to say that the 1996 
crisis really makes all state behaviors in the triad less stable, but the end of the Cold War only 
makes Taiwan’s behavior toward China (DTC), China’s behavior toward the United States 
(DCU), and the U.S. behavior toward Taiwan (DUT) less stable.  
In sum, although the statistical evidence supports the neo-realist causality in a certain 
degree, the 1996 crisis works more like a real test for the volatility of state behaviors in the 
triangle. Moreover, since negative-or-positive patterns in the triad are obviously not influenced 
by the two events, it is reasonable to say that the Framework of the Three Communiqués and 
One Act still works. However, since the greater volatility is evident after the two events, 
especially the 1996 crisis, it is very likely that the dynamics and momentum under the surface of 
the framework are not as smooth as the surface looks like. Thus, perhaps after the two events, a 
new dynamics is forming while the old regime still holds in the triad.  
To sum up for this section, the statistical analysis does not support the predictions made 
by power transition theory and neo-realism in general. Both theories suggest a conflictive 
development in cross-strait relations due to the change of power structure at the international 
level. The statistical results show that there is no evidence to support a more conflictive pattern 
in the post-Cold War period in the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle. However, it is reasonable to 
claim that some state behaviors are more “stable” or less volatile in the Cold War era as the neo-
realists predict, but the effect of the 1996 crisis has a more comprehensive impact on the stability 
of state behaviors in the triad. 
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4.4 The Impact of Taiwan’s Democratization 
The impact of Taiwan’s democratization process is very similar with the Cold War effect. 
In general, based on the statistical results, the different stages of Taiwan’s democratization do 
not lead to any change for negative-or-positive patterns in the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle, but 
some state behaviors are more volatile and less stable in some stages. Thus, Taiwan’s 
democratization does not directly influence negative-or-positive patterns in the triangle, but 
makes the dynamics within the triangle less stable. The summarized results including the dummy 
variables of Taiwan’s democratization process are presented as Table 4.3.44 
Table 4.3 Summarized Results of the Democratization Model (1979-2012) 
 DTC DCT DCU DUC DTU DUT 
Conditional mean 
Authoritar- -0.0966 0.380 -3.827 -1.576 -0.762 0.274 
ian (1.84) (1.93) (3.01) (2.48) (1.29) (0.53) 
Transition 1.362 1.211 2.148 0.0630 0.507 -0.0890 
 (1.97) (1.54) (3.20) (2.33) (1.22) (0.57) 
Consolida- -4.867+ -1.549 6.970 6.186 1.191 -0.519 
tion (2.84) (2.06) (4.41) (4.25) (1.87) (1.41) 
Conditional Variance 
Authoritar- -0.694** 0.969* -0.653+ -0.488 0.258 -1.227* 
ian (0.17) (0.40) (0.40) (0.49) (0.21) (0.57) 
Transition -0.0500 -0.666* 0.460 0.199 -0.628** 0.850 
 (0.19) (0.29) (0.38) (0.40) (0.19) (0.59) 
Consolida- 1.369** 1.212** 0.814** 0.502 1.270** 2.126** 
tion (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.43) (0.27) (0.50) 
Note: 1. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 2. Standard errors in parentheses. 3. The rest part of these models is 
omitted and all tests on standardized residuals show no evidence of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. 
As shown in Table 4.3, none of the dummy variables about democratization is significant 
at 5% level in the conditional mean equations. The results imply that Taiwan’s democratization 
process does not change the development of negative-or-positive patterns in the triad. In other 
                                                 
44 As mentioned before, to add three dummy variables (authoritarian, transition, consolidation) in both the 
conditional mean and variance equations of all state behaviors makes all models fail to converge and produce 
regression results. Therefore, I run the regression three times and add only one dummy variable each time to 
compare the impacts of the three transition periods on the interactions of the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle. Thus, the 
results in Table 4.3 is the comparison of the results when a certain dummy variable is included in the conditional 
mean and variance equations. 
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words, although Taiwan’s democratization attempts to emphasize the de facto independence of 
Taiwan, the existing framework of negative-or-positive patterns in the triangle remains. Thus, 
there is also no evidence to support the claim that the democratization process changes negative-
or-positive patterns of cross-strait relations. In sum, the results suggest that the correlation 
between democratic transition and conflictive behaviors still needs a further consideration at 
least in the U.S.-China-Taiwan triad. 
Reviewing the theoretical relationship between democratization and conflict, it seems 
that in the case of Taiwan there is no evidence indicating that Taiwan’s behavior toward China is 
more conflictive in the process of democratic transition as Mansfield and Snyder suggest. 
However, the dependent variable in their empirical study is war or military conflict, but in this 
model it is conflictive behaviors ranging from verbal conflict to material conflict. Therefore, it is 
obvious that when extending the range of conflict, the correlation between regime change and 
conflict may not be as clear as Mansfield and Snyder suggest. 
On the other hand, the results in the conditional variance equations show that in general 
the variance of state behaviors in the triad is higher in the consolidation period. As to the period 
of the KMT authoritarian rule, Taiwan’s behavior toward China (DTC) and the U.S. behavior 
toward Taiwan (DUT) have a lower volatility while China’s behavior toward Taiwan (DCT) has 
a higher volatility in this period. The results are quite reasonable because it is consistent with the 
history after the normalization of the U.S.-China relationship. After 1979, Taiwan still held the 
“three noes” policy toward China, which made any negotiation, communication, and 
compromise between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait impossible. The U.S. policy toward 
Taiwan had no significant change since the Taiwan Relations Act passed. Therefore, the lower 
volatility of Taiwan’s behavior toward China (DTC) and the U.S. behavior toward Taiwan 
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(DUT) in Table 4.3 is quite reasonable when comparing with the history. In sum, it seems that 
when Taiwan does not challenge or attempt to deviate from the “one China” position, Taiwan’s 
behavior to China and the U.S. behavior to Taiwan tend to be stable. In short, regarding the 
volatility of cross-strait relations, Taiwan’s behavior toward China has a lower volatility while 
China’s behavior toward Taiwan has a greater volatility in the period of the KMT authoritarian 
rule. 
As to the period of democratic transition (1989-2000), the statistical analysis shows that 
China’s behavior toward Taiwan (DCT) and Taiwan’s behavior toward the United States (DTU) 
are less volatile or have a lower variance in this period. In other words, in cross-strait relations, 
only China’s behavior toward Taiwan is influence by Taiwan’s democratic transition, but the 
effect of Taiwan’s democratic transition is a stabilizing effect because the coefficient is negative. 
However, the results may be biased by omitting the 1996 crisis. Therefore, it is necessary to 
further divide the transition period (the Lee presidency) into the first half of transition before 
March 1996 and the second half after March 1996 to observe the difference in the transition 
period. The summarized results are presented as Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4 The Before-After Comparison in the Transition Period 
 DTC DCT DCU DUC DTU DUT 
Conditional mean 
Before the  1.411 0.850 2.123 0.574 0.508 -0.0668 
1996 Crisis (1.77) (1.10) (3.39) (2.39) (0.80) (0.57) 
After the 11.25* 5.793+ 7.051 7.552 1.238 -0.328 
1996 Crisis (4.55) (3.48) (12.7) (12.3) (1.55) (1.76) 
Conditional Variance 
Before the  -0.0294 -0.762** 0.388 -0.189 -0.375+ 0.728 
1996 Crisis (0.19) (0.24) (0.42) (0.32) (0.20) (0.61) 
After the 0.804 0.963+ 0.736 1.996** -0.355 1.758+ 
1996 Crisis (0.83) (0.56) (0.65) (0.43) (0.41) (1.06) 
Note: 1. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 2. The rest part of this model is omitted and all tests on standardized 
residuals show no evidence of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. 
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Two findings are important about the results of dividing the transition period by the 1996 
crisis. First, as shown in the conditional mean equations, after the 1996 crisis, Taiwan’s behavior 
toward China (DTC) is in fact more positive than before.45 In average, after the 1996 crisis, the 
growth of the net cooperation score of Taiwan’s behavior toward China per month is 11.25 
higher than the average growth from 1979 to 2012. Therefore, checking the results in Table 4.3 
and 4.4 together, it is clear that the correlation between democratic transition and higher 
probability of conflict does not occur in cross-strait relations, and Taiwan is in fact more 
cooperative after a crisis near war. 
Second, as shown in the conditional variance equations, the 1996 crisis influences the 
stability of two state behaviors, which are China’s behavior toward Taiwan (DCT) and the U.S. 
behavior toward China (DUC). China’s behavior toward Taiwan (DCT) is more stable or less 
volatile before the 1996 crisis, and the U.S. behavior toward China (DUC) is less stable after the 
1996 crisis. Comparing Table 4.3 with Table 4.4, in general Taiwan’s democratic transition does 
not create too much uncertainty for China’s behavior toward Taiwan, especially before the 1996 
crisis. The lower volatility of China’s behavior toward Taiwan (DCT) in the transition period is 
evident in Table 4.3, but the stabilizing effect mainly comes from the period before the 1996 
crisis as Table 4.4 shows. Therefore, even when taking the 1996 crisis into account, there is still 
no evidence to support the claim that cross-strait relation are less stable in the transition period. 
As to the period of democratic consolidation (2000-2012), in Table 4.3, almost all state 
behaviors, besides the U.S. behavior toward China (DUC), are more volatile in this period 
because of the positive sign of the dummy variable of democratic consolidation in all conditional 
                                                 
45 China’s behavior toward Taiwan is (DCT)  more positive after the 1996 crisis, but it is not significant at 5% level.  
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variance equations. However, since the consolidation period is a combination of the Chen and 
Ma presidencies, it is worth trying to take the partisan alternation in Taiwan into account.  
In theory, the partisan alternation in Taiwan has a great potential to influence negative-or-
positive patterns or the behavioral stability in the triad, because it somehow represents Taiwan’s 
willingness to stay on the original “one China” position. In Taiwan, the first partisan alternation 
occurred in 2000 when the pro-independence DPP won the presidential election, and the second 
one occurred in 2008 when the pro-unification KMT won the presidential election. Thus, in order 
not to be misled by ignoring the effect of partisan alternation after 2000, two dummy variables 
indicating the Chen and Ma’s presidencies are created to replace the variable of democratic 
consolidation in the democratization model. The summarized results after replacing the original 
variable of democratic consolidation are shown in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5 The Before-After Comparison in the Consolidation Period 
 DTC DCT DCU DUC DTU DUT 
Conditional mean 
Chen -2.469 -0.667 5.607 4.339 0.0305 -2.514 
 (2.89) (2.00) (4.55) (3.62) (2.05) (1.56) 
Ma -9.830+ -5.870 21.01 14.79 9.150* 9.431* 
 (5.87) (5.18) (13.2) (13.1) (4.62) (4.02) 
Conditional Variance 
Chen -0.0294 -0.762** 0.388 -0.189 -0.375+ 0.728 
 (0.19) (0.24) (0.42) (0.32) (0.20) (0.61) 
Ma 0.804 0.963+ 0.736 1.996** -0.355 1.758+ 
 (0.83) (0.56) (0.65) (0.43) (0.41) (1.06) 
Note: 1. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 2. The rest part of this model is omitted and all tests on standardized 
residuals show no evidence of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. 
There are also two important findings about the consequence of the partisan alternation in 
the consolidation period. First of all, in the conditional mean equations, the results show that 
there is no evidence indicating that the Chen’s presidency causes any change on negative-or-
positive patterns, but the U.S.-Taiwan relationships go toward a more cooperative or positive 
direction in the Ma period. In average, the growth of the net cooperation score of Taiwan’s 
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behavior toward the United States and the U.S. behavior toward Taiwan is about 9.0 higher than 
the average from 1979 to 2012 in the Ma period. In short, a positive development of the U.S-
Taiwan relationship is evident during the Ma presidency in the consolidation period, and the 
conventional wisdom about the negative tendency caused by the DPP leaders is not supported by 
the results in Table 4.5. 
Second, in the conditional variance equations, it is evident that during the Chen period 
(2000-2008) the volatility of China’s behavior toward Taiwan (DCT) is lower and the volatility 
of the U.S behavior toward China (DUC) is higher in the Ma period (2008-2012). The lower 
volatility of China’s behavior toward Taiwan shows that China’s policy toward Taiwan is quite 
stable in the period of the DPP’s rule. Unlike what the conventional wisdom argues, it seems that 
China does not feel so “uncertain” about the DPP’s policy in the Chen period. Or it may be 
reasonable to say that the DPP’s policy is in fact quite predictable from China’s perspective from 
2000 to 2008. On the other hand, the higher volatility of the U.S. behavior toward Taiwan in the 
Ma period is also evident, which may reveal the uncertainty in the U.S. decision-makers’ minds 
about Taiwan’s over leaning on China in the Ma period. In sum, after dividing the consolidation 
period into the DPP-ruled and the KMT ruled periods, the greater volatility for almost all state 
behaviors in the consolidation period is no longer evident. Therefore, it is very likely that the 
great volatility in the consolidation period as shown in Table 4.3 is an average effect, and the 
partisan alternation in Taiwan after 2000 is the main reason for the great volatility in the triad.  
To conclude for the impact of Taiwan’s democratization, in general the statistical 
analysis does not support the claim that different stages of Taiwan’s democratization cause the 
shift of negative-or-positive patterns in the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle. More specifically, the 
pattern of a more conflictive tendency in cross-strait relations is not evident in the transition 
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period. In other words, Mansfield and Snyder’s rationale that incomplete democratization leads 
to conflict is not supported by the case of the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle from 1979 to 2012 in 
general.  
On the other hand, the statistical analysis somehow suggests that the volatility of some 
state behaviors in the triad is different in the three stages of Taiwan’s democratization. In 
general, the pattern is that the volatility is higher for most state behaviors in the consolidation 
period. As to cross-strait relations, after controlling for the 1996 crisis and the partisan 
alternation after 2000 in the transition and consolidation periods, the statistical evidence shows a 
lower variance of China’s behavior toward Taiwan (DCT) before the1996 crisis in the transition 
period and during the DPP ruled period in the consolidation period. Both results of the before-
after comparison in the two periods reveal China’s sensitivity on Taiwan’s domestic politics, but 
not in a way that Taiwan’s pro-independence preference leads to the instability of China’s 
behavior toward Taiwan. 
4.5 Conclusion 
Do the end of the Cold War and the stages of Taiwan’s democratization play an 
important role to reveal the different before-after dynamics in the triad? The answer is mixed. On 
the one hand, in general, both political events do not directly alter negative-or-positive patterns 
in the triangle. As to the effect of the Cold War, although both neo-realism and power transition 
theory suggest a more conflictive tendency in the U.S.-China relations and cross-strait relations, 
the results in the conditional mean equations do not show any sign to support the realist 
hypotheses as shown in Table 4.1. As to the correlation between democratic transition and the 
conflictive tendency, there is no evidence to support the correlation in Taiwan’s transition 
102 
period. More importantly, after controlling for the effect of 1996 crisis, Taiwan’s behavior 
toward China (DTC) is in fact more cooperative in the second half of the transition period. 
On the other hand, the two political events indeed influence the volatility of some state 
behaviors in the triangle. As to the effect of the Cold War, the empirical evidence shows that 
some state behaviors are more “stable” or less volatile in the Cold War era. In cross-strait 
relations, the stabilizing effect of bipolarity works only on Taiwan’s behavior toward China. 
Therefore, if defining stability as lower volatility, the results somehow echo the neo-realist 
hypothesis about the stability in a bipolar system in a certain degree. However, the 1996 crisis 
has a more comprehensive impact on the stability of all state behaviors in the triad than the end 
of the Cold War. Basically, all state behaviors are less stable after the crisis.  
As to the effect of Taiwan’s democratization on the stability of the triad, it is evident that 
the volatility is higher for most state behaviors in the consolidation period. As to cross-strait 
relations, Taiwan’s behavior toward China (DTC) is more stable while China’s behavior toward 
Taiwan (DCT) is less stable in the period of the KMT authoritarian rule. For the transition and 
consolidation periods, after controlling for the 1996 crisis and the partisan alternation in 2008 in 
the two periods, the statistical evidence shows a lower variance of China’s behavior toward 
Taiwan (DCT) before the1996 crisis in the transition period and during the period of the DPP 
rule in the consolidation period. Both results in the two periods reveal that Taiwan’s leadership 
have an impact on the stability of China’s behavior toward Taiwan, but the relationship is 
different from what conventional wisdom suggests, which may need a further investigation. 
CHAPTER 5. THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC INTERDEPEDENCE AND ELECTION 
The main research question of this chapter is how the election cycle in Taiwan and cross-
strait economic interdependence influence negative-or-positive patterns and the stability of cross-
103 
strait relations. Based on the results in the previous chapters, it is also clear that the U.S.-China-
Taiwan interactions are factors that cannot be omitted when analyzing cross-strait relations. 
Therefore, the goal of this chapter is to include the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangular politics, cross-
strait economic interdependence, and Taiwan’s election cycle into analysis to build a general 
model about cross-strait relations. 
As Taiwan’s political system transformed into a democracy, domestic politics itself 
became an independent variable that can influence the US-China-Taiwan interactions. In 
particular, elections in Taiwan became a new important factor possibly influencing the state of 
cross-strait relations. Under the authoritarian KMT regime, the latent assumption of Taiwan’s 
policy toward China was based on the Chinese Civil War legacy, which assumed that Taiwan 
and China are bound to be united with the end of the Chinese Civil War. However, after 
democratization this assumption has shifted and it is now usually challenged in the debates 
during Taiwan’s elections since the main political cleavage goes along with the unification-or-
independence division in Taiwan. Thus, the possibility for Taiwan to stay on the “one China” 
position may be influenced by the campaigning process. First, Taiwanese politicians may have 
the incentive to utilize Taiwan’s sovereign issue, like to stand tough toward China or to 
emphasize the independent status of Taiwan, for winning voters’ support during the election, 
which may agitate China. Second, after winning the election, Taiwanese politicians may need to 
compromise or tune down the electoral tension on the sovereign issue to avoid further conflicts 
with China. More importantly, empirical studies also suggest a correlation between election 
cycle and military conflict. In this case, it is reasonable to assume a correlation between the 
approach of Taiwan’s general election and a conflictive or instable tendency in cross-strait 
relations, and this chapter aims to assess the validity of this correlation. 
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On the other hand, Taiwan’s democratization also brings another consequence, which is 
Taiwan’s liberalization of trade regulation toward China. Since the foundation of the KMT 
authoritarian regime in Taiwan was based on the need to suppress the CCP rebellion for national 
unification, any trade or investment related to China was deemed as a collaboration with the 
enemy in Taiwan’s legal system. Liberalization of investment and trade toward China started in 
the early 1990s and the amount of cross-border trade between Taiwan and China grew rapidly 
after then. Since the strong economic tie may increase the cost to engage military conflict based 
on the liberal peace literature, the increasing level of economic interdependence may lead to a 
more positive and stable development in cross-strait relation. However, to date, the question for 
Taiwan is no longer “how much Taiwan should liberalize trade and investment.” Instead, it is 
“how much Taiwan should regulate” since Taiwan’s asymmetric dependence on China has been 
an undeniable trend. The political impact of this asymmetry has also become a hot issue in 
Taiwan’s elections. In this case, it is also reasonable to assume that the more dependent, the 
more likely to cooperate in cross-strait relation. In sum, the effects of economic interdependence 
and asymmetric dependence will both be examined in this chapter. 
There are three sections in this chapter. First, I will review the relevant literature and 
summarize the causalities in theory and the implications in cross-strait relations. Second, a 
statistical analysis will be presented to assess the effects of economic interdependence and 
Taiwan’s election cycle. Third, due to the significance of Taiwan’s asymmetric dependence on 
China, a model to assess the effects of asymmetric dependence and the election cycle will be 
presented in this section. 
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5.1 Theoretical Background 
Besides the power politics in the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle, economic interdependence 
and Taiwan’s domestic politics start to become significant factors in cross-strait relations after 
Taiwan’s democratization. As to the effect of economic interdependence, the IR liberal theorists 
suggest the trade-promote-peace hypothesis to depict a relationship between economic 
interdependence and the potential for conflict (Keohane & Nye 1977; Oneal & Russett 1999). In 
cross-strait relations, does the increasing level of economic interdependence influence negative-
or-positive patterns of cross-strait relations? This is one of the questions that this chapter aims to 
answer.  
Based on Keohane and Nye’s (1977: 12-13) theory, there are two elements in the concept 
of economic interdependence which are sensitivity and vulnerability. Sensitivity is related to the 
cost of change, and is usually measures by the amount of trade flows across borders. In other 
words, the latent assumption of sensitivity is that the greater the amount of trade flow is, the 
more costly it is to disrupt the trade relations. It is reasonable to say the concept of sensitivity is 
to capture the opportunity cost to interfere the trade flow across borders. Therefore, in cross-
strait relations, it is reasonable to expect a more cooperative development with the increasing 
level of cross-strait trade flow. Vulnerability, on the other hand, is related to the ability to offset 
or endure a costly change. In other words, how efficient a state can self-adjust to the costly 
change is what the concept of vulnerability want to capture. However, this concept may be not 
easy to measure. Since Taiwan’s asymmetric dependence on China is evident, Taiwan may be 
more vulnerable than China when facing the threat to cease the economic tie. In other words, the 
asymmetric dependence can also works as a leverage to induce cooperation, so the effect of 
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dependence in cross-strait relations should also be considered. In this chapter, both elements 
(sensitivity and vulnerability) in the concept of economic interdependence will be examined. 
The relationship between economic interdependence and the potential for conflict has 
been confirmed in Oneal and Russet’s (1999) empirical study. However, the validity of the trade-
promote-peace hypothesis has been criticized from both the theoretical and empirical aspects. 
From the theoretical aspect, the realists argue that it is very likely that the causality between 
trade interdependence and peace is a spurious relationship since it fails to consider the relative 
gains problem, the security externality problem, hegemonic stability, and alliance relationships 
(Gilpin 1981; Gowa 1995; Grieco 1988). In other words, without controlling for the effect of 
power politics at the international level, the causal relationship between economic 
interdependence and peace may be biased. From the empirical aspect, Taiwanese scholars also 
argue that some important variables are omitted, like Taiwan’s domestic politics characterized by 
the struggle between the pro-unification and pro-independence positions or China’s strategy to 
transform the economic tie into a political leverage (Chu 1997; Tung 2003). More importantly, 
the pacifying effect of economic interdependence is also conditioned by the salience of trade and 
trade symmetry in a bilateral relationship (Barbieri 2005). Thus, based on what the relevant 
studies suggest, the validity of the trade-promote-peace hypothesis in the Taiwan Strait can be 
confirmed only when the three following factors are controlled: (1) the international power 
politics, (2) the salience and symmetry of economic interdependence, and (3) Taiwan’s domestic 
politics. 
For controlling for the three factors, the model in this chapter includes the strategic 
interactions in the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle, Taiwan and China’s dependence on cross-strait 
trade flow, and Taiwan’s election cycle to analyze cross-strait relations. First, the strategic 
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interactions in the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle help control the United States and China’s 
political leverage in cross-strait relations. Second, economic interdependence is not be a single 
variable in this chapter, and will be operationalized by two variables, Taiwan’s and China’s 
dependence on cross-strait trade flow.46 This way of operationalization can help control the 
different level of salience and symmetry for Taiwan and China. Third, Taiwan’s election cycle 
helps capture the changing political dynamics in Taiwan. More importantly, the model in this 
chapter also helps figure out a critical question: What is the relative importance of international 
versus domestic factors in influencing cross-strait relations?  
For answering the question more properly, China’s domestic politics should also be 
controlled. Since China is still a single-party regime, the power transition within the CCP is the 
most important factor of policymaking.47 Therefore, in the following analyses, the term of the 
highest body within the CCP, the National CCP Congress, will be included to control the change 
of China’s domestic politics. Although the highest status of the National CCP Congress only 
exist in theory, the top leadership in the CCP still need the approval of the National Party 
Congress. More importantly, the political agenda of the ten-year term of China’s leadership after 
Deng goes along with the seven plenums of the Central Committee within the five-year cycle of 
the National Party Congress.48 In short, the National CCP Congress may not as important as it 
should be, but its cycle may include some information about the power transition of the CCP. 
As to the effect of election on military conflicts, empirical studies of foreign policy 
suggest a correlation between election cycle and conflict. Regarding the rationale behind the 
                                                 
46 See Chapter2 for details. 
47 Based on Geddes’s (1999) standard and Linz and Stepan’s (1996) classification, it is reasonable to define China as 
a single-party regime.  
48  Wu (2005b: 59) also suggests that the role of the CCP party congress can be seen as the presidential elections in 
Taiwan and the United States 
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causality, Mansfield and Snyder’s (1990; 1995; 2005) studies suggest that the war-prone 
tendency of the democratizing states comes from politicians’ utilization of nationalist emotion 
and prestige strategy for winning elections. On the other hand, about the timing to engage a 
military conflict, empirical studies show that the closer to elections, the more likely a conflict 
will occur. Taiwanese scholars, like Wu (2011), have argued that the aggressive behavior is more 
likely to take place at the end of the election cycle in Taiwan, but cross-national studies show 
that aggressiveness tends to occur at the early stage of  the election cycle (Gaubatz 1991). In 
other words, both studies reveal that aggressive behaviors tend to occur in a shorter period before 
and after elections. In the case of cross-strait relations, based on the nature of Taiwan’s domestic 
politics, Taiwanese politicians’ position on the “one China” issue may be influenced by the 
timing of election easily. First, Taiwanese politicians may have the incentive to utilize Taiwan’s 
sovereign issue, like to emphasize the independence status of Taiwan, for winning voters’ 
support during the election, which may agitate China. Second, after winning the election, 
Taiwanese politicians may need to compromise or tune down the electoral tension on the 
sovereign issue to avoid further conflicts with China. From the cases of the 1996 crisis and Chen 
Shui-ban’s referendum strategy for reelection in 2004, it is easy to assume that the approach of 
Taiwanese election causes a conflictive tendency in cross-strait relations due to politicians’ 
calculation in the campaigns. However, the validity of this assumption may be questionable, and 
this chapter aims to use statistical analysis to test it. 
According to the summary of the relevant literature, this chapter will test the following 
hypotheses with statistical analysis. 
H1 Trade-Promote-Peace Hypothesis  
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Based on the conflictive nature between Taiwan and China on the sovereignty issue, the 
positive development of Taiwan’s dependence on cross-strait trade flow leads to the positive 
development of Taiwan’s behavior toward China, and the positive development of China’s 
dependence on cross-strait trade flow leads to the positive development of China’s behavior 
toward Taiwan. 
 Based on the conflictive nature between Taiwan and China on the sovereignty issue, the 
negative development of Taiwan’s dependence on cross-strait trade flow leads to the negative 
development of Taiwan’s behavior toward China, and the negative development of China’s 
dependence on cross-strait trade flow leads to the negative development of China’s behavior 
toward Taiwan. 
H2 Electoral Tension Hypothesis  
The closer Taiwan’s presidential and parliamentary elections are, the more likely a 
negative development of cross-strait relations will occur. 
Besides the hypotheses about positive-or-negative patterns of cross-strait relations, the 
existing literature mentions less about the stability of state behavior. In general, I hypothesize a 
relationship between uncertainty and behavioral instability for cross-strait relations. Any 
behavior disrupting the status quo creates uncertainty for decision-makers and then leads to 
behavioral instability because the original behavioral patterns are not sufficient to respond the 
change. Following this logic, I hypothesize that the positive development of economic 
interdependence leads to stability while the approach of Taiwan’s general elections leads to 
instability for cross-strait relations. 
H3 Trade-Promote-Stability Hypothesis  
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Given that economic interdependence is a general trend in cross-strait relations, the 
positive development of Taiwan’s dependence on cross-strait trade flow leads to a lower 
volatility of Taiwan’s behavior toward China, and the positive development of China’s 
dependence on cross-strait trade flow leads to a lower volatility of China’s behavior toward 
Taiwan. 
Given that economic interdependence is a general trend in cross-strait relations, the 
negative development of Taiwan’s dependence on cross-strait trade flow leads to a higher 
volatility of Taiwan’s behavior toward China, and the negative development of China’s 
dependence on cross-strait trade flow leads to a higher volatility of China’s behavior toward 
Taiwan. 
H4 Electoral Instability Hypothesis  
The closer Taiwan’s presidential and parliamentary elections are, the higher volatility of 
cross-strait relations is. 
5.2 The Effects of Trade Interdependence and Elections 
In this chapter, the economic interdependence is defined as trade interdependence, which 
represents the concept of sensitivity in economic interdependence. The pacifying effect of 
economic interdependence is based on the idea that “the higher the fraction of total output 
crossing state boundaries, the more costly would be the interruption of such flows” (Mansfield & 
Pollins 2003: 12). In this light, the level of economic interdependence in this section will be 
measured by the portion of trade flow including imports and exports between China and Taiwan 
represented in the total trade amount of China (Ctrade) and in the total trade amount of Taiwan 
(Ttrade).49 In other words, the two variables represent Taiwan and China’s dependence on cross-
                                                 
49 China’s trade statistics comes from China monthly statistics (State Statistical Bureau 1992). Taiwan’s trade 
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strait trade flow respectively. This trade interdependence measurement helps not only to capture 
the mutual effect coming from the interdependent relationship, but also reveals the salience of 
cross-strait trade flow in China and Taiwan’s economies. 
The research design and methodology are similar with previous chapters. Limited by the 
availability of the related trade data, the time period in this chapter is shorter than the previous 
two chapters. Unlike the GDELT database backing to 1979, the monthly statistics about cross-
strait economic interactions starts from 1990. Therefore, the time period in this chapter is from 
1990 to 2012. Because of the change of time period, all tests to detect the problems of 
autocorrelation, non-stationarity, and heteroscedasticity for time series variables have to be 
redone. The results are shown in Appendix B, and based on the results, this chapter also applies 
an ARIMA(1,1,1)-GARCH(1,1) model as the previous chapters. Similar with the previous two 
chapters, the conditional mean equation in the model is to show whether a certain variable 
influences the negative-or-positive pattern of a certain state behavior or not. The conditional 
variance equation in the model, on the other hand, is to show whether a certain variable 
influences the volatility of a state behavior or not. 
Three groups of variable are included in the interdependence models: all state behaviors in 
the U.S-China-Taiwan triad, trade interdependence between Taiwan and China, and the domestic 
politics in Taiwan and China. First of all, all state behavior variables in the triangle are the same 
as previous chapters, which record the net cooperation score on a monthly basis in a source-
target form (DTC, DCT, DCU, DUC, DTU, and DUT). Second, how to measure the level of 
trade interdependence has been mentioned in the beginning of this section. Third, as to the 
domestic politics in Taiwan and China, for Taiwan, two kinds of election cycles are included, 
                                                 
statistics comes from the statistics of the Directorate General of Customs on the website of Bureau of Foreign Trade 
of Taiwan, see http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/ENGLISH/FSCE/.  
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which are presidential elections and parliamentary elections (both the Legislative Yuan elections 
and the National Assembly elections) in Taiwan. Each election variable is measured by the 
number of month closing to the next election. For the China side, the term of the National CCP 
congress is measured as the same way to measure Taiwan’s election cycle, the number of month 
closing to the next term of the Party Congress. Thus, the conditional mean equations of Taiwan’s 
behavior toward China (DTC) and China’s behavior toward Taiwan (DCT) can be expressed as: 
𝐷𝑇𝐶𝑡  = 𝐷𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝐶𝑈𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝑈𝐶𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝑈𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡−1
+ 𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 + 𝐶𝐶𝑃 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 + 𝐴𝑅(1)
+ 𝑀𝐴(1) + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 
𝐷𝐶𝑇𝑡  = 𝐷𝑇𝐶𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝐶𝑈𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝑈𝐶𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝑈𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡−1
+ 𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 + 𝐶𝐶𝑃 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 + 𝐴𝑅(1)
+ 𝑀𝐴(1) + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛 
On the other hand, the conditional variance equations of Taiwan’s behavior toward China 
(DTC) and China’s behavior toward Taiwan (DCT) can be expressed as: 
𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑇𝐶𝑡  
= 𝐷𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝐶𝑈𝑡−1 + 𝐷𝑈𝐶𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝑈𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡−1
+ 𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 + 𝐶𝐶𝑃 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 + 𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻(1)
+ 𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻(1) + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 
𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝐶𝑇𝑡  
= 𝐷𝑇𝐶𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝐶𝑈𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝑈𝐶𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝑈𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡−1
+ 𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 + 𝐶𝐶𝑃 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 + 𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻(1)
+ 𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻(1) + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 
The results of the trade interdependence model are shown as Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1 Results of the Trade Interdependence Model (1990-2012) 
 DTC Standard Error DCT Standard Error 
Conditional mean 
DTC t-1   0.178* (0.084) 
DCT t-1 0.0454 (0.084)   
DCU t-1 0.0255 (0.074) 0.0391 (0.090) 
DUC t-1 -0.0108 (0.071) -0.00835 (0.084) 
DTU t-1 -0.0472 (0.20) 0.176 (0.22) 
DUT t-1 0.0147 (0.16) -0.280 (0.20) 
DTtrade t-1 440.8 (1278.1) -1527.6 (1647.7) 
DCtrade t-1 -4132.8+ (2130.5) -2852.8 (2919.9) 
CCPNC 0.0537 (0.091) -0.0361 (0.095) 
Election (Pres.) 0.0603 (0.087) -0.0289 (0.094) 
Election (Parl.) -0.0485 (0.19) 0.214 (0.19) 
AR(1) 0.0627 (0.10) -0.0874 (0.099) 
MA(1) -0.776** (0.056) -0.757** (0.058) 
Constant  -2.452 (5.91) 0.746 (6.41) 
Conditional variance 
DTC t-1   -0.000717 (0.0024) 
DCT t-1 -0.00694** (0.0016)   
DCU t-1 -0.00568** (0.0015) 0.00616** (0.0019) 
DUC t-1 0.00287+ (0.0016) -0.00301+ (0.0017) 
DTU t-1 0.00364 (0.0046) -0.00967+ (0.0051) 
DUT t-1 -0.00439 (0.0035) 0.0101* (0.0047) 
DTtrade t-1 -64.91 (40.6) -213.1** (37.1) 
DCtrade t-1 -160.2** (58.2) -119.1* (53.7) 
CCPNC 0.00877 (0.0098) -0.00237 (0.0098) 
Election (Pres.) -0.0553** (0.012) -0.0602** (0.014) 
Election (Parl.) 0.0346* (0.014) 0.0235 (0.014) 
Constant 7.147** (0.52) 8.402** (0.52) 
ARCH 0.0985 (0.063) 0.122+ (0.067) 
GARCH 0.659** (0.062) 0.587** (0.075) 
N 268  268  
B Statistic se 0.5687  0.9343  
B Statistic se2 0.6605  1.0043  
Note: 1. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 2. The B statistic reports the results of Bartlett's test on 
standardized residuals, which helps detect serial correlation in the standardized residuals (se) and 
heteroscedasticity in the squared standardized residuals (se2). 3. All tests and regressions are performed by 
STATA (ver. 12). 
As to the results of the conditional mean equations, there are three important points worth 
mentioning. First, China’s bilateral tit-for-tat pattern toward Taiwan remains significant as the 
result in Chapter 3. In Table 5.1, Taiwan’s behavior toward China (DTC) is significant for 
China’s behavior toward Taiwan (DCT). The positive signs of the coefficient indicates that the 
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positive development of Taiwan’s behaviors leads to China’s positive response and the negative 
development of Taiwan’s negative behavior leads to China’s negative response. According to the 
result, when the change of Taiwan’s net cooperation score toward China increased 1 point in the 
last month, the change of  China’s net cooperation score toward Taiwan increases 0.178 point 
toward Taiwan in this month. Like the results in Chapter 3, China’s behavior toward Taiwan 
does not have the same tit-for-tat effect on Taiwan’s behavior toward China, and Taiwan’s 
negative-or-positive pattern toward China is quite independent. Thus, in fact, Taiwan has an 
active status in cross-strait relations.  
Second, when considering trade interdependence and the domestic politics of Taiwan and 
China, the statistical results show no sign of any triangularity in negative-or-positive patterns of 
cross-strait relations. In Chapter 3, when the time scope is from 1979 to 2012, the indirect 
triangularity from the United States is evident for China because China’s behavior toward 
Taiwan is influenced by the U.S. behavior toward Taiwan.50 However, when the time period is 
from 1990 to 2012 and considering both trade relations and domestic politics together, there is no 
evidence to support the presence of the U.S. triangularity that influences positive-or-negative 
patterns of cross-strait relations.51 There are two possible answers for the disappearance of the 
U.S. indirect triangularity in the negative-or-positive pattern of China’s behavior. First, it is 
likely that the U.S. indirect triangularity in China’s behavior triggered by the U.S. behavior 
toward Taiwan is an average effect from 1979 to 2012, but the effect may decline after 1990. 
Secondly, when taking Taiwan’s domestic politics and economic interdependence into account, 
the importance of the U.S. indirect triangularity goes down in the decision-making process of 
                                                 
50 See Table 3.2 and Figure 3.4. 
51 But the U.S. triangularity still works in explaining the variance of Taiwan’s behavior. See the following analysis. 
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China.52 Therefore, the indirect U.S. triangularity on China works under some conditions and 
Taiwan’s behavior toward China (DTC) is still a significant factor influencing the negative-or-
positive pattern of China’s behavior. Thus, since China’s tit-for-tat response to Taiwan is the 
only significant pattern in the conditional mean equations, it is reasonable to claim that the 
Chinese Civil War legacy is the only factor that can influence negative-or-positive patterns of 
cross-strait relations when taking economic interdependence and Taiwan’s domestic politics into 
account. 
Third, neither trade interdependence nor the domestic politics of Taiwan and China 
affects negative-or-positive patterns of cross-strait relations. In other words, the statistical 
analysis does not support the trade-promote-peace and electoral tension hypotheses (H1 & H2). 
The change of cross-strait trade share in Taiwan (DTtrade) and China (DCtrade) is not 
significant for both Taiwan’s behavior toward China (DTC) and China’s behavior toward 
Taiwan (DCT) at 5% level. Furthermore, both Taiwan’s election cycles and the cycle of the 
National CCP Congress do not have significant impacts on Taiwan and China’s negative-or-
positive patterns toward each other. 
As to the results of the conditional variance equations, it is obvious that cross-strait 
economic interdependence and Taiwan’s election cycle do not affect the mean of the net 
cooperation score of Taiwan or China’s behaviors toward each other. Instead, these variables 
mainly influence the variance of the net cooperation score of Taiwan or China’s behaviors 
toward each other. 
                                                 
52 In fact, this pattern is quite consistent because the two models in Chapter 5 and the models in Chapter 6 all 
suggest the disappearance of the U.S. indirect triangularity in China’s negative-or-positive pattern toward Taiwan 
after 1990. 
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For Taiwan’s behavior toward China (DTC), there are three points worth noting. First, 
Taiwan’s behavior toward China is sensitive to the negative development of China’s behavior 
toward Taiwan (DCT) and China’s behavior toward the United States (DCU), and both cause a 
greater variance of Taiwan’s behavior toward China. In other words, beside the bilateral effect 
from China (DCT), the triangular effect (DCU) also works in explaining the variance of 
Taiwan’s behavior. In short, the negative development of China’s behaviors in the triad tends to 
make Taiwan’s behavior toward China less stable, and both triangular and bilateral effects 
present in influencing the volatility of Taiwan’s behavior. Second, Taiwan is only sensitive to the 
negative development of the share of cross-strait trade flow in China’s foreign trade amount 
(DCtrade) but not sensitive to the share in its own foreign trade amount (DTtrade). This is 
contradictory with the trade-promote-stability hypothesis (H3). The statistical result shows that 
the negative change of the share in China leads to a greater instability of Taiwan behavior toward 
China. In other words, this pattern implies that Taiwan is sensitive to China’s dependence on 
cross-strait trade flow rather than its own dependence on cross-strait trade flow. In short, only 
China’s dependence on cross-strait trade flow influences the stability of Taiwan’s behavior to 
China. Thus, it is reasonable to say that Taiwan is more dependent on cross-strait economic tie 
than China is, and this pattern also implies that the negative development of China’s dependence 
on cross-strait trade flow creates uncertainty in Taiwan’s decision-makers’ calculation. Third, the 
approach of Taiwan’s presidential election makes Taiwan’s behavior toward China instable 
while the approach of Taiwan’s parliamentary election leads to a lower volatility of Taiwan’s 
behavior to China because of the positive sign of the coefficient of the parliamentary election 
variable. The result shows a partial support of the electoral instability hypothesis (H4) because of 
the wrong sign of the coefficient of Taiwan’s parliamentary election. Thus, Taiwan’s two general 
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elections do not necessarily cause the negative development of Taiwan’s behavior toward China 
but mainly influences the stability of Taiwan’s behavior. 
For China’s behavior toward Taiwan (DCT), three points are note-worthy. First, China is 
sensitive to the positive development of China’s behavior toward the United States (DCU) and 
the U.S. behavior toward Taiwan (DUT), and both cause a greater volatility for China’s behavior 
toward Taiwan. Since Taiwan’s behaviors do not lead to any disturbance to the stability of 
China’s behavior to Taiwan, it is reasonable to say that the volatility of China’s behavior is 
mainly influenced by the U.S. triangular effect. Second, China is sensitive to cross-strait 
economic interdependence. In Table 5.1, the two economic interdependence variables (DTtrade 
& DCtrade) are significant for the variance of China’s behavior toward Taiwan. The negative 
sign of the two coefficients indicates that the negative development of Taiwan and China’s 
dependence on cross-strait trade flow causes a greater volatility of China’s behavior toward 
Taiwan. Therefore, the statistical evidence supports the trade-promote-stability pattern (H3) in 
China’s behavior. Third, China is sensitive to Taiwan’s presidential election. The negative sign 
of the presidential election coefficient indicates that the approach of Taiwan’s presidential 
election makes China’s behavior toward Taiwan less stable or more volatile. The cycles of the 
National CCP Congress and Taiwan’s parliamentary election do not influence the variance of 
China’s behavior toward Taiwan. The statistical evidence, thus, only shows that a partial support 
of the electoral instability hypothesis (H4) because only Taiwan’s presidential election causes the 
instability of China’s behavior, but the parliamentary election does not. 
To sum up for this section, based on the analysis above, the summarized result about 
hypothesis testing is shown as Table 5.2. In general, there is no evidence to support the U.S. 
triangular effect, the trade-promote-peace hypothesis (H1), and the election tension hypothesis 
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(H2) in negative-or-positive patterns of cross-strait relations. The statistical results of the 
conditional mean equations only support the presence of the China’s tit-for-tat response to 
Taiwan. In other words, the Chinese Civil War legacy is the only factor that can influence 
negative-or-positive patterns of cross-strait relations. However, it is too hasty to claim that the 
U.S. triangularity, cross-strait trade interdependence, and Taiwan’s election are irrelevant to 
cross-strait relations. 
Table 5.2 The Result of Hypothesis Testing of the Trade Interdependence Model 
Hypothesis DTC DCT 
Bilateral or Triangular Effects   
     Negative-or-Positive Patterns  DTC (bilateral tit-for-tat) 
     Volatility DCT (-), DCU (-) DCU (+), DUT (+) 
Trade-Promote-Peace (H1)   
Electoral Tension (H2)    
Trade-Promote-Stability (H3)   ** 
Electoral Instability (H4) * (presidential election) * (presidential election) 
Note: ** indicates that the hypothesis is supported by the results in Table 5.1. 
The results of the conditional variance equations indicate that these factors mainly affect 
the volatility of Taiwan and China’s behaviors toward each other rather than directly influence 
the negative-or-positive patterns of Taiwan and China’s behaviors. First, Taiwan is sensitive to 
the negative development of China’s behaviors in the triad, and China’s dependence on cross-
strait trade flow, and Taiwan’s presidential and parliamentary elections. Although the result 
indicates that Taiwan is more dependent on the cross-strait trade flow than China, it does not 
support the trade-promote-stability hypothesis (H3) because cross-strait trade flow in Taiwan’s 
trade share (DTtrade) is not significant. Further, the result partially supports the electoral 
instability hypothesis (H4), because only the approach of Taiwan’s presidential produces 
instability for Taiwan’s behavior, but the approach of parliamentary elections does not. Second, 
China is sensitive to the positive development of China’s behavior toward the United States and 
the U.S. behavior toward Taiwan, cross-strait flow in both Taiwan and China’s trade share, and 
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the approach of Taiwan’s presidential elections. Thus, the result shows a full support of the 
trade-promote-stability hypothesis (H3), and only a partial support of the electoral instability 
hypothesis (H4) for China. 
5.3 The Effects of Trade Dependence and Elections 
In this section, the concept of economic interdependence is defined as vulnerability. The 
concept of vulnerability is to measure how great the cost that a country can tolerate when an 
existing interdependent relationship is altered (Keohane & Nye 1977: 13). In order to measure 
the ability to endure the termination of an existing relationship, the level of dependence is a good 
indicator to capture the issue of symmetry in a trade relationship. In this section, the asymmetric 
dependence variable (Dependency) is calculated by subtracting the share of cross-strait trade 
flow in China’s foreign trade (Ctrade) from the share of cross-strait trade flow in Taiwan’s 
foreign trade (Ttrade). Therefore, when the value of the dependence variable is positive, it 
implies that Taiwan is more vulnerable than China to cease cross-strait economic 
interdependence, because the share of the cross-strait trade flow in Taiwan is greater than the 
share in China, which indicates that Taiwan depends on cross-strait economic tie more than 
China does. In other words, this variable capture the level of Taiwan’s dependence on China. 
Since the logic of vulnerability is that the cost to conflict with the less dependent trade partner is 
higher, it is reasonable to hypothesize that “the more dependent, the easier to cooperate” for the 
more dependent actor. On the other hand, for the less dependent actor, the cost to conflict with 
the more dependent partner is lower. Thus, based on the conflict nature between Taiwan and 
China on the sovereignty, for the less dependent partner like China, the increasing level of 
Taiwan’s dependence increases the potential for conflict. In short, the dependence variable 
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attempts to capture the ability to endure the end of an interdependent relationship, and the 
hypothesized pattern in cross-strait relations is: 
H1a Dependency-Induced Cooperation Hypothesis  
Based on the conflict nature between Taiwan and China on the sovereignty issue, the 
positive development of Taiwan’s dependence on China leads to the positive development of 
Taiwan’s behavior toward China and the negative development of China’s behavior toward 
Taiwan. 
Based on the conflict nature between Taiwan and China on the sovereignty issue, the 
negative development of Taiwan’s dependence on China leads to the negative development of 
Taiwan’s behavior toward China and the positive development of China’s behavior toward 
Taiwan. 
On the other hand, since the Taiwan’s dependence on cross-strait trade has been a trend 
after 1990, the decline of Taiwan’s dependence on China may also create uncertainty for cross-
strait relations. The logic is that any attempt to worsen the status quo creates uncertainty for 
decision-makers and then leads to instability. Since the current status quo is a trend of Taiwan’s 
increasing dependence on China, I then hypothesize the decline of Taiwan’s dependence on 
China leads to instability for cross-strait relations as follows: 
H3a Dependence-Induced Stability Hypothesis 
Given that Taiwan’s dependence on cross-strait trade is a general trend in cross-strait 
relations, the positive development of Taiwan’s dependence on China leads to a less volatility of 
both Taiwan’s behavior toward China and China’s behavior toward Taiwan. 
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Given that Taiwan’s dependence on cross-strait trade is a general trend in cross-strait 
relations, the negative development of Taiwan’s dependence on China leads to a greater 
volatility of both Taiwan’s behavior toward China and China’s behavior toward Taiwan. 
In this section, the research design, methodology and time period are the same as the 
previous section, and an ARIMA(1,1,1)-GARCH(1,1) model is applied to see the effects of 
dependence and election. The results of the model are shown as Table 5.3.  
As to the results of the conditional means equations, two points are worth noting. First, 
China’s tit-for-tat response to Taiwan is still evident, because Taiwan’s behavior toward China 
(DTC) is significant for China’s behavior toward Taiwan (DCT). The positive sign of the 
coefficient indicates the presence of tit-for-tat effect. Therefore, this result is the same as the 
result of the trade interdependence model in the previous section, and the Chinese Civil War 
legacy is the only factor influencing negative-or-positive patterns of cross-strait relations.  
Second, there is no evidence to support the hypotheses that the level of dependence and Taiwan’s 
election cycle influence negative-or-positive patterns of cross-strait relations. As shown in Table 
5.3, the statistical results do not support both the dependency-induced cooperation (H1a) and 
electoral tension hypotheses (H2) because the relevant variables are not significant for both 
Taiwan and China’s behaviors. 
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Table 5.3 Results of the Dependence Model (1990-2012) 
 DTC Standard Error DCT Standard Error 
Conditional mean 
DTC t-1   0.239** (0.067) 
DCT t-1 0.0440 (0.084)   
DCU t-1 0.0397 (0.087) 0.0574 (0.073) 
DUC t-1 -0.0211 (0.081) -0.0320 (0.073) 
DTU t-1 -0.212 (0.22) 0.0985 (0.22) 
DUT t-1 0.118 (0.17) -0.218 (0.20) 
DDependency t-1 1126.2 (1274.2) -92.07 (1276.1) 
CCPNC -0.00700 (0.099) -0.0239 (0.090) 
Election (Pres.) 0.0616 (0.090) -0.0151 (0.092) 
Election (Parl.) 0.00953 (0.19) 0.130 (0.16) 
AR(1) 0.00374 (0.11) -0.183* (0.091) 
MA(1) -0.754** (0.059) -0.751** (0.053) 
Constant  -2.192 (6.22) -0.0297 (6.20) 
Conditional variance 
DTC t-1   -0.00170 (0.0024) 
DCT t-1 -0.00542** (0.0018)   
DCU t-1 -0.00546** (0.0017) 0.00270 (0.0023) 
DUC t-1 0.00367* (0.0018) -0.00197 (0.0021) 
DTU t-1 0.00271 (0.0059) -0.0121+ (0.0066) 
DUT t-1 -0.00408 (0.0042) 0.0118* (0.0048) 
DDependency t-1 -123.8* (61.8) -116.3** (37.1) 
CCPNC -0.00232 (0.013) -0.00422 (0.014) 
Election (Pres.) -0.0538** (0.015) -0.0771** (0.014) 
Election (Parl.) 0.0533** (0.016) 0.0215 (0.019) 
Constant 7.511** (0.62) 9.093** (0.40) 
ARCH 0.189** (0.065) 0.265** (0.074) 
GARCH 0.606** (0.067) 0.579** (0.063) 
N 268  268  
B Statistic se 0.5687  1.1371  
B Statistic se2 0.8549  0.8663  
Note: 1. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 2. The B statistic reports the results of Bartlett's test on 
standardized residuals, which helps detect serial correlation in the standardized residuals (se) and 
heteroscedasticity in the squared standardized residuals (se2). 3. All tests and regressions are performed by 
STATA (ver. 12). 
As to the results of the conditional variance equations, basically some behaviors in the 
triad, Taiwan’s dependence on China, and Taiwan’s election cycle all help explain the volatility 
of China and Taiwan’s behaviors toward each other. As to Taiwan’s behavior toward China, 
first, Taiwan is sensitive to the negative development of China’s behavior toward Taiwan (DCT) 
and China’s behavior toward the United States (DCU) and the positive development of the U.S. 
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behavior toward China (DUC). In other word, both bilateral and triangular effects help explain 
the volatility of Taiwan’s behavior. Second, Taiwan is sensitive to the negative development of 
Taiwan’s dependence on China. As in Table 5.3, the negative sign of the coefficient of the 
dependence variable (DDependency) indicates that when Taiwan becomes less dependent on the 
cross-strait economic tie, the volatility of Taiwan’s behavior is greater. In other words, the 
statistical results support the dependency-induced stability hypothesis (H3a). Third, Taiwan is 
sensitive to its two elections, but only the approach of Taiwan’s presidential elections makes 
Taiwan’s behavior less stable. The approach of the parliamentary elections makes Taiwan’s 
behavior toward China more stable because the coefficient is positive. Therefore, the statistical 
evidence only support the electoral hypothesis (H4) partially, because only the presidential 
elections cause instability as the hypothesis predicts. 
Regarding Chinese behavior toward Taiwan, first China is sensitive to the positive 
development of the U.S. behavior toward Taiwan (DUT). The positive sign of the coefficient 
indicates that the positive development of the U.S. behavior toward Taiwan leads to a greater 
volatility of China’s behavior. Therefore, from China’s perspective, the U.S. cooperation toward 
Taiwan is a dangerous sign that causes uncertainty. Second, China is also sensitive to the 
negative change of Taiwan’s dependence on cross-strait economic tie. The negative sign of the 
coefficient of the dependence variable (DDependency) confirms the pattern suggested by the 
dependency-induced stability hypothesis (H3a). Third, China is sensitive to Taiwan’s 
presidential election only. The negative sign of the coefficient means that the closer Taiwan’s 
presidential elections are, the less stable China’s behavior toward Taiwan is. Thus, the statistical 
evidence supports the electoral instability hypothesis (H4) partially. Based on the analysis above, 
the summarized result about hypothesis testing is shown as Table 5.4. 
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Table 5.4 The Result of Hypothesis Testing of the Trade Dependence Model 
Hypothesis DTC DCT 
Bilateral and Triangular Effects   
     Negative-or-Positive Patterns  DTC (bilateral tit-for-tat) 
     Volatility DCT (-), DCU (-), 
DUC (+) 
DUT (+) 
Dependency-Induced Cooperation (H1a)   
Electoral Tension (H2)    
Dependence-Induced Stability (H3a)  ** ** 
Electoral Instability (H4) * (presidential election) * (presidential election) 
Note: ** indicates that the hypothesis is supported by the results in Table 5.3. 
To sum up for this section, basically the dependence model shows a similar pattern as the 
trade interdependence model. First of all, regarding the factors influencing negative-or-positive 
patterns of cross-strait relations, the statistical evidence only supports the presence of China’s 
bilateral tit-for-tat pattern toward Taiwan. Therefore, like the result in the previous section, the 
Chinese Civil war legacy is the only significant factor to influence the negative-or-positive 
patterns between Taiwan and China from 1990 to 2012. On the other hand, there is also no 
evidence to claim the significance of Taiwan’s dependence on China and Taiwan’s elections in 
explaining negative-or-positive patterns of cross-strait relations. Thus, both the dependency-
induced cooperation (H1a) and electoral tension (H3) hypotheses are not supported by the 
statistical evidence. However, it is too hasty to conclude that the U.S. triangularity, Taiwan’s 
trade dependence, and Taiwan’s election cycle do not influence cross-strait relations because the 
statistical analysis in this section shows that these factors mainly influence the stability of 
Taiwan and China’s behaviors. 
Second, the results of the conditional variance equations in this model show that the 
stability of Taiwan and China’s behaviors is a function of some state behaviors in the U.S.-
China-Taiwan triangle, Taiwan’s dependence on China, and Taiwan’s presidential election. Both 
Taiwan and China’s behaviors to each other are influenced by the uncertainty caused by the 
negative change of Taiwan’s dependence on China and the approach Taiwan’s presidential 
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election. As to the impact of the strategic interactions in the triangle, Taiwan is sensitive to the 
negative development of China’s two behaviors (DCT & DCU) and the positive development of 
the U.S. behavior toward China (DUC), and China is sensitive to the positive development of the 
U.S. behavior toward Taiwan (DUT) only. Thus, the volatility of Taiwan’s behavior is 
influenced by both triangular and bilateral effects while the volatility of China’s behavior is 
mainly caused by the U.S. triangularity. In sum, the model in this section again shows that these 
factors mainly influence the volatility rather than negative-or-positive patterns of cross-strait 
relations. 
After analyzing the two models, what is the relative importance of the factors from both 
international and domestic levels in cross-strait relations? It is obvious that both levels are 
important in explaining the different facets of cross-strait relations. First of all, although the U.S. 
triangularity is no longer significant for negative-or-positive patterns of cross-strait relations, 
some state behaviors in the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle still play a role in explaining the stability 
of Taiwan and China’s behaviors in both models. Second, although Taiwan’s negative-or-
positive behavioral pattern cannot be explained by any factor in the two models, the stability of 
Taiwan’s behavior can still be explained by the factors from both levels as shown in Table 5.2 
and 5.4. Third, China’s positive-or-negative behavioral pattern and the stability of China’s 
behavior are only influenced by the factors from the international level because the only variable 
of China’s domestic politics is not significant in both models. As shown in Table 5.1 and Table 
5.3, since the cycle of the National CCP Congress does not have a significant impact on China’s 
behavior, it is fair to say that China’s negative-or-positive pattern and behavioral stability to 
Taiwan is only influenced by the international factors. 
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5.4 Conclusion 
To sum up for the whole chapter, it is obvious that the impact of Taiwan’s 
democratization mainly influences the stability rather negative-or-positive patterns of cross-strait 
relations. Taiwan’s democratization introduces two important factors for cross-strait relations, 
cross-strait economic interdependence and Taiwan’s elections. The results of the two models 
show that these new-introduced factors basically influence the stability of cross-strait relations. 
As to the influence of the strategic interactions in the U.S.-China-Taiwan, it is clear that the 
Chinese Civil War legacy is the only factor that can influence negative-or-positive patterns of 
cross-strait relations. China tit-for-tat response to Taiwan is the only evident pattern, and the U.S. 
triangularity is no longer a factor that can influence negative-or-positive patterns in cross-strait 
relations, which is different from the result in the chapter 3. However, the statistical analysis in 
this chapter still suggests that the presence of the U.S. triangularity in influencing the stability of 
Taiwan and China’s behaviors toward each other. 
As to the result of hypothesis-testing, first of all, basically, there is no evidence to support 
the trade-promote-peace, dependency-induced cooperation and electoral tension hypotheses 
because the relevant variables are not significant in the conditional mean equations of Taiwan 
and China’s behaviors. Therefore, it is not necessary that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait 
would be more cooperative with the increasing level of economic independence as the liberal 
theories suggested. Even when taking Taiwan’s dependence on China into account, there is still 
no evidence indicating that the negative-or-positive development of cross-strait relations is a 
function of cross-strait economic interdependence. Moreover, Taiwan’s two general elections do 
not necessarily cause a conflictive development for cross-strait relations. Thus, although the 
main political cleavage in Taiwan goes along with the independence-or-unification debate, the 
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issue of Taiwan independence debated by politicians in the campaigns does not necessarily lead 
to a conflictive development in the Taiwan Strait as the relevant literature suggests. 
Second, the statistical results in the conditional variance equations of both models 
support the trade-promote-stability, dependence-promote-stability, and electoral instability 
hypotheses. This implies that both the negative development of economic interdependence and 
the approach of Taiwan’s presidential election create uncertainty for the decision-making of 
Taiwan and China’s policies toward each other. As to the impact of economic interdependence, 
the statistical analysis indicates that the volatility of China’s behavior is influenced by both 
shares of the cross-strait trade flows in Taiwan and China, while Taiwan’s is only influenced by 
the share in China. In other words, from Taiwan’s perspective, only the negative change of 
China’s dependence on cross-strait trade flow creates uncertainty for its own decision-making. 
Moreover, it also implies that Taiwan is more dependent on the cross-strait trade flow than China 
is. The results of the dependence model further confirm that the negative development of 
Taiwan’s dependence on China leads to instability for both Taiwan and China’s behaviors. As to 
the impact of Taiwan’s election, the statistical analysis shows that the approach of Taiwan’s 
presidential election produces uncertainty that causes instability for cross-strait relations. Both 
Taiwan’s parliamentary election cycle and the National CCP Congress cycle do not have the 
same effect on the stability of cross-strait relations. In sum, the analysis in this chapter shows 
that both economic interdependence and Taiwan’s elections are factors to influence the stability 
of cross-strait relations rather than factors to influence negative-or-positive patterns of cross-
strait relations. 
To conclude at the end, it is obvious that the factors from both the international and 
domestic levels are important in explaining the different facets of cross-strait relations. For the 
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Taiwan side, the U.S. and China’s behaviors, cross-strait trade interdependence and Taiwan’s 
presidential election cycles all contribute to explain the stability of Taiwan’s behavior. In other 
words, both levels matter for Taiwan’s policy toward China. As to the China side, both the 
negative-or-positive pattern and stability of China’s behavior are only influenced by the 
international factors, because the variable related to China’s domestic politics is not significant in 
both models. Thus, it is obvious that Taiwan’s presidential election is an important factor for the 
stability of both China and Taiwan’s behavior, but China’s domestic politics does not have the 
same salience in cross-strait relations, at least in the analysis of this chapter. 
CHAPTER 6. THE IMPACT OF LEADERSHIP CHANGE IN TAIWAN 
The main research question of this chapter is: What is the relationship between leadership 
change in Taiwan and cross-strait relations? After Taiwan’s democratization, leadership change 
in Taiwan becomes an important variable because Taiwan’s pro-independence actors start to 
have the opportunity to win elections and further to influence Taiwan’s policy toward China. The 
partisan alternation from the KMT to DPP in 2000 is a good example. Since the main political 
cleavage in Taiwan goes along with the independence-or-unification line, it is reasonable to 
assume that leaders from the KMT and DPP hold different preferences about Taiwan’s relations 
with China. More importantly, the conventional wisdom believes that Taiwan’s deviation from 
the “one China” position leads to a conflictive or instable tendency in cross-strait relations. In 
this case, it is reasonable to hypothesize that Taiwan’s pro-independent leadership leads to a 
conflictive development or the instability of cross-strait relations. 
 However, due to different backgrounds and personalities, the difference between Lee 
Teng-hui and Ma Ying-jeou is also obvious although they are both presidents from the KMT. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to use leadership change rather than partisanship as an indicator to 
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capture Taiwan’s willingness to stay on the “one China” position recognized by the Three 
Communiqués and One Act framework in 1979. In sum, in this chapter, leadership change in 
Taiwan works as a proxy to know Taiwan’s position on the “one China” issue, and this chapter 
aims to test the validity of the conventional wisdom that Taiwan’s pro-independence preference 
leads to conflict. 
On the other hand, this chapter also use leadership change in Taiwan as a proxy to 
understand the policy priorities in different periods. Based on the results in Chapter 5, it is clear 
that both international and domestic factors can influence cross-strait relations. Theoretically 
speaking, we need a method to deal with the “too many” variable problem in social science and 
figure out the priority among these factors from both international and domestic levels. In 
general, idea can plays an important role in foreign policymaking, which helps leaders to make 
choice among alternatives (J. Goldstein & Keohane 1993). In this case, it is reasonable to treat 
leadership change as a shift of policy priority in cross-strait relations, which means that 
leadership change helps answer which factor is more important in a certain period. In sum, this 
chapter takes a normative approach to synthesize factors influencing cross-strait relations, and 
leadership change in Taiwan works as a proxy to identify the priorities. 
As to the research design of this chapter, this chapter plans to examine how the change of 
leadership in Taiwan influences cross-strait relations from 1990 to 2012 in two ways. The first 
way is to investigate the effect of a certain leader on negative-or-positive patterns and the 
stability of cross-strait relations. The second way is to compare the differences among the 
significant factors when different leadership dummies are included respectively into analysis. 
As to the organization of this chapter, there are four sections. The first section summarize 
the relevant theories and facts about the effect of Taiwan’s leadership change in cross-strait 
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relations. The second section is about methodology and research design. The third section 
examines the effect of a certain leader on negative-or-positive pattern and the stability of cross-
strait relations. The fourth section compares the differences among the significant factors for 
Taiwan and China’s behaviors when facing different Taiwanese leaders. 
6.1 Theories and Hypotheses about Leadership Change 
From the liberal perspective in IR theory, the leaders’ ideas can work as a proxy to assess 
the priority of policy or guidelines of foreign behaviors. When introducing domestic factors into 
the analysis of international politics, an efficient way to synthesize all factors coming from both 
the international and domestic levels is critical to deal with the “too many variable” problem. In 
Goldstein and Keohane’s (1993: 11-24) work, there are three causal pathways to explain the role 
of belief and idea in foreign policy-making. Ideas can serve as road maps which can limit policy-
makers’ choices. Ideas can serve as focal points when a unique equilibrium is not available. 
Ideas embedded in institutions can serve as innovations for new policies. In short, since ideas 
and beliefs help decision-makers identify an option among alternatives, it is reasonable to take 
ideas or beliefs as factors that cause shifts of foreign behavior. On the other hand, the outcomes 
of policymaking is also a function of perceptions or misperceptions based on Jervis’ (1976: 117-
203) theory, because policy-makers have to maintain their cognitive consistency between beliefs 
and reality. Perception is related to a process of reasoning in which actors formulate their beliefs, 
images about other actors, and other actors’ intentions. In this light, the preexisting belief works 
as a gate-keeper to filter and process information for decision-makers. In both works, ideas and 
beliefs can work as proxies to understand decision-makers’ priority and reasoning.53 Therefore, 
when policy-makers face challenges and factors coming from both international and domestic 
                                                 
53 For a more detailed psychological origin of these cognitive theories, see Larson (1989: 24-56)  
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levels, they may have different priorities because of their different ideas. In this case, when 
analyzing cross-strait relations, it is reasonable to take Taiwan’s leadership change into account 
because the shift of leadership may denote a shift of policy preference or priority which leads to 
the change of negative-or-positive patterns of foreign behavior or the possibility of increasing 
uncertainty. 
On the other hand, leadership change in Taiwan also implies the possibility for Taiwan to 
deviate from the “one China” position. Since 1949, the legacy of Chinese Civil War makes “one 
China” issue become the essential characteristic of cross-strait relations, and the “one China” 
position is further moved to favor the P.R.C. because of the normalization of the U.S.-China 
relations in 1979. However, the democratization process creates a momentum for Taiwan to 
deviate from the “one China” position because it provides an opportunity for the pro-
independence actors, like the DPP, to influence cross-strait relations. In general, Taiwan’s 
democratization has two political consequences which need a further analysis. First, in the last 
chapter, the statistical analysis has shown that the approach of Taiwan’s presidential election 
creates uncertainty for both Taiwan and China and then makes cross-strait relations less stable.54 
Second, after democratization, the change of Taiwan’s leadership also becomes a noteworthy 
variable in cross-strait relations because Taiwanese leaders may hold different positions on the 
“one China” issue, and this chapter aims to investigate its consequence. However, it is also worth 
noting that the difference about the “one China” position among the top leaders cannot be totally 
explained by partisanship. For example, both Lee Teng-hui and Ma Ying-jeou are the KMT 
presidents, but their “one China” positions are quite different. This is the main reason for this 
chapter to take leadership change rather than partisan alternation as a proxy to access the 
                                                 
54 For a detailed analysis, please see Chapter 5. 
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preference deviating from the “one China” position. In sum, the goal of this chapter is to explore 
what the impact of leadership change is on cross-strait relations.55 
As to the hypotheses in this chapter, like the previous chapters, leadership change may 
influence negative-or-positive patterns and the stability of Taiwan and China’s behaviors. 
Regarding negative-or-positive patterns, any leader attempting to deviate from the “one China” 
position may lead to a negative development of Taiwan and China’s behaviors toward each 
other, while any leader maintaining the “one China” position may lead to a positive development 
of Taiwan and China’s behaviors toward each other. In this case, it is reasonable to assume that 
when the DPP leaders are in office, the actors in the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle tend to expect 
Taiwan to deviate from the “one China” position recognized by the framework of 1979. As to the 
KMT leaders after 1990, it is obvious that Lee Teng-hui is defined as a supporter of Taiwan 
independence in China’s rhetoric, but Ma Ying-jeou is never criticized for any attempt to deviate 
from the “one China” position. Since the DPP leaders generally hold a pro-independence 
position, it is reasonable to hypothesize a more conflictive development of cross-strait relations 
when the DPP leaders are in office. As to the KMT leaders, considering China’s criticism on Lee 
Teng-hui, it is also reasonable to hypothesize that Lee Teng-hui has the same effect like the DPP 
leaders on cross-strait relations. In this case, two hypotheses about negative-or-positive patterns 
go as follows: 
H1 Conflict Brought by the Independence Preference Hypothesis  
When the DPP leaders (Chen Shui-bian) or Lee Teng-hui are in office, a negative 
development of cross-strait relations can be expected. 
H2 Cooperation Brought by the Unification Preference Hypothesis 
                                                 
55 Since there is no evidence of China’s deviation from the “one China” position, this chapter does not includes 
leadership change of China into analysis. 
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When Ma Ying-Jeou is in office, a positive development of cross-strait relations can be 
expected. 
As to the hypotheses about the stability of Taiwan and China’s behaviors, any leader 
attempting to deviate from the “one China” position creates uncertainty for all decision-makers, 
and then causes the instability of Taiwan and China’s behaviors. On the other hand, any leader 
maintaining the “one China” position makes Taiwan and China’s behaviors more stable. Thus, 
two hypotheses about the stability of cross-strait relations go as follows: 
H3 Instability Brought by the Independence Preference Hypothesis 
When the DPP leaders (Chen Shui-bian) or Lee Teng-hui are in office, China and 
Taiwan’s behaviors toward each other are less stable. 
H4 Stability Brought by the Unification Preference Hypothesis 
When Ma Ying-jeou is in office, China and Taiwan’s behaviors toward each other are 
more stable. 
To sum up, the change of leadership may represent a shift of policy preference, and it can 
work as a proxy to indicate Taiwan’s preference to hold or deviate from the “one China” position 
in the US.-China-Taiwan triangle because of the independence-or-unification nature of Taiwan’s 
domestic politics. In general, this chapter hypothesizes that any deviation from the “one China” 
position creates a conflictive development of cross-strait relations or produces uncertainty that 
causes instability for both Taiwan and China’s behaviors. In the following sections, a set of 
statistical analyses will be conducted to test the validity of the hypotheses. 
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6.2 Method and Variables 
This chapter applies an ARIMA(1,1,1)-GARCH (1,1) model to control the bias caused by 
the serial correlation, non-stationary and heteroscedasticity problems.56 The GARCH model is 
designed to model both the mean and variance of time series data, so there are two equations in 
the GARCH model, which are the conditional mean equation and the conditional variance 
equation. The conditional mean equations in the following sections help explain how factors 
including state behaviors in the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle, trade interdependence, electoral 
cycles, and leadership change impact the negative-or-positive patterns of Taiwan and China’s 
behaviors. In other words, the conditional mean equations can be expressed as: 
𝐷𝑇𝐶𝑡  = 𝐷𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝐷𝐶𝑈𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝑈𝐶𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑡−1 + 𝐷𝑈𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡−1
+ 𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 + 𝐶𝐶𝑃 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 + 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝
+ 𝐴𝑅(1) + 𝑀𝐴(1) + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 
𝐷𝐶𝑇𝑡  = 𝐷𝑇𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝐷𝐶𝑈𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝑈𝐶𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑡−1 + 𝐷𝑈𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡−1
+ 𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 + 𝐶𝐶𝑃 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 + 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝
+ 𝐴𝑅(1) + 𝑀𝐴(1) + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 
The conditional variance equations in the following sections help examine how the same 
variables change the variance of Taiwan and China’s behaviors. A greater variance of a state 
behavior is defined as the instability of a state behavior. Thus, the conditional variance equations 
can be expressed as: 
                                                 
56 Since the time period (1990-2012) is the same as the analysis in Chapter 5, so the model is the same as the models 
in Chapter 5. 
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𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑇𝐶𝑡  
= 𝐷𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝐶𝑈𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝑈𝐶𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑡−1 + 𝐷𝑈𝑇𝑡−1
+ 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒
+ 𝐶𝐶𝑃 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 + 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 + 𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻(1) + 𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻(1)
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 
𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝐶𝑇𝑡  
= 𝐷𝑇𝐶𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝐶𝑈𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝑈𝐶𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑡−1 +  𝐷𝑈𝑇𝑡−1
+ 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒
+ 𝐶𝐶𝑃 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 + 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 + 𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻(1) + 𝐺𝐴𝑅𝐶𝐻(1)
+ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 
In general, besides the leadership dummy variables, all variables are the same as the 
dependence model in Chapter 5.57 The leadership dummies are the main objectives to observe in 
this chapter.58 There are three top leaders in Taiwan after 1990, and they are Lee Teng-hui (Lee), 
Chen Shui-bian (Chen), Ma Ying-jeou (Ma). 
6.3 The Impact of Leadership Change in the Dependence Model 
In this section, the concept of economic interdependence is measured by Taiwan’s trade 
dependence on China as the analysis in Chapter 5. The summarized results about the leadership 
dummies are shown as Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1 Summarized Results about the Effect of Leadership Change in Taiwan 
                                                 
57 In this chapter, the indicator of cross-strait economic interdependence is the level of Taiwan’s trade dependence on 
China. Based on the analysis in Chapter 5, the results of the trade interdependence model and the dependence model 
are very similar. Thus, this chapter takes the dependence model as the main model for the reason of parsimony. 
58 Like the situation in Chapter 4, adding too many variables leads to the convergence problem easily for a GARCH 
model, and the problem really occurs when I add the interactive variables combing the leadership dummy and the 
right-hand-side variables in the dependence model (like Lee*DCTt-1) or include the three leadership dummy 
variables at the same time. Therefore, I apply the same method in Chapter 4 to run the regression three times and 
add only one dummy variable each time to compare the effects of the three presidencies on the dependence model. 
The result in Table 6.1 is a comparison of the results when a certain leadership dummy is in the equations.  
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 DTC Standard Error DCT Standard Error 
Conditional mean 
Lee 11.56** (3.22) 4.040 (3.41) 
Chen -4.333 (3.93) 2.783 (3.73) 
Ma -9.792 (7.34) -12.29* (5.46) 
Conditional variance 
Lee 0.00595 (0.58) 1.164* (0.59) 
Chen 0.728+ (0.38) -0.222 (0.41) 
Ma -3.251* (1.48) -3.347 (2.34) 
Note: 1. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 2. The rest part of this model is omitted and all tests on 
standardized residuals show no evidence of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. 
In general, the results in Table 6.1 show three points worth noting. First, the positive 
development of Taiwan’s behavior toward China is a general trend in the Lee period before 
controlling the effect of the 1996 crisis, and China’s behavior toward Taiwan is less stable in the 
Lee period. Second, the Chen presidency has no impact on both negative-or-positive patterns and 
the stability of cross-strait relations. Third, in general, the development of China’s behavior 
toward Taiwan is negative in the Ma period, and Taiwan’s behavior toward China is more stable 
in the Ma period. A detailed illustration goes as follows. 
First, the Lee presidency has two effects. The first effect is that Taiwan’s behavior toward 
China goes toward a more positive development and the second one is China’s behavior is less 
stable in the Lee period. In Table 6.1, the coefficients of the Lee dummy are positive and 
significant in the conditional mean equation of Taiwan’s behavior toward China (DTC) and in 
the conditional variance equation of China’s behavior toward Taiwan (DCT). Based on the 
results, it is reasonable to reject the conflict brought by the independence preference hypothesis 
(H1), because of the wrong sign of the coefficients in the conditional mean equation of Taiwan’s 
behavior toward China (DTC). On the other hand, the results in the conditional variance 
equations show that the instability brought by the independence preference (H3) is evident on the 
China side in the Lee period, because it only works on China’s behavior toward Taiwan (DCT). 
However, the results still need to be further examined by controlling the effect of the 1996 crisis. 
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The summarized results after dividing the Lee period into the “before” and “after” the crisis 
dummies are shown in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2 Summarized Results of the Before-After Comparison in the Lee Period 
 DTC Standard Error DCT Standard Error 
Conditional mean 
Before the  6.915* (3.42) 0.390 (2.94) 
1996 Crisis     
After the 11.47* (5.03) 6.469* (2.84) 
1996 Crisis     
Conditional variance 
Before the  -1.116** (0.42) 0.0300 (0.39) 
1996 Crisis     
After the   0.255 (0.43) -0.0336 (0.45) 
1996 Crisis     
Note: 1. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 2. The rest part of this model is omitted and all tests on 
standardized residuals show no evidence of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. 
The results in Table 6.2 further confirm that it is reasonable to reject the conflict brought 
by the independence preference hypothesis (H1), and it also shows that Taiwan’s behavior 
toward China is in fact more stable before the crisis in the Lee period. First of all, in Table 6.2, 
all coefficients in the conditional mean equations are positive, which contradict what the conflict 
brought by the independence preference hypothesis (H1) predicts. If the hypothesis is true, then 
the signs of all coefficients in the conditional mean equations should be negative. Thus, it is safe 
to reject the hypothesis about the conflict brought by the independence preference (H1). The 
results also indicate that the Lee presidency brings a positive development of cross-strait 
relations rather than a negative development to cross-strait relations. Second, as to the stability of 
cross-strait relations, the results in the conditional variance equations show the instable effect of 
the Lee presidency on China’s behavior is not significant in both periods. The result suggests that 
the instable effect of the Lee presidency on China is an average effect when taking the before 
and after periods of the 1996 crisis as a whole. The 1996 crisis may be the key to make China’s 
behavior to Taiwan have a greater variance in the Lee period because controlling for the 1996 
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crisis has a significant impact on the instable effect of the Lee presidency shown in Table 6.1. 
The only significant coefficient in the conditional variance equations of Table 6.2 is the before 
1996 crisis dummy in the equation of Taiwan’s behavior toward China (DTC), but the sign of the 
coefficient is different from what the instability brought by the independence preference 
hypothesis (H3) predicts. Therefore, after controlling the effect of the 1996 crisis, the results 
show that there is no evidence to support the conflict brought by the independence preference 
hypothesis (H1) and the instability brought by the independence preference hypothesis (H3) only 
works on China when taking the before and after periods of the 1996 crisis as a whole. In short, 
the effect of the Lee presidency is complicated in cross-strait relations, and the statistical analysis 
shows that the conventional wisdom about the negative development of cross-strait relations in 
the Lee period is wrong. However, China’s uncertainty about Taiwan’s behavior in the Lee 
period is also evident, because of China’s behavioral instability as shown in Table 6.1, and the 
1996 crisis may be the key for the greater variance of China’s behavior.   
Second, as to the impact of the Chen presidency, the results in Table 6.1 show that the 
Chen presidency has no impact on both negative-or-positive patterns and the stability of cross-
strait relations. Therefore, there is no evidence to support the conflict brought by the 
independence preference hypothesis (H1) in general. Based on the coefficients of the Chen and 
Lee dummies in the conditional mean equations of Table 6.1, it is reasonable to say that the 
negative-or-positive patterns of Taiwan and China’s behaviors toward each other does not go as 
the hypothesis predicts or is not influenced by Taiwan’s two pro-independence leaders. 
As to the effect of Taiwan’s pro-independence leaders on the stability of cross-strait 
relations, the results in Table 6.1 show some support for the instability brought by the 
independence preference hypothesis (H3). The Chen presidency has no impact on the stability of 
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cross-strait relations, but the Lee presidency has an instable effect on China’s behavior toward 
Taiwan in general. Thus, the statistical evidence only support the instable effect of the Lee 
presidency when taking the Lee period as whole. 
Third, as to the impact of the Ma presidency, the negative development of China’s 
behavior toward Taiwan is evident in the Ma period, and Taiwan’s behavior toward China is 
more stable in the Ma period. In Table 6.1, the results in the conditional mean equations reject 
the cooperation brought by the unification preference hypothesis (H2) because the negative 
development in the Ma period contradicts what the hypothesis predicts. As in Table 6.1, the 
coefficient related to the Ma presidency is negative and significant in the conditional mean 
equation of China’s behavior toward Taiwan (DCT). On the other hand, the results in the 
conditional variance equations support the stability brought by the unification preference 
hypothesis (H4) only on the Taiwan side. As in Table 6.1, the coefficient of the Ma presidency is 
negative and significant in the conditional variance equation of Taiwan’s behavior toward China 
(DTC), which indicates the stable effect of the Ma presidency on Taiwan’s behavior to China. 
Based on the analysis in this sections, the summarized result about the hypothesis testing 
is shown as Table 6.3. In general, it is reasonable to conclude that Taiwan’s deviation from the 
“one China” position creates uncertainty rather than a conflictive tendency in cross-strait 
relations. Two note-worthy patterns go as follows. 
Table 6.3 The Result about the Hypothesis Testing Related to Leadership Change 
Dependence Model DTC DCT 
Conflict Brought by the independence preference (H1)   
Cooperation Brought by the unification preference (H2)   
Instability Brought by the independence preference (H3)  Lee (whole) 
Stability Brought by the unification preference (H4) Ma  
Note: 1. The last names of Taiwan’s presidents means that the effects of their presidencies are significant. 2. The 
instable effect of the Lee presidency is significant only when taking the Lee period as a whole without 
considering the effect of the 1996 crisis. 
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First, like previous chapters, the effect of Taiwan’s leadership change mainly works on 
the stability rather than negative-or-positive patterns of cross-strait relations. The statistical 
evidence in this section does not support the two hypotheses about negative-or-positive patterns 
(H1 and H2). More importantly, the statistical analysis contradicts the conventional wisdom to 
formulate the two hypotheses. As shown in Table 6.1, both the positive development of Taiwan’s 
behavior in the Lee period and the negative development of China’s behavior in the Ma period 
contradict the conventional wisdom. 
Second, the statistical results show some support for both hypotheses about the stability 
of cross-strait relations. In the first place, the instability caused by Lee is evident on the China 
side when taking the Lee period as a whole. However, the effect of the Lee presidency on the 
Taiwan side is mixed and not totally works as the hypothesis predicts. Before the crisis, the Lee 
presidency is a stable factor for Taiwan’s behavior, which is different from what the hypothesis 
predicts. Therefore, the role of Lee Teng-hui in cross-strait relations is complicated and the 
instable effect only works on the China side. Next, the stability caused by the pro-unification 
leader is only significant on the Taiwan side. The Ma presidency has a stable effect on Taiwan’s 
behavior toward China. Thus, it seems that the stable effect of the pro-unification preference 
(caused by Ma) only works on Taiwan while the instable effect of the pro-independence 
preference (caused by Lee) only works for China. The fact also denotes that only the Lee 
presidency has an impact on the stability of China’s behavior, and the rest of Taiwanese leaders 
after 2000 do not cause any disturbance for the stability of China’s behavior. 
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6.4 Priorities in Different Periods 
In this section, the goal is to compare the significant factors influencing Taiwan and 
China’s behaviors under different Taiwanese leaders. The summarized results are listed as Table 
6.4.  
Table 6.4 Significant Factors in cross-strait Relations in Different Periods  
Dependence Model DTC DCT 
Conditional mean equations   
Lee  DTC (+) 
Chen  DTC (+) 
Ma  DTC (+) 
Conditional variance equations   
Lee DDependency (-), 
Election (Pres., -), 
Election (Parl., +) 
DTU (-), DUT (+), 
DDependency (-), 
Election (Pres., -) 
Chen DCT (-), DCU (-), DUC 
(+), Election (Pres., -), 
Election (Parl., +) 
DUT (+), DDependency (-
), Election (Pres., -) 
Ma DCT (-), DCU (-), DUC 
(+), DDependency (-), 
Election (Pres., -), 
Election (Parl., +) 
DDependency (-), 
Election (Pres., -) 
Note: 1. The variables listed are the factors significant at 5% level when a certain leadership dummy is in 
the equation. 2. The signs in the parentheses indicate the sign of the coefficient of a certain variable in the 
equation. 
First, regarding the negative-or-positive pattern of Taiwan’s behavior, the results in the 
conditional mean equation show that no factor helps explain the negative-or-positive pattern of 
Taiwan’s behavior in all periods, and are consistent with the results in the previous chapters. 
That is, the negative-or-positive pattern of Taiwan’s behavior toward China is quite independent 
from most international and domestic factors, and there is no evidence to support any bilateral or 
triangular effects in influencing the negative-or-positive pattern of Taiwan’s behavior. 
Second, regarding the stability of Taiwan’s behavior, in the results of the conditional 
variance equations, the two electoral cycles are the common factors in all periods, which 
suggests that all Taiwanese leaders are sensitive to electoral cycles. Besides the two electoral 
142 
cycles, Lee is additionally sensitive to Taiwan’s economic dependence on China. On the other 
hand, Chen is additionally sensitive to the negative development of China’s behaviors toward 
Taiwan (DCT) and China’s behavior toward the United States (DCU) and the positive 
development of the U.S. behavior toward China (DUC). In other words, the strategic interactions 
in the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle starts to play a role after 2000 in the stability of Taiwan’s 
behavior toward China and this pattern is also evident in the Ma period. The fact suggests that 
the U.S.-China relations and China’s policy to Taiwan start to create uncertainty for Taiwanese 
leaders after 2000. More importantly, Chen is the only one leader who is not sensitive to 
Taiwan’s economic dependence on China. In other words, this suggests that Chen cares more 
about political factors than economic factors. Ma basically is concerned about the same issues as 
the previous two Taiwanese leaders: the U.S.-China relations, China’s policy to Taiwan, and 
Taiwan’s economic dependence. Thus, both international and domestic factors help explain the 
stability of Taiwan’s behavior in all periods, and Taiwan’s general elections are the common 
concerns of the three Taiwanese leaders. Besides elections, Lee concerns more about economic 
dependence, while Chen cares more about the U.S.-China interactions and China’s policy toward 
Taiwan. Ma basically concerns both political and economic factors. 
Third, as to the negative-or-positive pattern of China’s behavior, it is obvious that the 
bilateral tit-for-tat response toward Taiwan is the most significant pattern for China and the 
pattern is not changed by Taiwan’s leadership change. As shown in Table 6.4, Taiwan’s behavior 
toward China (DTC) is always a significant factor for the negative-or-positive pattern of China’s 
behavior no matter how the leadership in Taiwan changes. Again, this fact confirms the special 
status of Taiwan in China’ policymaking. On the other hand, the results in Table 6.4 also show 
no sign of any triangularity in the negative-or-positive pattern of China’s behavior. Again, as 
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previous models show, the indirect U.S. triangularity on China works only when the time period 
is from 1979 to 2012 without taking economic interdependence and Taiwan’s domestic politics 
into account. However, Taiwan’s behavior toward China (DTC) is always a significant factor 
influencing the negative-or-positive pattern of China’s behavior, which indicates that the 
influence of the Chinese Civil War legacy on China is never changed by Taiwan’s leadership 
change. 
Fourth, as to the stability of China’s behavior, cross-strait economic interdependence and 
Taiwan’s presidential election are two common factors for China under different Taiwanese 
leaders. Compared with the stability of Taiwan’s behavior, the cycle of Taiwan’s parliamentary 
election does not disturb the stability of China’s behavior. Besides the two common factors, 
China is sensitive to some additional factors in both the Lee and Chen periods. In the Lee period, 
China is additionally sensitive to the negative development of Taiwan’s behavior toward the 
United States (DTU) and the positive development of the U.S. behavior toward Taiwan (DUT). 
In other words, China is uncertain about the implications of the negative development of 
Taiwan’s behavior toward the United States and the positive development of the U.S. behavior 
toward Taiwan. In the Chen period, China is additional sensitive to the positive development of 
the U.S. behavior toward Taiwan (DUT). Thus, in general, China feels uncertain about the 
positive development of the U.S. behavior toward Taiwan when the pro-independence leaders 
are in power, because it is the common factor in both the Lee and Chen periods. When Ma is in 
power, the interactions in the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle is irrelevant because none of state 
behaviors in the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle is significant in the conditional variance equation of 
China’s behavior toward Taiwan in the Ma period. The result illustrates that there is no more 
surprise in China’s expectation about the interactions of the U.S.-China-Taiwan triad in the Ma 
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period. Therefore, the stability of China’s behavior is commonly influenced by economic 
interdependence and Taiwan’s domestic politics, and China is additionally sensitive to some 
state behaviors in the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle when facing the pro-independence leaders of 
Taiwan. 
To sum up for this section, it is obvious that the significant factors that influence 
negative-or-positive patterns of cross-strait relations are identical throughout these periods. On 
the Taiwan side, no factor can influence the negative-or-positive pattern of Taiwan’s behavior. 
On the China side, Taiwan’s behavior toward China is always significant in all periods. As to the 
stability of Taiwan and China’s behaviors to each other, it is evident that some factors are 
emphasized or sensitive in certain periods. Regarding the stability of Taiwan’s behavior, besides 
the two cycles of Taiwanese election, Lee concerns more about economic dependence, while 
Chen cares more about the triangular politics, and Ma basically is concerned about the same 
issues as the previous two Taiwanese leaders. As to the stability of China’s behavior, besides 
Taiwan’s economic dependence and the cycle of Taiwan’s presidential election, China is 
additionally sensitive to the positive development of the U.S. behavior toward Taiwan when the 
pro-independence leaders are in power. When Ma is in power, the interactions in the U.S.-China-
Taiwan triangle becomes irrelevant for the stability of China’s behavior. 
6.5 Conclusion 
To sum up for this chapter, it is clear that leadership in Taiwan is a factor to influence the 
stability of cross-strait relations under some conditions. When assuming the change of leadership 
in Taiwan as a proxy to indicate Taiwan’s preference to deviate from the “one China” position in 
the US.-China-Taiwan triangle, the results in this chapter show that Taiwan’s deviation from the 
“one China” position creates uncertainty rather than conflict in cross-strait relations. In the four 
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hypotheses developed according to the conventional wisdom about cross-strait relations, none of 
the hypotheses about negative-or-positive patterns is evident because of the wrong sign of the 
relevant coefficients. The results in Table 6.1 show that the development of Taiwan’s behavior 
toward China is in fact more positive in the Lee period and the development of China’s behavior 
toward Taiwan is more negative in the Ma period. Therefore, the conventional wisdom that the 
pro-independence preference leads to conflicts or the pro-unification preference leads to 
cooperation in cross-strait relations may not be the true mechanisms to depict the development of 
cross-strait relations. As to the stability of cross-strait, the results show some support for the 
relevant hypotheses. The results in Table 6.1 indicates that China’s behavior is less stable in the 
Lee period and Taiwan’s behavior is more stable in the Ma period.59 Thus, it is evident that 
Taiwan’s pro-independence preference of creates uncertainty for China because of the instable 
effect of Lee on China, and Taiwan’s pro-unification preference only influences Taiwan because 
of the stable effect of Ma on Taiwan. More importantly, the statistical analysis shows that Chen 
in fact plays no role in both negative-or-positive patterns and the stability of cross-strait 
relations, which is quite different from what the conventional wisdom depicts. In sum, the 
statistical analysis suggests that leadership change in Taiwan influences the stability rather than 
negative-or-positive patterns of cross-strait relations. In other words, Taiwan’s pro-independence 
preference creates uncertainty rather conflict for cross-strait relations, and the instable effect of 
Taiwan’s pro-independence only works on the China side while the stable effect of Taiwan’s 
pro-unification preference only works on Taiwan. 
On the other hand, the analysis in this chapter also shows that the significant factors 
influencing the stability of cross-strait relations are different when different Taiwanese leaders 
                                                 
59 The instable effect of the Lee presidency for China works when taking the Lee period as a whole without taking 
the 1996 crisis as a breaking point of the Lee presidency. See Table 6.1 and 6.2. 
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are in power. Regarding the stability of Taiwan’s behavior, Lee concerns more about economic 
dependence, while Chen cares more about the triangular politics, and Ma is concerned about the 
same issue as the two previous presidents. As to the stability of China’s behavior, China is 
additionally sensitive to the positive development of the U.S. behavior toward Taiwan when the 
pro-independence leaders are in power and when Ma is in power, the interactions in the U.S.-
China-Taiwan triangle no longer create uncertainty for China. 
CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS 
The goal of this dissertation is to clarify how the Cold War legacy, the Chinese Civil War 
legacy, economic interdependence, and Taiwan’s domestic politics influence cross-strait 
relations. In the process of investigating this question, two trends are obvious. First, most factors 
have impacts on the stability rather than negative-or-positive patterns of cross-strait relations. 
The result suggests that the traditional war-and-peace aspect in IR is insufficient to analyze state 
behaviors and it is necessary to model uncertainty and instability when analyzing cooperation 
and conflict in the context of time. Second, the Chinese Civil War legacy is the only factor that 
can influence negative-or-positive patterns of cross-strait relations. China’s tit-for-tat response to 
Taiwan is the only significant pattern presenting in the conditional mean equations of all models. 
The result represents Taiwan’s active and special status in cross-strait relations. Based on the 
findings in the previous chapters, the causal relations confirmed by the statistical analyses are 
shown as Figure 7.1, and will be illustrated in the following section. 
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Figure 7.1 Causal Relations between Factors and Cross-Strait Relations 
7.1 Findings 
First, about the Cold War legacy, in this dissertation, the legacy is defined as the U.S. 
related behaviors, and in general, they can only influence the stability of cross-strait relations. 
Although the statistical analysis in Chapter 3 shows that the United States can influence China’s 
negative-or-positive pattern toward Taiwan through manipulating its cooperative level toward 
Taiwan, when taking economic interdependence and Taiwan’s domestic politics after 1990 into 
account, such influential pattern is no longer significant in the models of Chapter 5. More 
importantly, the U.S. influence never works in a direct way. In all models from Chapter 3 to 
Chapter 6, the variables of the U.S. direct triangularity in cross-strait relations are never 
significant.60 Thus, it is reasonable to say that although the United States plays an important role 
                                                 
60 For Taiwan’s behavior toward China, the U.S. behavior toward Taiwan is the variable of the U.S. direct 
triangularity. For China’s behavior toward Taiwan, the U.S. behavior toward China is the variable of the U.S. direct 
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in the formation of the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle and the Three Communiques and One Act 
framework in the history after World War Two, the U.S. leverage in the interactions between 
Taiwan and China is in fact very limited, and does not direct alter negative-or-positive patterns of 
cross-strait relations. On the other hand, the statistical results in Chapter 4 show that the end of 
Cold War brings instability for some state behaviors, but there is no evidence to support a 
conflictive tendency in the post-Cold War era. In other words, both neo-realism and power 
transition theory fail to depict the development of the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle after the Cold 
War. In sum, the Cold War legacy or the U.S. influence can only works on the stability of cross-
strait relations in an indirect way. 
 Second, about the Chinese Civil War legacy, the statistical analyses in this dissertation 
suggest that the legacy is the only factor that can influence both negative-or-positive patterns and 
the stability of cross-strait relations.61 On the one hand, based on the results in Chapter 5, the 
negative development of China’s behaviors toward Taiwan leads to a greater volatility for 
Taiwan’s behavior toward China. On the other hand, based on the results from Chapter 3 to 
Chapter 6, China’s tit-for-tat response to Taiwan is always significant in the conditional mean 
equations, which denotes Taiwan’s special status in China’s decision-making process. More 
importantly, all results about negative-or-positive patterns of cross-strait relations suggest that 
only China responds to Taiwan’s behavior but Taiwan does not response to China’s behavior, 
which means that Taiwan is in fact leading the negative-or-positive development of cross-strait 
relations. Thus, it is reasonable to believe that Taiwan’s persistent cooperation toward China is 
the key to prevent future conflicts in cross-strait relations and the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle, 
                                                 
triangularity. The related hypotheses about the U.S. direct triangulairy, see Chapter 3.  
61 In this dissertation, China’s behavior to Taiwan is defined as the variable of the Chinese Civil War legacy for 
Taiwan’s behavior to China. As to China’s behavior to Taiwan, the variable of the Chinese Civil War legacy is 
defined as Taiwan’s behavior to China. 
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and how to build an environment which can encourage Taiwan’s persistent cooperation toward 
China is an important issue to reduce the tension in the Taiwan Strait. As to the effect of 
Taiwan’s pro-independence preference, the results in Chapter 6 basically show that there is no 
evidence indicating a conflictive tendency in cross-strait relations when Taiwan’s pro-
independent leaders are in power. 
Third, about economic interdependence, the statistical analyses in Chapter 5 and 6 show 
that economic interdependence only influence the stability of cross-strait relations. Based on the 
results, the two related variables, the level of economic interdependence and the level of 
Taiwan’s dependence on China, are only significant in the conditional variance equations, and 
the negative development of economic interdependence or Taiwan’s dependence on China 
creates uncertainty and instability for cross-strait relations. In other words, the results do not 
support the commercial peace hypothesis, and economic interdependence promote stability 
rather than a cooperative tendency in the case of cross-strait relations. More importantly, China’s 
consistent concern on Taiwan’s economic dependence on China is also evident based on the 
results of Chapter 6. No matter how Taiwan’s leadership changes, Taiwan’s dependence is 
always a sensitive factor in influencing China’s behavior stability toward Taiwan. The results, 
again, show that the impact of economic interdependence works only on the stability of cross-
strait relations. 
Fourth, about Taiwan’s domestic politics, in general, the impact of Taiwan’s domestic 
politics mainly works on the stability of cross-strait relations, and Taiwan’s presidential election 
cycle is an important factor for the stability of Taiwan and China’s behaviors to each other. The 
results in Chapter 5 show that the approach of Taiwan’s presidential elections creates instability 
rather than a conflictive tendency in cross-strait relations. The results in Chapter 6 also indicate 
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that Taiwan’s presidential elections are the common factor to influence the stability of Taiwan 
and China’s behaviors since 1990, which shows that Taiwan’s presidential elections really 
generate great uncertainty for Taiwan and China’s decision-makers. On the other hand, the 
results in Chapter 4 also indicate that Taiwan’s democratic transition does not create a conflictive 
or instable tendency, and in fact, the partisan alternation in the consolidation period is the main 
source of uncertainty and instability in the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle. All results suggest that 
Mansfield and Snyder’s “election to fight” rationale may not work in cross-strait relations.  
Although the effect of leadership change in Taiwan on negative-or-positive patterns is 
different from what the conventional wisdom predicts and the effect on the stability of cross-
strait relations is conditional, leadership change in Taiwan still works well in identifying Taiwan 
and China’s policy priorities under different Taiwanese leaders. From 1990 to 2012, regarding 
Taiwan’s policy priorities, the results in Chapter 6 show that the triangular politics starts to a 
sensitive factor for all Taiwanese leaders after 2000 and the KMT leaders basically care more 
about economic interdependence. As to China’s policy priorities, a trend is obvious that China’s 
sensitivity on the U.S.-Taiwan relations keeps declining from 1990 to 2012. More importantly, 
China is no longer sensitive to the U.S.-Taiwan relations in the Ma period. The political 
implication is clear: Taiwan’s policies and the effect of the U.S.-China-Taiwan interactions 
during the Ma period is quite predictable in China’s decision-makers’ minds. The results also 
supports the reasonability to apply the normative way to synthesize factors from both 
international and domestic levels and to understand the causal relationships of policymaking 
suggested by J. Goldstein and Keohane (1993). 
Besides, the findings directly related to the variation to cross-strait relations, by 
controlling for China’s domestic politics factor, the question about the relative importance of 
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international versus domestic factors in determining cross-strait relations can also be answered. It 
is clear that the answer is different for Taiwan and China based on the results in Chapter 5 and 6. 
On the China side, both the negative-or-positive pattern and stability of its behavior toward 
Taiwan are only influenced by the international factors. The result is quite reasonable because 
there is no reason for China to deviate from the “one China” position in the 1979 framework of 
the triad. In this case, there is no domestic force to alter its negative-or-positive pattern or to 
disturb the stability of China’s behavior toward Taiwan. 
On the Taiwan side, it is evident that no factor can influence the negative-or-positive 
pattern of Taiwan’s behavior toward China, but factors from both international and domestic 
levels influence the stability of Taiwan’s behavior toward China. The result shows that although 
Taiwan’s deviation from the P.R.C.-favored “one China” position combining with the high level 
of economic interdependence with China is a general trend after 1990, to deal with Taiwan’s 
policy toward China rationally is still a consensus for all decision-makers in Taiwan, because 
there is no evidence to support the two factors significantly alter the negative-or-positive pattern 
of Taiwan’s policy toward China. However, decision-makers in Taiwan still have to face the 
uncertainty caused by the approach of elections and the negative development of China’s 
dependence on cross-strait trade flow. In sum, the results illustrate the insufficiency to make 
inference based on international factors only and the necessity to include domestic factors for 
searching the origins of different policy preferences at least in the case of Taiwan’s policy 
toward China. 
7.2 Contribution 
Based on the findings mentioned above, this dissertation contributes to the existing 
theories in two aspects. First, future IR studies may need considering to model uncertainty and 
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instability when analyzing cooperation and conflict. The war-and-peace perspective is not the 
only aspect of foreign behavior, and this dissertation have shown that “stable or not” is a new 
perspective worthy for further exploration. Uncertainty is a natural part of the real world, and it 
is also unreasonable to assume that states’ behavioral patterns are always constant. In this case, 
to understand what generates uncertainty and what leads to instability should also be a task for 
future IR studies. Second, the structural perspective of neo-realism is not comprehensive and 
sufficient enough to explain cross-strait relations. The logic of power does not explain the lack of 
direct leverage for the United States in cross-strait relations and China’s tit-for-tat response to 
Taiwan. Moreover, to stay at the international level only does not help see the whole picture of 
cross-strait relations. The results in Chapter 5 and 6 have shown the importance of domestic 
politics, especially Taiwan’s presidential election, in cross-strait relations. In short, in the case of 
cross-strait relations, it is necessary to model behavior instability when analyzing cooperation 
and conflict and the explanatory power of neo-realism may not be as powerful as its proponents 
claim. 
First, when analyzing state behavior in the context of time, the behavioral stability should 
be a new aspect worth of further study. In other words, besides war and peace, foreign policy 
researchers should consider to take the stability of state behavior as the dependent variables for 
future studies. Traditional foreign policy studies only focus on the effects on negative-or-positive 
patterns of state behavior, which is the war-and-peace aspect of foreign behavior. However, the 
findings in this dissertation show that most conflictive factors suggested by the existing theories 
do not directly influence negative-or-positive patterns of state behavior but have a significant 
impact on the behavioral stability in general. 
This finding has two implications. On the one hand, this implies that the cooperative game 
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approach may need to reconsider it research design and hypotheses. In the previous studies 
applying this approach, researchers tend to apply a series of stability tests to make sure that the 
behavioral patterns are stable in a certain period.62 However, this process often excludes a large 
number of data points and extremely limits the generalizability of the conclusion. The non-
constant variance across time periods is quite common in the real world, so to model and figure 
out how factors influence the stability of state behavior may be a better way to further our 
understanding about state behaviors rather than to exclude the non-constant part of data. This 
dissertation suggests applying the GARCH model to deal with negative-or-positive patterns and 
the stability of state behavior at the same time. As shown in the results of the previous chapters, 
it is clear that state behaviors in the triangle mainly influence the stability of other state behaviors 
in the triangle, and this dissertation suggests using uncertainty to explain the origin of instability. 
However, this dissertation still has its limitation, and a further research to formulate hypotheses 
about the relationship between cooperative behaviors and behavioral stability is needed to make 
up the gap in the cooperative game approach. 
On the other hand, the effect of economic interdependence and election cycle in the 
democratization process on conflictive behavior may need to be reconsidered. The analyses in 
this dissertation show that in fact the two factors lead to instability rather than conflict in cross-
strait relations. For dealing with the stability of state behavior, this dissertation suggests 
assuming that uncertainty leads to instability or a greater variance of state behavior, and the 
negative change of economic interdependence and the approach of election both generate 
uncertainty for decision-makers. This is only a first step for further research, and based on the 
findings in this dissertation, at least in cross-strait relations, to disrupt an economic 
                                                 
62 See J. S. Goldstein and Freeman (1990); J. S. Goldstein and Pevehouse (1997). 
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interdependent relationship or the approach of Taiwan’s presidential election only leads to 
uncertainty for decision-makers or instability of Taiwan and China’s behaviors rather than 
incentives to conflict. In sum, the findings in this dissertation suggest that behavioral stability is 
an important aspect when analyzing state behavior in a context of time. More importantly, in the 
future, when applying the hypotheses of the cooperative game, commercial peace and democratic 
transition in cross-strait relations, the inference will be more comprehensive if the stability of 
cross-strait relation is considered. 
Second, the structural perspective of neo-realism may not be as powerful and elegant as its 
proponents claim. On the one hand, there is no evidence to support the claim that the power 
structure at the international level is the most salient factor to explain the variation of state 
behaviors in the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle. First of all, there is no evidence of the presence of 
the U.S. direct leverage in negative-or-positive patterns of cross-strait relations. More 
importantly, the only U.S. indirect leverage, which is to manipulate the U.S. cooperation toward 
Taiwan to change China’s calculation of utility toward Taiwan, is no longer significant after 1990 
when cross-strait economic interdependence and the domestic politics in Taiwan start influencing 
the stability of cross-strait relations. In other words, it is clear that the U.S.-China struggle can 
only partially explain cross-strait relations, and Taiwan’s domestic politics and cross-strait 
economic interdependence also play an important role in cross-strait relations. Second, the shift 
of polarity from a bipolar system to a multi-polar system after 1989 does not necessarily leads to 
a conflictive tendency in the triad. Both neo-realism and power transition theory suggest a more 
conflictive U.S.-China relationship and cross-strait relations in the post-Cold War period, but the 
results in Chapter 4 do not show any sign to support the conflictive development. However, the 
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stable effect of the bipolar system does work on some state behaviors as neo-realists predict.63 
On the other hand, as to the role of Taiwan, the wisdom of Thucydides (1972: 402) that 
“the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must” does not accurately depict 
Taiwan’s behavioral patterns and characterize its importance in the triad. As shown in all 
models, only China responds to Taiwan in a tit-for-tat way, but there is no sign of Taiwan’s 
response toward China’s behavior in negative-or-positive patterns of cross-strait relations. The 
result suggests that in fact Taiwan is leading the negative-or-positive development of cross-strait 
relation, not the powerful China. More importantly, Taiwan’s negative-or-positive pattern to 
China is not influenced by the triangular interactions at all and this pattern remains even with the 
addition of new factors. The result shows that although it is the weakest state in the triad, 
Taiwan’s negative-or-positive pattern is quite independent from the two great powers.  
Finally, to stay at the international level can only explain China’s behavior toward Taiwan, 
but not Taiwan’s behavior toward China. Although the negative-or-positive pattern and stability 
of China’s behavior to Taiwan are only influenced by international factors, the stability of 
Taiwan’s behavior to China is influenced by both international and domestic factors. Thus, it is 
clear that to stay at the international level does not get the whole picture of cross-strait relations. 
Moreover, Taiwan’s domestic politics is an important factor to influence the behavioral stability 
of Taiwan and China. The approach of Taiwan’s presidential election is a factor that creates 
uncertainty and instability for both sides of Taiwan Strait. In short, to stay at the international 
level may risk for omitting important variables in cross-strait relations. Thus, the structural 
perspective of neo-realism is not salient enough to fully explain the patterns in cross-strait 
                                                 
63 Taiwan’ behavior toward China, China’s behavior toward the United States and the U.S. behavior toward Taiwan 
are more stable in the Cold War period. In other words, the three behaviors are less stable in the post-Cold War 
period. However, the 1996 crisis seems to have a more comprehensive influence on the stability of the U.S.-China-
Taiwan triad. See Chapter 4 for details.  
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relations, and the neo-realist hypotheses and predictions are not fully supported by the statistical 
evidence in this dissertation. 
To sum up, there are two main contributions in this dissertation. First, the stability of state 
behavior is a new aspect worth of further study, because all important factors in this dissertation 
mainly have impacts on the stability of state behavior rather than on negative-or-positive patterns 
of state behavior like war and peace. Second, the development of cross-strait relations and the 
interactions in the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle both revel the insufficiency of the structural 
perspective in neo-realism.  
To conclude for the whole dissertation, the formation of the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle 
is a product of both the Cold War and Chinese Civil War legacies. The framework of the U.S.-
China-Taiwan triangle established in 1979 still holds and is not severely challenged by Taiwan’s 
democratization or the end of the Cold War, because the two factors mainly influence the 
stability rather negative-or-positive patterns of state behaviors in the triad. In other words, 
Taiwan’s deviation from the “one China” position and the changing nature of the U.S.-China 
relationship only create instability or uncertainty for the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle, not 
necessarily conflict. 
However, it is also evident that the U.S. leverage in cross-strait relations is declining based 
on the analyses in the previous chapters. Since 1979, the U.S. direct leverage in cross-strait 
relations is never significant, and after 1990 the U.S. indirect leverage to influence China’s 
negative-or-positive pattern toward Taiwan also loses its significance when cross-strait economic 
interdependence and Taiwan’s election start to influence the stability of cross-strait relations. 
Thus, it can be expected that the decline of the U.S. leverage will be a clear pattern in the 
foreseeable future, but it is still too early to claim that cross-strait relations are pure bilateral 
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affairs between Taiwan and China because the U.S.-related behaviors still play a role in the 
stability of cross-strait relations in general. However, the U.S. influence on the stability of cross-
strait relations is also in a declining process, because China is no longer sensitive to any U.S.-
China-Taiwan triangular interaction since Ma is in power. What the development of the declining 
U.S. influence in cross-strait relations after the Ma period is an interesting topic for further 
investigation. 
Finally, Taiwan in fact plays a special role in the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangle. Taiwan’s 
negative-or-positive pattern toward China is independent from any factor suggested by the 
existing theories and Taiwan can also trigger China’s tit-for-tat response while Taiwan does not 
respond to China’s behavior. Both suggest that Taiwan has the ability to play a more active role 
in cross-strait relations. On the other hand, Taiwan’s electoral cycle also works as an instable 
factor that creates uncertainty for both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan’s ability to influence 
and disturb cross-strait relation mainly comes from its incentive to deviate from the current 
P.R.C.-favored “One China” position. Furthermore, after democratization, Taiwan’s electoral 
cycle has become a periodic opportunity to examine Taiwan’s willingness to stay on the “one 
China” position formed in 1979. In sum, it is safe to assume that Taiwan is an independent and 
important actor in the triad and not a pure recipient of the result of the U.S.-China struggle. More 
importantly, Taiwan’ domestic politics including its electoral competition and leadership change 
is an important factor to disturb the stability of cross-strait relations.  
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APPENDICES  
Appendix A The Goldstein Scale and the CAMEO Event Scheme 
CAMEO EVENT 
CODE 
EVENT DESCRIPTION GOLDSTEIN SCALE 
01  MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENT 0 
010 Make statement, not specified below 0 
011 Decline comment -0.1 
012 Make pessimistic comment -0.4 
013 
014 
Make optimistic comment 
Consider policy option 
0.4 
015 Acknowledge or claim responsibility 0 
16 Deny responsibility 0 
17 Engage in symbolic act -2 
18 Make empathetic comment 0 
19 Express accord 3.4 
02 APPEAL 3.4 
020 Appeal, not specified below 3 
21 
Appeal for material cooperation, not 
specified below 
3 
211 Appeal for economic cooperation 3.4 
212 Appeal for military cooperation 3.4 
213 Appeal for judicial cooperation 3.4 
214 Appeal for intelligence 3.4 
22 
Appeal for diplomatic cooperation, such as 
policy support 
3.4 
23 Appeal for aid, not specified below 3.2 
231 Appeal for economic aid 3.4 
232 Appeal for military aid 3.4 
233 Appeal for humanitarian aid 3.4 
234 
Appeal for military protection or 
peacekeeping 
3.4 
24 
Appeal for political reform, not specified 
below 
3.4 
241 Appeal for change in leadership -0.3 
242 Appeal for policy change -0.3 
243 Appeal for rights -0.3 
244 Appeal for change in institutions, regime -0.3 
25 Appeal to yield -0.3 
251 
Appeal for easing of administrative 
sanctions 
-0.3 
252 Appeal for easing of popular dissent -0.3 
253 Appeal for release of persons or property -0.3 
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254 
Appeal for easing of economic sanctions, 
boycott, or embargo 
-0.3 
255 
Appeal for target to allow international 
involvement (non-mediation) 
-0.3 
256 
Appeal for de-escalation of military 
engagement 
-0.3 
26 Appeal to others to meet or negotiate -0.3 
27 Appeal to others to settle dispute 4 
28 
Appeal to others to engage in or accept 
mediation 
4 
03 EXPRESS INTENT TO COOPERATE 4 
30 
Express intent to cooperate, not specified 
below 
4 
31 
Express intent to engage in material 
cooperation,  not specified below 
4 
311 Express intent to cooperate economically 5.2 
312 Express intent to cooperate militarily 5.2 
313 
Express intent to cooperate on judicial 
matters 
5.2 
314 Express intent to cooperate on intelligence 5.2 
32 
Express intent to provide diplomatic 
cooperation such as policy support 
5.2 
33 
Express intent to provide matyerial aid, 
not specified below 
4.5 
331 Express intent to provide economic aid 5.2 
332 Express intent to provide military aid 5.2 
333 Express intent to provide humanitarian aid 5.2 
334 
Express intent to provide military 
protection or peacekeeping 
5.2 
34 
Express intent to institute political reform, 
not specified below 
6 
341 Express intent to change leadership 7 
342 Express intent to change policy 7 
343 Express intent to provide rights 7 
344 
Express intent to change institutions, 
regime 
7 
35 
Express intent to yield, not specified 
below 
7 
351 
Express intent to ease administrative 
sanctions 
7 
352 Express intent to ease popular dissent 7 
353 
Express intent to release persons or 
property 
7 
354 
Express intent to ease economic sanctions, 
boycott, or embargo 
7 
355 Express intent allow international 7 
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involvement (not mediation) 
356 
Express intent to de-escalate military 
engagement  
7 
36 Express intent to meet or negotiate 7 
37 Express intent to settle dispute 4 
38 Express intent to accept mediation 5 
39 Express intent to mediate 7 
3 EXPRESS INTENT TO COOPERATE 5 
30 
Express intent to cooperate, not specified 
below 
1 
31 
Express intent to engage in material 
cooperation,  not specified below 
1 
311 Express intent to cooperate economically 1 
312 Express intent to cooperate militarily 1.9 
313 
Express intent to cooperate on judicial 
matters 
2.8 
314 Express intent to cooperate on intelligence 2.5 
32 
Express intent to provide diplomatic 
cooperation such as policy support 
5 
33 
Express intent to provide matyerial aid, 
not specified below 
7 
331 Express intent to provide economic aid 3.5 
332 Express intent to provide military aid 3.5 
333 Express intent to provide humanitarian aid 3.4 
334 
Express intent to provide military 
protection or peacekeeping 
3.5 
34 
Express intent to institute political reform, 
not specified below 
3.8 
341 Express intent to change leadership 6 
342 Express intent to change policy 7 
343 Express intent to provide rights 7 
344 
Express intent to change institutions, 
regime 
8 
35 
Express intent to yield, not specified 
below 
6 
351 
Express intent to ease administrative 
sanctions 
6 
352 Express intent to ease popular dissent 6.4 
353 
Express intent to release persons or 
property 
7.4 
354 
Express intent to ease economic sanctions, 
boycott, or embargo 
7.4 
355 
Express intent allow international 
involvement (not mediation) 
7 
356 
Express intent to de-escalate military 
engagement  
7 
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36 Express intent to meet or negotiate 7 
37 Express intent to settle dispute 7.4 
38 Express intent to accept mediation 8.3 
04 CONSULT 7.4 
40 Consult, not specified below 8.5 
41 Discuss by telephone 7 
42 Make a visit 5 
43 Host a visit 5 
44 Meet at a “third” location 5 
45 Mediate 5 
46 Engage in negotiation 5 
05 
ENGAGE IN DIPLOMATIC 
COOPERATION 
5 
50 
Engage in diplomatic cooperation, not 
specified below 
5 
51 Praise or endorse 5 
52 Defend verbally 5 
53 Rally support on behalf of 5 
54 Grant diplomatic recognition 5 
55 Apologize 5 
56 Forgive 5 
57 Sign formal agreement 7 
06 
ENGAGE IN MATERIAL 
COOPERATION 
7 
60 
Engage in material cooperation, not 
specified below 
7 
61 Cooperate economically 7 
62 Cooperate militarily 9 
63 Engage in judicial cooperation 9 
64 Share intelligence or information 9 
07 PROVIDE AID 9 
70 Provide aid, not specified below 9 
71 Provide economic aid 9 
72 Provide military aid 9 
73 Provide humanitarian aid 9 
74 
Provide military protection or 
peacekeeping 
10 
75 Grant asylum -2 
08 YIELD -2 
80 Yield, not specified below  -2 
81 
Ease administrative sanctions, not 
specified below 
-2 
811 Ease restrictions on political freedoms -2 
812 Ease ban on political parties or politicians -2 
813 Ease curfew -5 
814 Ease state of emergency or martial law -5 
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82 Ease political dissent  -5 
83 
Accede to requests or demands for 
political reform not specified below 
-5 
831 
Accede to demands for change in 
leadership 
-5 
832 Accede to demands for change in policy -5 
833 Accede to demands for rights -5 
834 
Accede to demands for change in 
institutions, regime 
-5 
84 Return, release, not specified below -5 
841 Return, release person(s) -5 
842 Return, release property -5 
85 
Ease economic sanctions, boycott, 
embargo 
-5 
86 
Allow international involvement not 
specified below 
-5 
861 Receive deployment of peacekeepers -5 
862 Receive inspectors -5 
863 Allow delivery of humanitarian aid -5 
87 De-escalate military engagement -5 
871 Declare truce, ceasefire -5 
872 Ease military blockade -5 
873 Demobilize armed forces -5 
874 Retreat or surrender militarily -5 
09 INVESTIGATE -5 
90 Investigate, not specified below -5 
91 Investigate crime, corruption -5 
92 Investigate human rights abuses -5 
93 Investigate military action -5 
94 Investigate war crimes -5 
10 DEMAND -5 
100 Demand, not specified below -2 
101 Demand information, investigation -2 
1011 Demand economic cooperation -2 
1012 Demand military cooperation -2 
1013 Demand judicial cooperation -2 
1014 Demand intelligence cooperation -2 
102 Demand policy support -2 
103 Demand aid, protection, or peacekeeping -2 
1031 Demand economic aid -2 
1032 Demand military aid -2 
1033 Demand humanitarian aid -2 
1034 
Demand military protection or 
peacekeeping 
-2 
104 
Demand political reform, not specified 
below 
-2 
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1041 Demand change in leadership -4 
1042 Demand policy change -4 
1043 Demand rights -4 
1044 Demand change in institutions, regime -4 
105 Demand mediation -4 
1051 Demand easing of administrative sanctions -4 
1052 Demand easing of political dissent -4 
1053 Demand release of persons or property -4 
1054 
Demand easing of economic sanctions, 
boycott, or embargo 
-4 
1055 
Demand that target allows international 
involvement (non-mediation) 
-4 
1056 
Demand de-escalation of military 
engagement 
-4 
106 Demand withdrawal -4 
107 Demand ceasefire -4 
108 Demand meeting, negotiation -4 
11 DISAPPROVE -4 
110 Disapprove, not specified below -4 
111 Criticize or denounce  -4 
112 Accuse, not specified below -4 
1121 Accuse of crime, corruption -4 
1122 Accuse of human rights abuses -4 
1123 Accuse of aggression -4 
1124 Accuse of war crimes -4 
1125 Accuse of espionage, treason -5 
113 Rally opposition against -5 
114 Complain officially  -5 
115 Bring lawsuit against  -5 
116 Find guilty or liable (legally) -5 
12 REJECT -6 
120 Reject, not specified below -4.4 
121 Reject material cooperation -5.8 
1211 Reject economic cooperation -5.8 
1212 Reject military cooperation -5.8 
122 
Reject request or demand for material aid, 
not specified below 
-5.8 
1221 Reject request for economic aid -5.8 
1222 Reject request for military aid -5.8 
1223 Reject request for humanitarian aid -5.8 
1224 
Reject request for military protection or 
peacekeeping 
-5.8 
1245 
Refuse to allow international involvement 
(non mediation) 
-5.8 
1246 Refuse to de-escalate military engagement -5.8 
125 Reject proposal to meet, discuss, or -5.8 
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negotiate 
126 Reject mediation -5.8 
127 Reject plan, agreement to settle dispute -7 
128 Defy norms, law -7 
129 Veto -7 
13 THREATEN -7 
130 Threaten, not specified below -7 
131 Threaten non-force, not specified below -7 
1311 Threaten to reduce or stop aid -7 
1312 Threaten to boycott, embargo, or sanction -7 
1313 Threaten to reduce or break relations -7 
132 
Threaten with administrative sanctions, 
not specified below 
-6.5 
1321 
Threaten to impose restrictions on political 
freedoms  
-6.5 
1322 
Threaten to ban political parties or 
politicians 
-6.5 
1323 Threaten to impose curfew -6.5 
1324 
Threaten to impose state of emergency or 
martial law 
-6.5 
133 Threaten political dissent, protest -6.5 
134 Threaten to halt negotiations -6.5 
135 Threaten to halt mediation -6.5 
136 
Threaten to halt international involvement 
(non-mediation) 
-6.5 
137 Threaten with violent repression -6.5 
138 
Threaten to use military force, not 
specified below 
-6.5 
1381 Threaten blockade -6.5 
1382 Threaten occupation  -6.5 
1383 Threaten unconventional violence  -6.5 
1384 Threaten conventional attack   -6.5 
1385 Threaten attack with WMD -6.5 
139 Give ultimatum -6.5 
14 PROTEST -7.5 
140 
Engage in political dissent, not specified 
below 
-7.5 
141 Demonstrate or rally -7.5 
1411 Demonstrate for leadership change -7.5 
1412 Demonstrate for policy change -7.5 
1413 Demonstrate for rights -7.5 
1414 
Demonstrate for change in institutions, 
regime 
-7.5 
142 Conduct hunger strike, not specified below -7.5 
1421 
Conduct hunger strike for leadership 
change 
-7.5 
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1422 Conduct hunger strike for policy change -7.5 
1423 Conduct hunger strike for rights -7.2 
1424 
Conduct hunger strike for change in 
institutions, regime  
-7.2 
143 
Conduct strike or boycott, not specified 
below 
-7.2 
1431 
Conduct strike or boycott for leadership 
change   
-7.2 
1432 
Conduct strike or boycott for policy 
change 
-7.2 
1433 Conduct strike or boycott for rights -7.2 
1434 
Conduct strike or boycott for change in 
institutions, regime 
-4 
144 Obstruct passage, block -4 
1441 
Obstruct passage to demand leadership 
change  
-4 
1442 Obstruct passage to demand policy change -5.6 
1443 Obstruct passage to demand rights -5.6 
1444 
Obstruct passage to demand change in 
institutions, regime 
-5.6 
145 Protest violently, riot -5.6 
1451 
Engage in violent protest for leadership 
change   
-8 
1452 Engage in violent protest for policy change -7 
1453 Engage in violent protest for rights -6.5 
1454 
Engage in violent protest for  change in 
institutions, regime 
-7 
15 EXHIBIT FORCE POSTURE -7 
150 
Demonstrate military or police power, not 
specified below 
-7 
151 Increase police alert status -7 
152 Increase military alert status -7 
153 Mobilize or increase police power -7 
154 Mobilize or increase armed forces  -9.2 
16 REDUCE RELATIONS -9.2 
160 Reduce relations, not specified below -9.2 
161 Reduce or break diplomatic relations -5 
162 Reduce or stop aid, not specified below -5 
1621 Reduce or stop economic assistance -5 
1622 Reduce or stop military assistance -5 
1623 Reduce or stop humanitarian assistance -5 
163 Impose embargo, boycott, or sanctions -5 
164 Halt negotiations -5 
165 Halt mediation -9 
166 Expel or withdraw, not specified below -9 
1661 Expel or withdraw peacekeepers -9 
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1662 Expel or withdraw inspectors, observers -9 
1663 Expel or withdraw aid agencies -9.5 
17 COERCE -9 
170 Coerce, not specified below  -9 
171 
Seize or damage property, not specified 
below 
-10 
1711 Confiscate property -10 
1712 Destroy property -10 
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Impose administrative sanctions, not 
specified below 
-10 
1721 Impose restrictions on political freedoms   -10 
1722 Ban political parties or politicians -8 
1723 Impose curfew -8 
1724 Impose state of emergency or martial law -10 
173 Arrest, detain, or charge with legal action  -10 
174 Expel or deport individuals -10 
175 Use tactics of violent repression   -9.5 
18 ASSAULT -9.5 
180 
Use unconventional violence, not specified 
below 
-10 
181 Abduct, hijack, or take hostage  -10 
182 Physically assault, not specified below -10 
1821 Sexually assault -9.5 
1822 Torture -10 
1823 Kill by physical assault -10 
183 
Conduct suicide, car, or other non-military 
bombing, not spec below 
-9.5 
1831 Carry out suicide bombing -10 
1832 Carry out car bombing -10 
1833 Carry out roadside bombing  -10 
184 Use as human shield  -10 
185 Attempt to assassinate -10 
186 Assassinate  0 
19 FIGHT 0 
190 
Use conventional military force, not 
specified below 
-0.1 
191 Impose blockade, restrict movement  -0.4 
192 Occupy territory 0.4 
193 Fight with small arms and light weapons 0 
194 Fight with artillery and tanks 0 
195 Employ aerial weapons -2 
196 Violate ceasefire  0 
20 
USE UNCONVENTIONAL MASS 
VIOLENCE 
3.4 
200 
Use unconventional mass violence, not 
specified below 
3.4 
172 
201 Engage in mass expulsion 3 
202 Engage in mass killings 3 
203 Engage in ethnic cleansing 3.4 
204 
Use weapons of mass destruction, not 
specified below 
3.4 
2041 
Use chemical, biological, or 
radiologicalweapons 
3.4 
2042 Detonate nuclear weapons 3.4 
Source: Gerner et al. (2002). 
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Appendix B Tests on the Time Series Variables in Chapter 5 
Results of ADF Test for All Time Series Variables (1990-2012) 
Variable ADF ADF with trend ADF  
(first difference) 
ADF with trend 
(first difference) 
TC -1.760540 (5) -2.427688 (5) -12.86618 (4)** -12.84303 (4)** 
CT -1.988068 (5) -2.789971 (5) -11.37649 (4)** -11.35489 (4)** 
CU -0.380454 (11) -3.734307 (3)* -7.731664 (10)** -7.49717 (12)** 
UC 0.036988 (15) -3.653114 (3)* -7.04909 (14)** -7.12278 (14)** 
TU -2.423167 (4) -3.725991 (4)* -8.260103 (9)** -8.247364 (9)** 
UT -1.406231 (10) -2.583783 (10) -8.384191 (9)** -8.371194 (9)** 
Ttrade 0.483155 (3) -1.765883 (3) -12.06402 (2)** -12.12504 (2)** 
Ctrade -1.319744 (13) -0.903673 (13) -3.95733 (15)** -4.118231(15)** 
Dependency 0.202639 (13) -1.925889 (13) -3.33594 (12)* -3.450042 (12)* 
Note: 1. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 2. The optimal lag length is in the parentheses and is selected based on 
the Akaike information criteria (AIC). 3. The null hypothesis is that the variable is not stationary. 4. The test is 
performed by Eviews (ver. 7.2). 
 
Results of the Ljung–Box Test for All Time series Variables (1990-2012) 
Variable Lags(3) Lags(6) Lags(12) Lags(18) 
DTC 36.31** 49.631** 57.949** 65.49** 
DCT 41.525** 43.327** 53.42** 59.035** 
DCU 34.113** 35.404** 44.409** 46.146** 
DUC 50.725** 52.831** 65.049** 75.886** 
DTU 27.511** 33.718** 43.034** 55.013** 
DUT 39.627** 40.788** 54.759** 62.692** 
Dttrade 32.155** 37.445** 46.124** 52.724** 
Dctrade 98.551** 108.88** 169.07** 245.11** 
DTCDepedecy 36.818** 42.389** 62.851** 68.635** 
Note: 1. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 2. The null hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation at the certain 
lag. 3. This table reports the Q statistics at a certain lag. 4. The test is performed by STATA (ver. 12). 
 
Results of LM test for All Time series Variables (1990-2012) 
Variable Lags(3) Lags(6) Lags(12) Lags(18) 
DTC 54.935** 67.721** 69.884** 70.513** 
DCT 24.218** 24.367** 25.801** 25.984** 
DCU 12.434** 30.952** 40.893** 53.430** 
DUC 20.581** 35.992** 54.043** 59.119** 
DTU 51.261** 70.329** 73.385** 77.030** 
DUT 27.471** 29.813** 31.685** 38.315** 
Dttrade 33.887** 38.649** 59.601** 69.129** 
Dctrade 3.962 7.266 35.203** 36.721** 
DTCDepedecy 24.294** 25.880** 28.514** 29.040* 
Note: 1. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 2. This table reports Engle’s LM test statistic. 3. The null hypothesis is 
that the variable has no ARCH effect. 4. The test is performed by STATA (ver. 12). 
 
